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The Dublin Review

OCTOBER, 1927

No. 363

ART. I.—THE CLAIMS OF COMMONSENSE

(A Paper read before the Aristotelian Society)

THE word "commonsense" is, I fear, a *bête noire* of philosophers, partly because it is used and quoted to defy their theories, and partly because it is very difficult to find any clear or precise meaning in its usage. I do not propose here to rely on its original meaning, or trace its history, nor even to attempt an exact definition of it. This, however, it is necessary to state to avoid misunderstandings—that I do not mean by it what may be called horse-sense, nor is it to be confined to sense knowledge, still less to public opinion. The word is chosen as convenient to express and cover certain activities of mind and their content, which can, I think, legitimately be put under one category. By sense is understood what comes by way of experience. Experience, however, is also a vague word, and so I mean by it and sense what can be classed under perception, direct knowledge and judgement; all, in fact that is opposed to speculation or reflective thought. I should add that in the use of these terms so far no particular theory is insinuated; they are words of everyday use, and are intended to be taken according to that use.

The adjective "common" limits the kind of "knowledge" contained under "sense," and again it is useful as excluding the ephemeral, the conventional, the technical, and the trivial. There is a common stock of knowledge which all men and women use in the ordinary concerns of life gained from the primitive and inevitable experiences which every human being must undergo. This common experience is found in language, and used in literature

and conversation, and presupposed and added to in the conduct of art and commerce. Were there no such commonwealth of meanings, language could never have become the easy means of communication that it is, and we should be perpetually in a worse plight than the builders of the Tower of Babel. When we are puzzled, as today, by certain modern writers of a new prose or Futuristic art, the cause is a conflict of a new set of meanings, created by a theory, with the old and established, and the latter will win the day unless the new can rid itself of the esoteric and show itself a legitimate development of what is sound in tradition.

Commonsense, therefore, as used in this article refers to that body of knowledge which is more or less permanent, gained by man in contact with life through experience. If I call it universal I do not mean to imply that I am resting its validity on universal assent. *Securus judicat orbis terrarum* may be a fair ground of argument, but here it is not to the purpose save in so far as a general agreement about the validity of an experience might imply that the experience in each particular case must have carried with it strong evidence for its truth. The claim then for commonsense is really a claim for truth in much that is direct, as opposed to reflective or philosophic knowledge.

Now the question so raised between the claims of commonsense and philosophy is an important one, for if we decide for commonsense then a question mark must be put after much that goes at present as sound in philosophy. Professor Whitehead has summoned the scientists to answer for the cleavage they have made without misgiving between the world we live in and the world of their abstractions; and his demand that part of a true education "should be intuition without an analytical divorce from the total environment," with the addition "that there is no substitute for the direct perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality," has its bearing on commonsense as I have described it, and its relation to reflective thinking. For may it not be that philosophy has suffered from a similar fault to that of science, in

ignoring what is given by direct "knowledge"? Instead of recognizing truth in what is given before reflection, it has by a very human weakness usurped all authority and made itself into a *roi fainéant*. How else can we account for the gulf that separates us as human beings and as philosophers, the gulf again between the conceptions that men live by, which are to be found in literature, education, practical ethics and politics, and the theories in the volumes of philosophy, and, lastly, the mistrust of the philosopher which is so widespread and perennial?

Philosophers, I know, will have their answers ready, each varying according to his theory, but to judge from the past and the present as well, they will either do scant homage to metaphysics, or they will exalt metaphysics on the plea that experience or the wisdom of commonsense is a very inferior kind of knowledge to be corrected or sublimated. It might be objected that neither is very satisfactory; if metaphysics is taboo, then a critical examination of the nature of knowledge should not be permitted. Those, for instance, who reduce direct acquaintance with objects to a bare awareness (where the word "bare" implies that the special relation set up by knowing can be ignored) have no right to write a philosophy, because the activity of mind involved in so doing is very different from that bare awareness. Nevertheless, they generally proceed to do so. On the other hand, if what I have called metaphysic is the province *par excellence* of truth, it is hard to see what an inferior kind of truth can mean. No doubt, the phrase helps to save its makers from the awkward predicament of denying the possibility of attaining truth below the metaphysical, or again, of admitting it unreservedly. Both positions are doomed. If there is no truth before reflection comes in, before a Critical Philosophy has had its say, then on what grounds can reflection or criticism claim to possess truth? As has been remarked, it is the same mind which works on weekdays as on Sundays, and if the value of the work of the six days cannot be guaranteed as sound, how can the Sabbath reflection be in better plight? If now we restore the guarantee of truth to the mind in its daily occupations,

the reflection on the Sabbath becomes superfluous, and the day truly one of rest. There is an obvious reason, therefore, for searching for some intermediary between the two mental activities, and though I do not assert that this is the sole explanation, the distinction between degrees of truth is very convenient. Moreover, it meets a curious inclination to prefer reflection to direct apprehension, the complicated to the simple, the demonstrated to the obvious and self-evident. But the inclination, while intelligible, because it safeguards us against hastiness in judgement, has no justification when we judge truly. Once we know a statement to be true, there is an end, and reflection cannot add anything to its truth.

The function, therefore, of a Critique must be sought elsewhere, and I think that many might explain the relation of what I have called commonsense, or experience, in the wide sense I have explained, to philosophy proper, by admitting that there may be truth in the first, but certainly not always, and that it is part of the function of reflection to separate the gold from the dross and so form a system of truth. I should have no quarrel with this explanation were its defenders without any concealed or unconscious prejudice against commonsense. In fact, however, behind this vague agreement I fancy that there lurks considerable diversity, or at least a difference of emphasis. Many views are influenced by theories which, though dead, yet exert an influence, bequeathing assumptions, ways of thinking and modes of expression. For instance, even though the word "phenomenal," as used by Kant, belongs to a theory which is perhaps discarded, the taint of the word subsists, and, consequently, we may pass lightly over experience as not putting us into touch with the thing itself. Similarly with sense-data, or the association of the word "commonsense" itself with Reid's interpretation of it; an interpretation which, in many places of his writing, connected it with instinct instead of reason.

And yet if we forgot theories and arguments for a moment, we should uphold the claims of commonsense, for whether we be writing letters, or talking, or thinking, we are using words with a meaning, and we should blush

to be told we did not know what we meant. Certainly our everyday life is made up of opinions, beliefs, prejudices, and certainty may be rare, but imbedded in the beliefs are meanings about which we have no doubt. Now meanings attach to objects, and so it would appear that we do have knowledge of objects. So deep is this conviction that the unsophisticated would, if asked, be sure to say that they had a certain knowledge of reality, that language with its distinctions of noun and adjective, its verbs active and passive, and other parts of speech, express the nature of the world we live in. And this conviction finds its place in the tradition of philosophy which descends from Aristotle. In this tradition, the function of mind is to apprehend reality as such; knowledge is of the real, of being or what is. Thought in distinction from sensation is at home with natures or essences—*perambulat essentias*, and hence, in its ordinary transactions, the intellect is telling us something about what a thing really is. Now this may sound very obvious, but the consequences are so serious, and so often ignored, that it requires restatement. If the intellect is the faculty of truth, and if truth is the apprehension or statement of what a thing or being is, then, as our intellect is never idle, we are constantly in the realm of truth, and the problem of commonsense is not whether it is ever right, but when and where it is wrong. Truth is the normal, and not the accidental, and so the whole emphasis in dealing with the question of commonsense is changed.

We should expect then to find far more in the declarations of commonsense than may have been hitherto suspected; for instance, that in understanding what we mean we have already arrived at the goal of truth, or at any rate established what cannot possibly afterwards be pulled down. And here speech and grammar should prove very illuminating. To take some examples: The distinctions between various attitudes of mind, ranging from surmise through probability to strict knowledge, imply that we know what knowledge is, and that the approximations to it presuppose it, and are also fully intelligible in themselves. We cannot know without being aware of it, and,

if this is so, a reflection on knowledge does not carry us any further in the one essential of its nature or validity, whatever else it may do. Being relieved, therefore, of a philosophy of knowledge in this regard, if we have to call to our aid a Critique of Reason or an Epistemology, we shall have to do so on some other grounds, and, furthermore, since knowledge is its own judge and appraiser, we may find it in operation in many of the dicta of commonsense. Now in many of the meanings we use in everyday speech, we should, I think, be prepared to swear we knew what we meant until we became confused by the philosophers with their affirmations and denials and their theories. No one, for example, hesitates over the meaning of truth till he becomes a philosopher, and the question becomes a difficult one because this theory or that has been invented to explain it, and usually fails to do so; because the explanation generally, if not inevitably, consists in the reassertion of a simple notion, *sui generis*, in terms of something else. Here the reflective mind is the villain of the piece, and I think that no one can deny that the history of philosophy is strewn with theories which, by treating a conception or object as what it is not, have made it more difficult for succeeding generations to use any word without ambiguity. (For this reason I might add incidentally that the putting of the question, What do you mean by truth? may be either pertinent or foolish, according as the person asked seems to be assuming a special theory of truth or not.) When we examine commonsense, we find, time and time again, that words have lost their simple and original meaning because theories have twisted them out of recognition, and the old sufficiently defined landmarks become as confused as the battlefields of Flanders. All words that end in "ism" are rightly suspect, and the most common words have to be watched sedulously, because their obvious meaning has been subverted. As the late Professor Cook Wilson wrote: "The fact is that a philosophical distinction is, *prima facie*, more likely to be wrong than what is called a popular one, because it is based on a philosophical theory which may be wrong in its ultimate principles. This is so far from

being appreciated that the reverse opinion is held, and there is a tendency to regard the linguistic distinction as less trustworthy because it is popular, and not due to reflective thought. The truth is the other way. Reflective thought tends to be too abstract, while the experience which has developed the popular distinctions recorded in language is always in contact with the particular facts. Now, it is not uncommon that some usual term, when reflected upon, presents great difficulties to the philosopher, difficulties, it may be said, which are due to some false theory of his which is presupposed. The criticism sometimes ends in pronouncing that reality only means what is intended by some other term, so that in a manner it is explained away; and thus a distinctive use of it is supposed to be a mistake, or even the meaning of the term may be pronounced as altogether an illusion." The same writer gives, in another place, an excellent example of the working of the mind when free from philosophic prejudice, and the intrusion into its language of a technical word, in an analysis of "idea." He argues with considerable force that normal thinking does not lead us into puzzles about intermediaries in knowledge between the object and the mind; there is no confusion between the content of our knowledge and phantasm or images; there is no sharp distinction between appearance and reality. But the word "idea" comes like a wolf into the fold, being historically connected with a theory which commonsense knows nothing about—and so the evil starts.

The same pernicious interference, it may be urged, can be seen in many other examples, and the result would be to give us greater confidence in our unsophisticated conceptions. Here, however, to prevent exaggeration, a distinction is required. I have said that the average man is under the impression that he knows what he is talking about, that his language is of reality, and that its distinctions are founded on that reality. In certain cases he would have no hesitation in saying that he understood fully, in others that he understood correctly and summarily but not adequately. This distinction is important because it gives full play to the claims of commonsense and yet

leaves room for a philosophy. Knowledge itself is the best example of the first category. A man in knowing must understand completely what he is doing; otherwise never will he gain a foothold. Besides, all the other attitudes of mind have significance only if knowledge is already understood; and this implies that the word "thinking" is fully evident. The same, I suggest, may be said of equality and inequality, of relation, existence, presence, and so forth. I hesitate to give other examples for fear of being provocative, and so preventing a possible agreement in principle by conflict about detail. For the purpose in view, conceptions which might belong to the first category can be assigned to the second. The conceptions which belonged to the latter were described as understood correctly and summarily but not adequately. This description will appear less vague if we recall what was said of the mind—that it was the activity whose sphere was reality as it is. In the first contact with reality by experience, whether in perception, observation or judgment, we apprehend being, substantive, adjectival or relational, and I would suggest that this direct apprehension is of more importance than is usually recognized—for, so to speak, it secures a grip on the real. It is of its very nature more likely to be correct, though inadequate, than incorrect; that is, as I have said, success is the normal, and failure the abnormal, which needs explanation. Our first apprehensions are of a general character, they catch hold of an object wholly before proceeding to consider aspects of it; that is, as I have said, they know it as a form of being. Unfortunately, the subsequent proceedings of the scientists, who quite justifiably abstract from the object in the plenitude of its being to examine it, for example, in so far as it is measurable—tend to make the philosopher forget the Humpty Dumpty on the wall in his interest in the pieces. And so he attempts a restoration out of a selected piece; and if over-confident, calls his new monstrosity the *real* Humpty Dumpty, or, in despair, declares that there never was such a being. Here the philosopher has surrendered completely to the scientist, and has forgotten that he is far more akin to the common-

sense man in that both deal with reality integrally—the one with its most striking characteristic, the other with the complete characterization and essence.

Perhaps the worst example ready to hand of this failure to appreciate the “given” and the consequent sham reconstruction out of the pieces of abstraction is Behaviourism. As a working hypothesis it may be legitimate to treat the whole, which is conscious life, under the aspect of behaviour. For this purpose there will be no need for “reference to such terms as sensation, perception, attention, will, image, and the like.” But when this scientific procedure is exalted into a philosophy and thinking is defined as “subvocal talking” and nothing else, and all the activities of consciousness are resolved into the reaction of the body to stimuli, then the vice which I have denounced is apparent, and the indelible meaning of consciousness and its activities given in commonsense and reflective thinking has been simply disregarded. The extreme position of Behaviourism is instructive, because it provides such an obvious example of the bad habits of philosophers which might not be so apparent in other theories. But I suggest that the same error is present in a more disguised form in many of the theories prevalent at the present day. Instead of psychologists admitting the data of developed consciousness as present from the beginning in embryo, the *totum sed non totaliter*, we find them tracing their genesis out of something quite indeterminate—or, at any rate, radically different from the resultant known. Time and space are evolved out of what was not originally given; and the object or thing with its appearances is reconstructed out of the pieces of sense-data. This reconstruction breaks down continually, but philosophers will not learn the lesson clear to commonsense from the start—that the real world is not a combination of sense-data, but a collection or constitution of subjects with attributes.

This neglect of the subject has been rectified to some extent with regard to the self or soul because of the scandal increasingly felt in leaving it out. Yet the history of its restoration provides an excellent confirmation of the thesis

in this paper. We see first a neglect of the information contributed by commonsense, and in the interest of a theory the self is reduced to a succession of impressions bound together somehow by association. This view, prevalent for some time, so failed to answer what was meant by self and to meet the facts, that a stream of consciousness was introduced as an amendment. But the stream was again found insufficient because the self was left out and the unity persisting despite periods of unconsciousness had not been explained. Hence a more modern tendency to revive "animism" and reinsert an entelechy, though the movement has not yet turned full circle. Scarcely less illuminating are the vicissitudes in the explanation of memory. One might have supposed that the meaning of memory would be clear, and the unsophisticated would be surprised to be told that he did not understand what he was continually exercising and speaking about; but he would be still more surprised to find explanations which, if true, would entail that the past is revived as present, seeing that the essential characteristic of memory is a thinking of an event as past.

What comes out in these examples is that commonsense is justified in clinging to its conceptions. The philosophic theory has in each case neglected its findings and suffered a reverse. These conceptions are, as I have suggested, of the real; they tell us what a being is correctly if inadequately. Further illustrations would, I think, confirm this result, and I may suggest a few without entering into a detailed examination of them. The habit, for instance, of translating the objects of perception, such as colour, into vibrations, and leaving out colour, or, what is perhaps even worse, talking about the brain being coloured, contravenes the meaning both of perception and colour, for try as one will one can never see vibrations, and there is something which is seen. Let, again, a theory dispose of causation, discard consciousness and a subject as not required, and after reducing reality to a changeless world where we are left with just a probability that events of a certain kind may follow events of another kind, substitute mnemonic causation, perspective and belief-feeling; on the principles

suggested in this article the criticism would be the same; reality has already been rightly apprehended and the theory is an evisceration. Causality has a meaning which cannot be reduced to something else, and probability involves knowledge, while the attempt to reconstruct reality without a consciousness or a subject lands one in the Humpty Dumpty predicament.

Extending still further this kind of knowledge, which is correct if inadequate, may we not apply it even to such distinctions as matter and mind, inanimate and animate, and with more assurance to the provinces of ethics and æsthetics. These latter serve perhaps best of all to bring out the nature of our conceptions, the conceptions of commonsense, as I have called them. All of us act as if we had a fair if inadequate idea of what is good and what is evil. We might be mistaken in certain particular cases, but even then we should correct our mistake in the light of what we knew, so that somehow the meaning of good appears already in our possession. Similarly with the virtues and the vices. Plato, as we know, opens his *Republic* dramatically with the figure of the old man Cephalus, who, though incapable of a philosophic justification of his actions, practises justice; and the suggestion given is that a theory of justice must be in accord with the "commonsense" of the old man. As a matter of fact, in the *Republic*, as in all sound treatises on the virtues, the theory is not only in accord with this commonsense, but is tested by it. Our theory of justice or bravery or love is confirmed or upset by its ability to meet what we are certain is justice or bravery or love in individual cases; so that in a sense we must be already aware of what these virtues are. Now, if this be so, we have an excellent example of the truth of the assertion that normally we know reality at once; roughly, perhaps, as a rude sketch, but so accurately that the details or the articulation must be in accord with the first vision.

A further confirmation of this would come from an analysis of the actual process whereby we pass from uncertainty to certainty. It is a curious fact that this process usually takes the form of asking ourselves what exactly

we mean or must mean when we are thinking. We think we have arrived at the truth, and then find that it is not exactly what we had in mind; we proceed, as I have said, by measuring the theory against what we, somehow, know already but cannot express adequately. As a contemporary philosopher has put it: "In growth of thought man broods and picks out what he seeks; the consciousness of the general nature of what he seeks somehow controls the movement of thought wherein detail suggests itself." And again: "In the growth of mind we cannot refuse to admit that what comes to be is what was imperfectly before. And as 'the passionate thought' directs the mind in study or the vague though passionate thought of the complete work of art directs it in designing, so it seems as if the mind helped to direct the process by which it is developed."

We can now sum up all that has been said so far. Commonsense in the sense used in this article of that wealth of information belonging to man as man deserves far greater respect than it usually receives at the hands of philosophers. Being the outcome of experience and tradition, it is often a safeguard against the reconstruction of the universe in a philosophic theory. But further, it has at times just as much claim to truth as any statement of metaphysic, because the word "sense" here does not exclude the activity of the mind, and, in fact, the mind is intimately involved, being engaged on its proper work of seeking and finding the nature of what is. As, however, it is unreflective, we can distinguish three classes of objects with which it is concerned. The first are those which yield their meaning completely; and here we have knowledge strictly so called. In the second class the general nature of objects with their differences from others is seized, but there is given only a sketch or summary, the details of which have to be filled in later. And into the third class falls the vast number of objects whose nature is at first more or less indeterminate, so that men have to wait on time, experiment and reflection before they can come to any certain conclusion.

It remains now to consider what change this view of commonsense demands in the outlook of philosophers.

First, as suggested in the beginning, in certain camps a change of front is required, and, in general, a high regard for the convictions of commonsense must be preserved. This regard will show itself in a deeper appreciation of language and the distinctions in it. These distinctions, arising through the pressure of reality in experience, save the philosopher from his besetting sin of reducing the irreducible in his desire to systematize and form a unified conception of reality.

Secondly, since it is normal for commonsense to be right, it were better when it is wrong to examine the reasons of the error than to treat its data in a cavalier fashion with occasional returns to courtesy. A great benefit would be conferred on the philosophic community if definite canons could be drawn up directing us to the chief sources of error, such as the contamination of judgement by prejudice, the tendency to treat the negative as something positive, and the immaterial as possessed of sensible properties. This latter is, perhaps, the most prolific of error, as we cannot help imaging and imagining the immaterial, in sensible form, and anthropomorphism is for ever getting in the way of a proper conception of the ideal and the divine. It must be confessed, however, that one almost equally fruitful source is the *damnosa hereditas* of bad philosophy. The evil that it does lives after, passing into common language and common thought, and so confusing simple conceptions that even the wise begin to wonder whether they know what, for example, duty or knowledge or reality means.

Thirdly, a vindication of commonsense does not lessen the value of philosophy. In this article I have reserved the name philosophy for the more reflective operations of the mind, for the theories which are built upon the data of the less reflective consciousness, and for the explanation of them *per ultimas causas*. It might be urged against this distinction that throughout this article I have been playing the philosopher, inasmuch as the justification made out rested on reflection. To save ambiguity, perhaps the word analysis might be used in contradistinction to synthesis. Of course, an analysis has to be made both of

what we mean and of the truth contained in what we mean, but this, if part of a philosophy, is separate from the other member, which would involve the construction of a system.

But the more serious objection is that the glory of philosophy, namely, system-making, is taken away from it, and in its place we are to have nothing but a checking and docketing of the data of commonsense; and even this occupation has been converted into a mere formality by the cry beforehand that all is well. To this the answer is that philosophy suffers not a whit, that there is nothing obscurantist in the plea for a fair trial for the convictions and judgements which we hold so firmly when we forget our philosophy, and that there is no pre-judging of the case before it comes into court. It would be quite a mistake to think that a favourable attitude to the suit of commonsense means less and not more thought. The analysis of what we mean persistently practised is a heavy if salutary labour of thought, and the close attention to the infinite shades of meaning in the world of our consciousness, as well as in the infinitely rich variety of the external world, spells gain to us and not loss. There is, too, no formula or prescription which will save us the labour of continually examining the content of our thought. This labour may not be congenial to the lover of synthesis ever bent on discovering or inventing a new philosophy. There will always be, I suppose, some discord between two types of philosophers, between those who are content to dig and examine foundations and those who build castles—often in the air. The analyst is sceptical of these synthetic philosophies; while his opponent is impatient of this stay-at-home policy, being eager himself to reach an eldorado. There is no reason in the nature of things why both should not work together, and the difference is one of taste and not of reason, and taste should not enter in when it is a question of truth. Truth should be the sole dictator, and it is wrong to sneer at commonsense because its light is very dry and its findings apparently trivial. As a matter of fact, the truth in commonsense is by no means trivial or sober, for as Plato and

Augustine saw, the truth is always there present to us, ancient and ever fresh, and it is "our estranged faces that miss the many-splendoured thing." After all, there is nothing undignified in vindicating one's hearth and home-territory instead of wandering to join far-off causes; nor, again, in maintaining a common humanity and common fund of truth with the men and women who appear in the literatures of Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages.

To prevent misunderstanding, it may be well to add another paragraph in conclusion. Fight as they may with one another there is no serious reason why the defender of commonsense, the analyst and the synthetic philosopher, should not work together amicably—in fact, it is necessary that they should do so if a theory is to deserve the name philosophic. There is, I believe, room for a critique of knowledge, even though the meaning and validity of knowledge be understood fully in the very act of knowing. But, apart from this vexed question, there is certainly room for a metaphysic, no matter what value we assign to the judgements of commonsense, and even to a philosophy which approximates to the mystic in its delicacy of apprehension and anticipation of the possibilities of intuition. If the number of fixed stars in the firmament of commonsense be greater than was supposed, that only means that the system co-ordinating them will be closer to truth and more vast in its embrace. The philosopher is still at liberty to search for the inter-relation of the data, their causes and grounds, seeking to penetrate to the ultimate causes and see all dialectically or synoptically. How one should set about this unity, on what principles and with what results, it is outside the scope of this article to inquire. But, clearly, the closer the inter-relation of the data, the less artificial it is, the more it allows for the rich variety of reality, the nearer will it be to full comprehension. Perhaps the ideal is impossible of complete attainment because the universe transcends man's limited capacities; and, just as a critic of a supreme artist grasps but partially the significance of his work, and returns again and again to find new detail and new meanings, so, too, the theories of philosophy are incapable of rivalling the divine plan.

This does not mean that they must necessarily be false, but it does suggest that the limitation must enter in in our account of the whole of reality. Herein, as it seems to me, lies the strength of the Aristotelian tradition. In that philosophy there is an explanation of why the human mind is pursued by failure, and yet rightly confident in its ability to know to some extent truly what the nature of reality is; why, again, the concrete individual escapes the mesh of abstractions and yet can be appreciated to a degree by means of those abstractions, with the result that the philosophy is both faithful to commonsense, and yet, if anything, ultra-metaphysical. The whole philosophy is governed by certain principles which are not taken from any section of reality, but are components of anything which deserves the name real at all. They therefore leave each intrinsic nature intact, and allow for it, and yet provide a means of unifying our conceptions of these natures in one system. In the place, then, of a unity which, by identifying the whole with one member in it, must necessarily impoverish the real, we have a hierarchy of being where the principles of order, being as wide as reality itself, leave the intrinsic denominations of that reality unaffected. Moreover, in that hierarchy, the human being finds his proper place, not at the top, nor at the bottom; neither pure spirit nor pure matter, but a half-way house between the two; a mind which can grow only by its contact with matter, and a matter which is a fit instrument for the mind.

I chose this example of a metaphysic, not for the purpose of defending it in this article, but in order to give an illustration of how commonsense and a metaphysic may go hand in hand, and how a system may fail to exhaust reality and yet remain true, giving us a synthetic vision, and at the same time a philosophy of failure. This value, I claim, attaches to the system, even if the system itself fails to recommend itself to modern minds. But whatever system be adopted, it must certainly be fully alive to the differences which make up the complex world we know, and avoid those generalizations which conceal more than they reveal, keeping, so to say, in the sun and away

from the night, in which all cows are black. When philosophers, for instance, explain laughter to us by telling us that we laugh at the incongruous, they forget that they have told us little or nothing, for we do not laugh at all that is incongruous, but only at comic incongruities. When duty is called a moral necessity or a law, the chief characteristic of duty is in danger of being left out, for it is like no other form of law, and only necessary inasmuch as it is a peculiar form of obligation. When Croce attributes freedom to every motion from that of a stone or a flower to the choices of man, the word freedom is made to cover what are radically incompatible, so that it becomes for the most part a mere metaphor; and his definition of volition, as at once necessary and free—necessary as arising from an historical situation, and free as going beyond it—is so vague as to apply to every event in nature, while it tells us nothing of the difference between the falling of a stone and the choice of a man. This subsuming of one department of reality under another is but a verbal operation; the old distinctions stick out all the while, and no one is any the wiser for it. Nature and life have taught us lessons that we cannot ignore, and the more we contemplate nature and others and ourselves without prejudice, the less shall we be prone to bring out any foot-rule of theory. Are not, for example, many of the problems connected with the self, or God, due to the prejudices and preconceptions with which we approach them! The self, if it be anything, will clearly have marked characteristics of its own separating it from all else, and it may be just its nature to be permanent and identical in and through development; a conception which, if unique, is nevertheless not self-contradictory. The same cannot be said of Gentile's conception of God as pure act and also in an eternal process of self-realization, eternal and also successive. Where a subject is not already a pure act, we can see, I think, meaning in a combination of change and permanence, but when all imperfection and potency are removed, how can there co-exist plenitude and growth? The thing seems, once again, to fail because it is maintained in the interests of a preconceived theory. Indeed,

when treating of God, philosophers are especially apt to forget what divinity implies. The conception is there rooted in tradition and language, and I suggest that if we would but admit with commonsense that we have some dim awareness of what divinity must and must not mean, many of the prevalent theories of God's nature would have to be rewritten.

These examples, then, out of many other possible ones, help to show that commonsense is not a foe of philosophy, but an ally; they show, too, that one of its chief services is to point the way to a true metaphysic and to warn philosophy of its principal vice. The vice is written in almost every page of its history, of neglecting the multiplicity often given and of attempting to rule by a veritable massacre of innocents. By these means we win a unity at too dear a price. *Solitudinem faciunt et pacem appellant.*

M. C. D'ARCY.

ART. 2.—THE GREEK WITNESS TO THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO

ERWIN ROHDE: *Psyche*.

JAMES ADAM: *The Religious Teachers of Greece. The Republic of Plato*.

JANE HARRISON: *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*.

CHRISTIAN philosophy, as is well known, has always maintained that the immortality of the soul is a truth attainable by human reason without the aid of revelation. To hold that a truth is attainable by reason is not, of course, in any way equivalent to an assertion that men of every degree of intelligence and civilization will in fact attain to it; we know that even among the Jews, till comparatively late in their history, a future life was looked upon as a vague, thin existence; among pagan nations and those nominally Christian many pass through life without seriously reckoning upon a personal immortality, while some profess that the immortality of the soul is contrary to reason, or at least incapable of proof. At the same time, it is probably true to say that now and at all times a deep and reasoned conviction of the mortality of the soul is a very rare thing indeed. Among savage peoples, traces of a belief in a life after death are found in observances of magic or ancestor-worship; among civilized nations, in a sense of responsibility, in a hope of reunion, in an expectation of rewards and punishments, and, finally, in a system of logical reasoning.

If this is so, we should naturally expect to find the clearest evidence of such a sentiment in that people which, above all others ancient and modern, excelled in the operations of the speculative intellect, and, in fact, the emphatic assertion in some Greek writings of the immortality of the soul has always been one of the greatest recommendations of Greek literature to the Christian mind. For believer and unbeliever alike this Greek attitude is always worthy of attention. Not only were the Greeks,

as a nation, rationalists *par excellence*—that is to say, the universe for them was a stage for thought rather than for action—but they alone of the civilizations of which we have any adequate knowledge were absolutely uninfluenced by any permanent legacy of thought or belief. The Western consciousness, so to say, was a *tabula rasa* before it received the Hellenic impress. Before the Christian era began it had received from Greece a legacy which has been felt and acknowledged by almost every subsequent thinker, and which fathers and doctors of the Church have not hesitated to acclaim as sent by God to prepare the world for the revelation of His Son.

In the pages which follow an attempt will be made to give the impression received from reading Greek literature and the comments of distinguished scholars who have recently given their attention to the problems of Greek religion. The evidence for immortality may conveniently be divided into that given by religious teaching, by professed philosophers, and by the common impressions whether of men of genius or of the ordinary Athenian. For a variety of reasons we will confine the survey to thought and literature between the epoch of the Persian wars and the death of Alexander the Great.

The Western mind has been spoken of as a *tabula rasa* before Greek thought left its impress upon it. This is approximately true if taken to mean that very little writing has ever been found upon it that was not Greek in origin. When Rome, in her turn, became reflective, Greece was from the first her spiritual director, and all Western nations of advanced civilization have learnt from Christianity in their cradles and from Greece in their schools. But the articulate classical age of Greece necessarily inherited certain traditions and beliefs from the past, and a great deal of modern research has been devoted to discovering what these traditions were from an examination of the scattered evidence which still survives, but which had for so long been ignored. Here it is proposed to do no more than mention these traditions, and to dwell somewhat more fully on their influence on men living in the full light of Greek civilization.

The official Olympic theology appears, almost fully developed, in the Homeric poems, and remained largely the same throughout all attacks and revivals until it disappeared before Christianity. It need not delay us, for as such it contained no theory of a life after death, no system of rewards and punishments. The gods live upon Olympus and are immortal; men live upon the earth and are mortal. Yet even in the oldest surviving piece of Greek literature, the *Iliad* of Homer, we find a theory of some sort of life after death, independent of Olympus, which is on the whole simple and well defined. In the Homeric world, as Rohde has well pointed out, in spite of the inevitable death that lays men at their length, the good things of life fall surely to the strong and to the swift, and it is for this successful aristocracy of those who have what they desire that Homer sings. He is, therefore, very rarely melancholy, though the present life is all that interests him. The present life, indeed, is the only full-blooded existence, and it is emphatically worth living. After death the body lies on the pyre, while the psyche, an image or reflection of the man, flies away to Hades, the dim underworld, lamenting its fate. Thus when Patroclus is slain

“his soul, fleeing from his limbs, went down to the house of Hades, wailing its own doom, leaving manhood and youth”;^{*}

and the poet often refers to the “strengthless heads” of the dead who still live on in Hades. For our purposes, the important point to notice is that even in these earliest times the soul is looked upon as existing in some shape, however shadowy, apart from the body.

Insensibly, Hades was given a population and topography—Styx, the river of separation; Charon, the grim ferryman; Cerberus, the hound who welcomed those who entered and attacked those who would escape—and since the original conception of the psyche was of an image or reflection connected with the body, the belief grew up that until the destruction of that body by fire or wild beasts, or at least the symbolical destruction by burial rites, the soul

^{*} *Iliad*, xvi 856, trans. Lang, Leaf, and Myers.

was detained on the hither side of the gates of Hades. Later mere burial, or even the symbolical scattering of a handful of dust, was sufficient, but the hold which this belief had got upon the common sentiment of the Greeks can be measured by the wrath displayed against the generals who did not bury the corpses after the battle of Arginusæ, and by the interest in the ethical problem put by such a play as the *Antigone*.^{*} The whole doctrine of death and burial is given very clearly in a few lines of the *Iliad*. The psyche of the dead Patroclus stands by the sleeping Achilles, and begs him:

“Bury me with all speed, that I may pass the gates of Hades. Far off the spirits banish me, the phantoms of men outworn, nor suffer me to mingle with them beyond the River . . . never more again shall I come back from Hades, when ye have given me my due of fire.”[†]

Achilles tries to embrace him, fails, and starts up, crying:

“Ay me, there remaineth then even in the house of Hades a spirit and phantom of the dead, albeit the life be not anywise therein.”[‡]

Elsewhere we catch a further glimpse of the shadow life of Hades, when Odysseus goes to consult the dead. There, in the land of the Cimmerians, shrouded in mist and cloud, the dead cluster round him, chirping like bats, and cannot speak till they have drunk the blood of a sacrifice. Elsewhere, too, we meet with a further development. Some few escape the doom of death, and go to the Elysian fields beyond the sunset, where falls not hail nor rain nor any snow. This heaven, however, is for the great, not for the good, for demigods and heroes alone, and although Elysium was adopted by poets and the popular imagination into the topography of Hades, it remained, even to the end, the privilege of the fortunate, not the reward of the virtuous. Indeed, it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that rarely, even in Roman times, did any orthodox conception of

^{*} The plot of Sophocles' *Antigone* turns upon the denial of burial, and the duty of a relative to supply the rites at whatever cost.

[†] *Iliad*, xxiii 71, trans. Lang, etc.

[‡] *Ibid.*, 103.

Hades and Elysium carry any religious associations or sanctions for the multitude. It remained for them either a theory, or a superstition, or a fairy-tale. It could be mercilessly burlesqued by the comic poets without either offending the piety or wounding the sensibilities of the Athenian audience. Even to those who accepted it as a probable description of what existed it was as a fact rather than an aspiration, and they would have echoed the unforgettable words of Achilles to Odysseus:

“Nay, speak not comfortably to me of death, O great Odysseus. Rather would I live bound to the soil as the hireling of another, with the landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that be departed.”*

This Homeric conception of the life after death, though by far the most common in ancient literature and the most familiar to us, did not stand alone. Another and very different view had probably preceded it, certainly lived side by side with it, and exerted, as we shall see, a very great influence on a few gifted minds. This was the belief, common enough in Egypt and elsewhere, that the dead man lived on in the grave. Although traces are found of such a belief in Homer, most of the evidence for its widespread existence comes from the discoveries of modern archæologists, and from scattered references in the ancient historians and orators. The dead man lived on in or near his body; hence the loved or powerful dead were not burned, but buried with care. They could help the living, and therefore were placated by funeral gifts and recurring offerings. As their life in the grave was even more shadowy than that in Hades, and had even less dependence upon a well-spent life, it was ignored except in the case of chieftains and, occasionally, heads of families, and tended to survive only as a cult of heroes. Yet in several plays, and especially the *Choephoroi* of Æschylus, the action centres round the tomb of an ancestor, and declarations of a belief in continued existence in the grave abound.

* *Od.*, xi 488, trans. Butcher and Lang.

Such, then, were the traditions which a young Greek of the age of Æschylus would have found about him—a considerable body of opinion that there was a shadow-life after death, either in the grave or in Hades; no rational theory in favour of either extinction or immortality; no native religious sanctions derived from the prospect of a future life.

We have now to consider how this vague general opinion was modified in the minds of individuals during the great age of Greece. There were considerable developments in religion and philosophy, and consequently in the opinions of the ordinary well-educated citizen of Athens and other Greek cities. In religion, the most important development was brought about by the arrival, in the sixth century B.C., of Orphism in the Greek world. Orphism was probably of Thracian origin, and is often regarded as a foreign, and, as it were, an alien, un-Greek, religion. Foreign it was in origin, and alien to much that has been thought typical of the Greek mind. The joy in the actual and the visible, the vision of an ideal present in the real, the unclouded serenity of outlook which the critics of a century or more ago—a Lessing, a Goethe, and a Shelley—saw in the Greek genius—all these are the reverse of Orphic teaching. Yet Orphism captured the Greek imagination wherever the Greek race was found; it received valuable developments at Greek hands and profoundly influenced some of the greatest Greek poets and thinkers.

The Orphic view of life was the exact reverse of that which is often spoken of as typically Greek. The soul, originally divine, is in the body as in a prison, a place of darkness and corruption. As the common Orphic phrase had it, the body was a tomb.* Only those who had been initiated into the mysteries of the cult could hope to escape after death into their pre-natal freedom. When the soul left the body, it journeyed along a well-defined road in the underworld, set about with landmarks which it was essential to recognize; it met with certain judges or guardians, and all depended on its ability to answer them

* σῶμα σῆμα, a phrase often quoted by Plato.

right. For greater safety, tablets were buried with the initiated, bearing this answer in various forms:

"Say: 'I am a child of earth and starry heaven; but my race is of heaven alone. This ye [the Guardians] know yourselves. And lo, I am parched with thirst and perish. Give me quickly the cold water flowing forth from the lake of memory.'"

As Orphism developed, and came into contact with philosophers such as Pythagoras, the ethical and ascetical side assumed more prominence. Man on earth was dead; he had lived once, and might hope to live again if he purified his soul from all earthly taint. The common values and judgements were entirely wrong. True life lay beyond the veil, not this side of it. The Orphist asserted what Euripides only dared to put into the form of a question, when he asked, in words which ever since they were first spoken have been the most familiar in Greek tragedy:

"Who knows if death be not life, and life death?"†

It may, of course, be said that the Orphic doctrine rested neither on reason nor on historical revelation, and has therefore no absolute value. This is true, but the significance of Orphism does not lie in its intrinsic value, but in its influence upon a highly rational people, who found that it answered a demand of their inmost nature for immortality, purity, and retribution. This last conception was certainly the most impressive part of Orphic teaching. A judgement after death, a place of happiness and a place of torture, formed an essential part of the full Orphic creed. Odysseus, here at least speaking a mystery, had seen

"Minos . . . wielding a golden sceptre, giving sentence from his throne to the dead while they sat and stood round the prince, asking his dooms through the wide-gated house of Hades."‡

* Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 574.

† *Eur.*, fragment 638.

‡ *Od.*, xi 568, trans. Butcher and Lang. Critics are almost unanimous in assigning a very late date to this book; Orphic influence is clear.

And he had also seen Tantalus, Tityos, and Sisyphus in grievous torment. Pindar, as we shall see, took much from Orphism, as did also Euripides, while Plato always makes use of Orphic phraseology and often of distinct doctrines whenever he grapples with the problem of the soul's destiny after death.

Orphism was content to assert; it did not offer to prove the soul's immortality, and its followers, though numerous, were never a majority, or even a powerful minority, in Greece. Their teaching was essentially a salutary formula for the initiate, rather than a discovery to benefit the world. Least of all, perhaps, were they to be found among the growing band of those who, at Athens and elsewhere, were endeavouring to submit all to the reason in the hope of finding the ultimate cause of all within the universe, or who, disappointed by subtle or negative results of so much philosophy, were resolved to turn the practical intellect to the service of a successful life. It was left for Plato, whether inspired by or merely speaking in the person of his master Socrates, to attempt to put what had hitherto been a dogma of enthusiasts upon a purely rational basis.

The question of Plato's dependence upon Socrates is answered so differently by those best qualified to judge that scarcely any view can be said to meet with general approval. It is, however, generally admitted that in the *Apology* we approach nearest to the historical Socrates. In that speech, delivered to his judges when on the point of leaving the law-courts under sentence of death, Socrates uses words of a certain ambiguity when he speaks of his hope for the future :

“ Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two things—either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. . . . But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? . . . Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. . . . For besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true. . . . Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and

know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. . . . The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better, God only knows.”*

Yet, even here, though the words are ambiguous, it is hope rather than doubt that shines through them. When we hear Socrates speaking again, some weeks after, on the day of his death, he has no doubts. He is passing to a place far better than any he has known upon earth, and, as a last gift to his friends, he is giving them a series of proofs of the soul's immortality, though his own conviction is so deep that he can afford to smile at his own ill-success in proving it to the satisfaction of others. How far his words at his trial were deliberately restrained and economical, whether his convictions had grown during his long expectation of death, whether, finally, almost everything in the *Phædo* is Plato's invention—these are questions to which no sure answer can be given. All we can assert is that his reported words have now a serene assurance.

“I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of such matters), and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve . . . for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.

“Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And . . . the true lover of wisdom . . . will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend . . . for he will have a firm conviction that there, and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity.”†

Plato's teaching is so important that it is worth while to consider his position in some detail. First, then, it is fully evident to every reader that for Plato the conviction

* Plato, *Ap.*, 40-42, trans. Jowett.

† Plato, *Phædo*, 63, 68, trans. Jowett.

that the soul is immortal was as certain, and as practically influential, as his conviction that justice is better than injustice, and truth better than falsehood. The whole drift of such dialogues as the *Phædo*, the *Phædrus*, and the last book of the *Republic*, would be ample evidence of this, but far more significant is the total absence of careless or pessimistic judgements of life, and an ever-present assumption of immortality in the most casual references.* Indeed, Plato goes further than this in anticipating Christian sentiment. Not only is all connected with the development and education of an immortal spirit supremely important, but life itself is nothing more than a *meditatio mortis*, an attempt to loosen as far as may be the chains that bind the spirit to the flesh.

“The true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and the release of the soul from the body their especial study? . . . The true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying.”†

It is not so easy to seize with precision the details of Plato's belief, or the grounds of his conviction. Like Shakespeare—and perhaps alone among writers Plato might challenge Shakespeare in this—he is myriad-minded; he is at once a philosopher, an artist, and a reformer; a mystic and an ascetic; logical and dogmatic to a degree, yet sympathetic towards a hundred different shades of thought. It is impossible, for example, to be certain whether his belief in a pre-natal existence is an essential part of his belief in immortality. More than once he uses a supposed recollection from a previous existence as a proof of immortality, but it may be doubted whether his words in these places have the deep ethical tone that they have elsewhere when he is asserting the soul's life after death. Similarly, scholars are not agreed how far he regarded some kind of transmigration, and a cycle of existence, as an essential part of the soul's destiny.

* J. Adam does well to draw attention to this in notes to his edition of the *Republic*.

† Plato, *Phædo*, 67, trans. Jowett.

Perhaps it is nearest the truth to treat all this as opinion, and to restrict Plato's certainty to immortality and retribution.

He sets out to prove the soul's existence after death more than once, and uses a variety of arguments. Four stand out among the rest, and have passed with some modification into various philosophical systems.* The soul is simple and indivisible, therefore indestructible. The objects of a soul's cognition are invisible, immaterial, and immortal; therefore itself has all these attributes. Life is an essential attribute of the soul; therefore the soul cannot die. Every mortal thing has its proper enemy or evil, which, if present in sufficient force, destroys it. Thus illness destroys the body, and rust iron. Injustice or sin is by common consent the proper evil of the soul, but so far from this causing the death of the soul, we see that the wicked are often the most full of vitality.

Whatever be the worth of these and other proofs,† either as they stand in Plato's writings, or as they have been translated into terms of subsequent thought, it is abundantly clear that Plato's conviction rested on a wider and more ultimate foundation than these. If all his formal proofs had been discredited, Plato would still have held his ground. No reader of the *Phædo* can fail to realize that the arguments are begotten of the conviction, not the conviction of the arguments. When he witnesses the unflinching courage and joyful expectation with which Socrates waits for the sun to sink behind the mountains and bring the hour at which he must drink the hemlock, he will hardly escape a feeling that such a spectacle is a more cogent argument for immortality than any of the elaborate proofs canvassed in the dialogue itself. Plato would scarcely have found such a feeling reprehensible; it is in large part the impression he intended to give. Socrates is arguing for the benefit of his hearers. He who has ears, let him hear. For himself, he is convinced already. It is, perhaps, not fanciful to imagine that the intrepid death of Socrates had seemed to the young Plato

* They occur in the *Phædo* and elsewhere.

† Notably the assumed "divinity" of the soul.

one of the strongest evidences of the soul's continued life. Certainly Socrates' assertion, that there could come no evil to a just man whether alive or dead, must have given a new value to justice and a new meaning to any theory of retribution.

For it is, perhaps, not too much to say that, above all else, Plato's conviction that justice or virtue was man's perfection and end led him to an equally strong conviction of immortality. The thought that without a future life virtue would lack any ultimate sanction seems to lie behind all his strenuous pleading. No less than three times at the most impressive moment of his greatest dialogues,* when he has exhausted every resource of his matchless logic and eloquence in stating that man's supreme task is the pursuit of justice, does he end by a quasi-religious myth which describes the judgement, reward, and punishment awaiting immortal souls. These myths are not formal philosophy—that is, they are no accurate account of what is; many of the details are, in fact, borrowed from Orphic or Pythagorean teaching; but they show most clearly Plato's conviction, overpassing all speculation, and even all mysticism, that there remained a judgement for all human action.

“‘In the case of the just man,’ says Socrates at the end of the *Republic*,† ‘we must assume that, whether poverty be his lot, or sickness, or any other reputed evil, all will work for his final advantage, either in this life, or in the next. For, unquestionably, the gods can never neglect a man who determines to strive earnestly to become just, and by the practice of virtue to grow as much like God as man is permitted to do. . . . [And the gifts from the gods in this world] are nothing, in number or magnitude, compared with the lot that awaits the just and the unjust after death. . . . Let us, then, ever hold fast the upward road, and devotedly cultivate justice combined with wisdom; in order that we may be loved by one another and by the gods, not only during our stay on earth, but also when, like conquerors in the games . . . we may receive the prizes of virtue.’”

* The *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*.

† Plato, *Rep.*, 613, 614, 621, trans. Davies and Vaughan.

Indeed, Plato, whom all who are qualified to judge have ever agreed to be among the two or three most powerful and luminous intelligences of the world's history, is without doubt the clearest witness, outside the people of God, to the immortality of the soul. The truth came home to his consciousness from every angle. The noblest man he knew had held, or at least hoped in, it; it was the greatest spur to nobility in others; it was a necessary postulate if anything in life was to have a value; it responded to a feeling more intimate than any conviction born of logic. On the other hand, he sincerely held it to be demonstrable by more than one logical argument, and it was the crown and the necessity of his whole edifice of metaphysics. We cannot wonder that a teacher inspired by such an idea should have seemed to a pagan filled with a divine spirit, and to a father of the Church one led by God to prepare His ways among the Gentiles,* and to many readers of all centuries the most sublime and persuasive of all teachers outside the canon of Scripture.

Aristotle, the pupil, the successor, and in so many ways the antagonist of Plato, has curiously little interest in any future life. Plato, in his mature thought, had come to regard the phenomenal world as little more than a pale reflection of reality, though he never came to despise action done within the limits of time and space, as did the latest of his followers. Aristotle, always more of a biologist than a metaphysician, and in so many ways the prophet of inspired commonsense, concentrated his attention almost entirely upon examining what lay before his eyes. In one of his earliest works he gives what is practically Plato's doctrine on immortality,† but in his later writings the future life sinks into the background. In the *Ethics* the contemplative life of the perfectly happy man, though it is in a sense divine, is not a prologue to something higher, but is itself all-sufficient. Death seems to have presented no problems to Aristotle, and he can allude to it in passing as the *ultima linea rerum* without comment. We should not ask

* Quintilian, *Inst. Or X*; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* i 5.

† The *Eudemus*.

whether the body and soul are one, just as we do not ask if wax and the impression on it are one; in fact, their theory is best who say that neither soul nor body can exist apart.*

We have now to consider what has been called the lay testimony to immortality. The task is not easy. In the literature of the modern world, and, indeed, in all literature since Christianity became a world religion, the majority of men and of writers are either avowed Christians or avowed unbelievers. With Chaucer and Milton and Addison, with Gibbon and Voltaire, with Newman and Morley, we know exactly where we stand. Whatever their belief, it is at least well-defined. Yet even in modern literature those who have searched most deeply would probably be the first to admit the impossibility of grasping with any certainty the deepest thoughts of Shakespeare. Does he ever put his own thoughts into the mouth of his creations? And if so, when is it? Is it when Prospero's revels are ended, or when Macbeth hears of his wife's death? When Claudius is endeavouring to repent, or when Claudio is pleading to his sister? Or is it not rather when Hamlet is resolved to speak to the Ghost, and Othello shrinks from his meeting with Desdemona at the bar of Heaven? If the difficulty can be so great in the case of a writer who lived in an age of intense religious dogmatism, what must it be when we are speaking of those who were groping their way in the mist and darkness of conjecture?

There are, however, some considerations which may assist us in reviewing the poets. First, the extremely negative character of the traditional religion throws into relief all who depart from it and discounts the value of such agreement with it as may be found. Rohde has justly observed that the life which on the whole was worth living to the people of Homer had become more pathetic to the contemporaries of Pericles. Death was now seen from afar as the melancholy and inevitable end of life's brief span of beauty and youth. Nay, death was to be prayed

* Arist., *de An.*, 412, etc. At best he seems to have admitted an impersonal immortality of mind.

for, sought for, and embraced, not indeed as a bride, but as the only tolerable end to life's tasteless jest. Such moods are a commonplace in Greek poetry, and prove little. They can be quoted from almost any poet. "Creatures of a day!" exclaims Pindar, "what is man, what not? Man is the phantom of a shade."* "Alas, ye generations of mortal men," cries Sophocles, "I count ye equal to those who have no life!"† And again, "Not to be born is beyond all reckoning best. And next best, if a man has once lived, is to return again whence he came as swiftly as may be."‡ This would seem to sound the furthest depths of pessimism, but Euripides can on occasion go further, and he is followed by epigrammatists:

"I was not; I came to be; I was, I am not; that is all; and who shall say more, will lie: I shall not be.§

"All is laughter, and all is dust, and all is nothing; for out of unreason is all that is."||

If we rather take what each poet can give of a positive and individual nature, we shall find that Pindar has glimpses of a higher destiny for the many, derived from Orphic or Pythagorean sources. The souls of the just are represented as passing to the isles of the blest:

"But such as have endured for three times [*i.e.*, for three lives] to keep their soul clear altogether from injustice, they travel the road of Zeus by the tower of Cronus where the ocean breezes blow about the islands of the blest. There flame out flowers of gold, with whose garlands they circle their arms and crown their heads.¶

"For them the mighty strength of the sun shines . . . and their abode is in meads deep in crimson roses, shadowed with frankincense and abounding in golden fruits."***

But for wrongdoers there is a day of reckoning:

"But the souls of the godless flit on earth beneath the sky in deadly pains, bound in fetters of crime that cannot be loosed."††

Æschylus, perhaps the most sternly religious of all Greek poets, has strangely little to say of the future life.

* Pind., *Pyth.*, viii 92.

† Soph., *O. T.*, 1186, trans. Jebb.

‡ Soph., *O. C.*, 1224, trans. Jebb.

§ *Greek Anthology*, xii 33, trans. Mackail.

|| *Ibid.*, xii 34, trans. Mackail.

¶ Pind., *Ol.*, ii 68.

** Pind., fragment.

†† Pind., fragment.

He can sometimes allow himself to speak of the nothingness of man and his destiny, and elsewhere he writes of death as a never-ending sleep, and the sole cure of life's incurable woes.* At bottom, however, the old conception, modified and sublimated by genius, of a life in the grave, dominates many of his plays, in particular the *Choephoroi* and the *Persæ*. In the latter the dead king Darius is invoked to restore the fallen fortunes of Persia. The chorus cry to the nether gods,

“Send up from below the spirit to the light of day,”

and the ghost appears.† In the *Choephoroi* the mound of Agamemnon's grave is seen upon the stage, and his spirit dominates the action. Electra and her maidens, sent by Clytemnestra to placate the dead king, instead of this, call upon him to arise in vengeance. Orestes and his sister pray to him in a long lament, urged by the leader of the chorus, who tells Electra, in a passage which has every appearance of presenting Æschylus' deep conviction :

“Child, the fire with its devouring jaws does not overcome the mind of the dead, but he shows his anger thereafter.”‡

Yet Æschylus, in spite of the weight of care laid on his mind by the problems of sin, does not seem to have looked for a readjustment beyond the grave. It is true that he speaks sometimes of a judgement. The chorus of Furies tell Orestes :

“Thou shalt see there [in Hades] all who, like thee, sinned against gods, or strangers, or their dear parents, receiving each a due reward of justice. For Hades is a mighty auditor of human deeds below the earth, and watches over all with a recording mind.”§

But of rewards he is silent. Man, he may have felt, was too weak and blind a creature to dream of rewards. Nor does he suggest the prospect of reunion after death. Unless I am mistaken, reunion is only spoken of in bitter irony, as when the murderess Clytemnestra speaks of the

* Æsch., frag. 255.

† Æsch., *Cho.*, 323.

‡ Æsch., *Pers.*, 630.

§ Æsch., *Eum.*, 269.

welcome that Agamemnon will receive below from his murdered daughter Iphigenia.*

Sophocles, the second of the great tragedians, meditates on death more than does Æschylus, but it is almost impossible to decide what was his personal belief. The passing of Œdipus at the end of the *Œdipus Coloneus* is not looked upon as a passage to life eternal. It is a unique translation, parallel in some respects to that of Elias or Enoch. Often the Homeric Hades with later developments appears, but the most individual utterances speak of a union or division of heart beyond the grave. These are most common in the *Antigone*. When faced with the alternative of obeying divine or human laws, Antigone chooses the former:

“For longer is the time in which I must please those below than these above; for there I shall lie for ever.”†

And in a dialogue with Creon she tells him of her belief that in the grave earthly enmities may vanish, but piety remain. Clearest of all is the passage where she speaks of her hope that her kin will receive her gladly in the halls of death:

“But I cherish a good hope that when I come there I shall be welcome to my father, and very welcome to thee, my mother, and welcome too to thee, dear brother.”‡

Euripides, “the human,” who questioned all things, was not content to rest upon tradition, nor of a temper of mind to arrive at complete satisfaction. Almost every mood of doubt and hope finds expression in his plays. His most famous utterance has already been quoted; elsewhere he voices the current Greek view in unforgettable words:

“If better life beyond be found,
The darkness veils, clouds wrap it round;
Therefore infatuate-fond to this
We cling—this earth’s poor sunshine-gleam:
Nought know we of the life to come,
There speak no voices from the tomb:
We drift on fable’s shadowy stream.”§

* Æsch., *Ag.*, 1526.

† *Ibid.*, 897.

‡ Soph., *Ant.*, 74.

§ Eur., *Hipp.*, 192, trans. Way.

And again:

"Well know we life. But through lack of knowledge of death all fear to leave this light of the sun."*

Once he goes further still and proclaims the certainty of extinction with a trace of that exaltation which inspired Lucretius:

"Every man when he dies is earth and shadow; a thing of nought ceases to exist at all."†

Sometimes he speaks of death as a dreamless sleep; once he pauses at the thought of the dreams that may disturb it:

"if in the grave aught be:
But ah that nought might be!—for if there too
We mortals who must die shall yet have cares,
I know not whither one shall turn: since death
For sorrows is accounted chiefest balm."‡

Modern as he is in sentiment, Euripides, in at least one play, suggests more vividly than his predecessors the hope of reunion. This is in the romantic tragi-comedy of *Alcestis*. The dying wife will prepare a home for her husband in Hades:

"But now, wife, wait for me till I shall come
Where thou art, and prepare our second home."§

Though here, again, we may wonder if the speaker is Euripides or the sentimental Admetus.

When we leave the poets and dramatists for the ordinary man we are confronted by a serious difficulty. Evidence of any sort is almost completely wanting. We may safely assume that many of the best minds of Greece were moved by the eloquent reasoning of Plato and sympathized with the hopes and questionings of Euripides, just as many must have been sincere and devout Orphists or shuddered at the prospect of a half-life in Hades. Still, there was probably far less concentration of interest on the subject than there is to-day, and even in the modern world every

* Eur., frag. 816.

† Eur., *Heracl.*, 588, trans. Way.

‡ Eur., frag. 532.

§ Eur., *Alc.*, 364, trans. Murray.

serious believer must have been surprised on many occasions in his life to find a profound indifference to the soul's existence after death in those about him. In Greece, at least, the ordinary man doubtless left questionings to philosophers and illuminati, and lived in the sunshine of the present :

“ ‘Do you not perceive,’ says Socrates in the *Republic*, ‘that our soul is immortal?’ ‘No, not I,’ replies his interlocutor, ‘have you *this* to tell us?’ ”*

Aristophanes, the great comic poet, treats the mythology of death, the ritual of the Eleusinian mysteries, and the claims of Orphism, in a spirit that would not be tolerated, where a religious topic was concerned, in the most worldly cities of Europe or America. Thucydides, in the course of his long history, does not once make mention of a future life, though the absence of such mention, notably in the funeral speech of Pericles, creates a chilling, if not painful, impression upon the reader of to-day. A like silence may be noticed in the orators. Yet from casual references in the dialogues of Plato we can see that in some respects there was little difference from modern sentiment. We have seen already that many Greeks were willing to die in the hope of meeting some loved one behind the veil. Equally, as we learn from the *Republic*, did many men think of a day of reckoning as their time of life drew to a close :

“ ‘When a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now . . . he has a clearer view of these things.’ ”†

On the other hand, it is clear that the absence of authoritative religious teaching, and a natural distrust of mere verbal proofs, left room for many doubts :

“ ‘In what concerns the soul,’ says a character in the *Phædo*, ‘men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of her death she may perish and come to an

* Plato, *Rep.*, 608.

† *Ibid.*, 330, trans. Jowett.

end—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air, and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. . . . Surely it requires a good deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.”*

Athenian tombstones, a fair index of the feeling of the masses, only rarely bear upon them a hint of reunion or happiness after death, though we should not forget the many Orphic grave-tablets that have been discovered, especially in Greek colonies in Italy. On the majority of Attic monuments the dead are represented in some action of life, commonplace or glorious as the case might suggest, or as bidding a calm farewell. Only rarely do the mythological figures of Hades intrude here. Certainly, the ordinary Athenian did not regard himself as a child of starry heaven, still less as passing by death into the rest which is prepared for the people of God. And we have to wait till Greek sentiment approaches more nearly to modern, as in some of the later sepulchral epigrams of the Greek Anthology, before we find a friend or wife hoping against hope that this world's love was not meaningless, and that the dead still think a remnant of the thoughts which once they had:

“This stone, noble Sabinus, is the memorial of our friendship—a small stone of a great love. I shall always seek after thee, and do thou, if it be lawful among the dead, drink not of the water of Lethe in my regard.”†

This review, it may seem, ends upon a note of uncertainty, of negation, perhaps of pessimism. Yet it is well to remind ourselves that even to-day, when the doctrine of immortality is held unswervingly by so many Englishmen as a dearer thing than life, the testimony of current literature is singularly discordant. Here, as ever, the rebel is more vocal than the traditionalist, and even in Greece we may imagine that the pessimist or the sophist made his voice heard more than the Orphist or the convinced disciple of Plato. If we look at the positive

* Plato., *Phædo*, 70, trans. Jowett.

† *Greek Anthology*, ed. Mackail, iii 64.

contribution of Greece to the natural theology of immortality, it is certainly important enough. No single Greek writer of the great period ventures to deny a future life as Lucretius denied it, or condemn it, as Horace condemned it, or to treat it, with Cicero, as an academic topic, or, with Virgil, as a literary motif. Current Greek thought and prejudice accepted some sort of life after death, and the greatest mind of Greece took the noblest life of Greek history as a proof of the doctrine to which he devoted his most fervent eloquence. We are apt to think of Plato as a writer only; he was more. He was the founder of an elaborate philosophical system and the most famous and popular teacher of Greece, and his pupils and followers alike must have been penetrated with his conviction of the divine origin and high destiny of the human soul.

Christianity, indeed, is so often accused at the present day of adopting wholesale the philosophy and mysticism of Greece, and the formal scholastic proofs of the soul's immortality bear upon them so clearly the impress of Greek thought, that we must rather be on our guard against exaggerating the influence of Greece. A glance at Roman literature and sentiment should be enough to check such exaggeration. The great questions of human destiny were the same for the Roman as for the Greek, and, like the Greek, he had no help from divine revelation. Yet even with Greek literature and philosophy to aid him the Roman never attained to the clear Greek conception of immortality. Not until the Christian revelation developed Greek guesses and speculations was the belief in a future life regarded as in some sense the birthright of every Western nation, nor is there any reason to suppose that, without the Christian revelation, any nation would have made the Greek heritage their own possession.

Yet that heritage is worth preserving. The extracts given above, if they have done no more, will at least have shown that some of the keenest intelligences among the most intellectual people the world has ever seen found satisfaction for their reason in arguments proving the immortality of the soul. Perhaps even more significant

is the evidence of Greek religious experience that a rationalistic and naturalistic people, so far from finding anything strange in the religious assertion of a judgement to come and of some sort of union with the divine, welcomed them gladly as answering to an imperative need, inexpressible, but deeply felt. The Platonic Socrates, and Plato himself, will not be accused of depressing human reason, and their attacks on current mythology and Olympic theology were many and telling, but when reasoning fails they have recourse to religious traditions which have moulded the lives of many before them.

“Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale,” says Socrates, after relating one of his myths, “and you will condemn it. And there might be reason in your condemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer; but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any other life than this [of virtue] which, it seems, is profitable also in the other world.”*

D. KNOWLES, O.S.B.

* Plato, *Gorg.*, 527.

ART. 3.—THE CRITERION IN ART

EVERY theory of art must yield a criterion by which to judge particular works, and our judgement about any work will be more or less valuable according as the theory of art, which we have consciously or unconsciously formed for ourselves, is true. If you believe, for instance, that the end of art is to give sensual pleasure, you will have one standard; and if you believe, instead, that art is identified in some way with morality, you will have a different standard. Or you may believe that art only imitates nature, and then you judge a picture by its fidelity in representing natural objects. Again, you may hold with Plato that art is only a persuasive medium for conveying nobler and higher truths, and you judge a work partly by the truths conveyed, partly by its success in conveying them.

The obvious way, then, of approaching the problem of art, and trying to form a theory of æsthetics, will be through the criterion which the study of individual works has forced upon us. The other way of approach would be to deduce the theory of art from a philosophy of the universe which we have already adopted. We should then have to trust to the truth of that philosophy to give us a true and workable theory of art. The former method is obviously more rational. For in the last resort any theory of art is judged by the workableness of its criterion, and if it is proved unsatisfactory in that, it goes far to upset the philosophy of which it is a part.

Croce seems to have followed the other method in evolving his theory of art. In those pages we shall consider briefly the criterion which he gives, and offer, at greater length, another in place of it—one which has grown out of the contemplation of great works of art, but which also, as is necessary, implies and finds its place in a definite system of philosophy.

According to Croce man is not a substance, but consists entirely in four activities. One of these is consciousness in its concrete form. This activity, which covers all consciousness except the pure concept, he calls art. So that

art for him embraces not only certain more elaborate representations, but all that ordinary people would call sensation. This extension of the meaning of "art" is only possible because he does not believe in any external world, that man is a substance placed among other substances to develop in their midst and by their aid. The consciousness is created wholly from the inside of the spirit, and hence it is all art. This consciousness is called by him also "expression" and "intuition." These words cover the same field.

The criterion he gives, by which to judge the relative excellence of works of art, remains rather obscure in the *Estetica*, and does not become much clearer in the *Breviario*. In the *Estetica* we learn that art or beauty is defined as successful expression, "*espressione riuscita*," and that in this respect all works are equal. There is here no question of degree or comparison possible. Either a thing is expression or it is not, and if it is really expression, it cannot be more expression. If we are to compare the value of works at all, it must be in virtue of something else, not—incredible as it may sound—in virtue of that which makes them works of art. We can compare them and grade them, it seems, only in the *amount* that is gathered into the expression. They are to be measured not intensively, but extensively.

For the benefit of those who are acquainted with Croce's writings we may justify ourselves by two short quotations from the *Estetica*: one from Chapter X, *il bello non presenta gradi, non essendo concepibile . . . un adeguato piu adeguato*; and the other from Chapter II, where he says that the declaration of love made by an ordinary man may be as intensively perfect as a poem of love, but *estensivamente* it is more restricted, *estensivamente tanto piu restretta della complessa intuizione di un canto amoroso di Giacomo Leopardi*.

I presume we need not go so far as to say that he measures the work of art by its dimensions. For a Meissonnier picture, however small, may contain far more objects than a Veronese mural decoration. But it does look as though we had to say a painting was greater than

another if it contained more figures; and that, of course, is a very false criterion. The figure of a Michelangelo prophet, without setting and without background, is a greater work of art in its stark simplicity than, say, some of the banquet scenes of Hals. The best of Masaccio's frescoes are greater art than his contemporaries, the Van Eycks, achieved in the *Adoration of the Lamb*. This instance may be disputed, but at all events, granted that both works are truly expressions, the *Adoration* is not to be reckoned the greater work because it contains a greater number of figures.

The difficulty of the *Estetica* is to see how there can be such a thing as bad art. For one hectic moment it seems to have vanished from the world—a consummation devoutly to be wished. Yet he speaks quite definitely of bad art and calls it *espressione sbagliata*. Only in the *Breviario* does it become quite clear what this means. It there turns out that the essential thing required for successful expression is unity. A real work of art is always one expression, its parts are fused by a synthetic act into a unity. In false art or unsuccessful expression you have indeed a sort of unity, but it is a fictitious one resulting from juxtaposition. The real living unity of art is not there.

This still leaves, we must suppose, the criterion as given in the *Estetica*. The unity is equally present in all true works of art and they are to be judged by the amount embraced by the unity. Yet at times in the *Breviario* he seems to be reaching towards another criterion. He writes, in the very act of explaining how this unity is all-important, "That which we admire in genuine works of art is the perfect imaginative form given to one state of mind. . . . That which displeases us, in false and imperfect works, is the contrast ununited of many and diverse states of mind." What meaning can be attached to the phrase "state of mind" by a writer who does not believe in substance, it would be hard to say. But surely if these states of mind can be diverse, then that which makes a work of art great and distinguishes it from bad art is no longer the mere presence or absence of unity, but the intrinsic value of the

state of mind. The states of mind—aspirations he also calls them—must surely differ qualitatively, and can vary from what is noble to what is positively ignoble. Moreover, even a certain want of unity might be forgiven if the states of mind were sufficiently noble. In any case, ugliness will no longer be the outcome of mere ununited states of mind. Michelangelo and the late Lord Leighton both achieved the expression of a unity, but the character of mind expressed in their work differs as sublimity differs from vulgarity. We are driven—even Croce should be driven—to quite a new criterion. What pleases or displeases us in art is the very character or temper of the artist's mind.

This is the view that will be upheld in the following pages. The theory of art may be put in its briefest form thus: art is the expression through concrete representation of the character or personality of the artist. The whole strictly æsthetic value of a work of art lies in this one aspect of it. It has many other aspects as well, for it is a complex whole flowing from many sources. In these other aspects it may give us pleasure and be of considerable value; but these are not its æsthetic values. The only æsthetic value is the personality as impressed upon the whole work.

Among the varied activities of man is sensible and imaginative consciousness. In part this consciousness is determined by the eternal world, and in part it is moulded by his personality itself, by the inward character of the man. Whether every act of representation bears upon its surface the stamp of our personality is a question we need not stop to discuss. It will be enough to say that whatever does so bear it, to any appreciable extent, is a work of art. When you have seen the personality behind, or rather in, the work, you are in a position to judge it. Till then you know nothing of it as art.

Thus the material image of a landscape is not the personality, but is modified and moulded by the personality. It is not the personality inasmuch as it comes upon us from outside. It is impressed with the personality when, having been taken into us, it is given out again with the

impress of our individuality. It is not those things which enter into a man that make him an artist, but those things which come out of a man. To take another and more difficult instance, the thoughts of a man are not the real personality or character of a man, but they may bear the stamp of the character. In this case, literature, it is an intricate matter to distinguish the æsthetic values from the other values, but not impossible if we keep clearly in mind that the only æsthetic value is the impress of personality. This surely is what is generally meant by saying that art is self-expression. The sequel will throw further light upon the theory.

The criterion, or standard, by which we are to judge the æsthetic value of any work follows obviously, and has the merit of being definite, permanent, and simple. If the character manifest in the work is noble, the work is great; if the character is ignoble, it is bad. In both cases, of course, it must have an adequate expression, or we shall not see it at all. We must always remember that it takes a considerable craftsman to produce a really bad work of art. Only when you can paint as skilfully as Leighton or Murillo can you produce such bad works of art as they did; for only then can you manifest your character as clearly as they.

In all this we are only giving utterance to the familiar saying that style is the man. Croce discusses this saying, and rejects it as either untrue or else tautological. If it means style is the artistic side of man it might be, as he says it is, tautological. But if it means, as it certainly does, that style or the art of a man is essentially the expression of his personality, it is perhaps the truest thing that has been, or can be, said about art. It is fairly generally accepted by those who are acquainted with art, but I am not aware of any writer on æsthetics who makes it the central doctrine of his teaching—its due position.

The real reason why Croce rejects it is because he does not believe that a man is one substance, a strict unity of being. Man is for him only a bundle of four different activities, one of which is consciousness of phenomena or art; and in that case to say that style or art is the man is

equivalent to saying that one of the four activities is all the others as well; and obviously that would be nonsense. Once suppose, however, that man is a substantial unity having variety of activity, and the aphorism assumes a definite meaning and a very pregnant one.

Another saying, generally acceptable to those who know something of art but not æsthetics, is that art is the emotional expression of reality. We might say more accurately, for the definition does not as it stands embrace music or architecture, that art is the expression of the emotional character through concrete presentation. Once again we have only a way of saying that art is essentially the expression of the artist's personality, that the sensible object he presents you with has been moulded by his individual character and bears its stamp upon it. It will be evident that when the artist speaks of emotion, he is using the word in a very different sense from that in which it is often used. Royal Academies will usually be found fairly full of pictures of damsels in distress, of warriors returning home from war, of the innocence of childhood and the dignity of labour, and numbers of people will be found to speak of such pictures as, "Oh, so full of emotion." Here the word "emotion" means that the pictures represent subjects which are calculated to arouse feelings of sorrow for the distress of others, of kindness, love, contentment, and so forth. Your true artist speaks of this sort of emotional picture as *sentimental*. He despises the picture, the artist who painted it, and those who look at it, not because he despises the feelings of sympathy, love, and kindness—how could he!—but because he is seeking something very different in a work of art. He habitually avoids painting such subjects because they confuse the issues—*i.e.*, they tend to concentrate the attention on what he calls sentiment, and make people forget the real end of art, which is to express emotion in quite a different sense. If you ask him to define this emotion he is speaking of, he may answer unblushingly that he cannot. It is his work to approve it when it appears, not to define it. Some attempt at a definition we have already made. It is the character of the artist which is given concrete

expression in the representation. We may speak of it as a single thing, or we may divide it up for convenience and speak of the emotions, just as we may speak of a man having character and personality, or go further and specify aspects and qualities of his character. In this way an artist may speak of a work as having restraint, vitality, dignity, strength, simplicity, sincerity, and so forth. These are emotional elements in his sense of the word. They are the stamp communicated to the work by the fact that it is a representation springing from him as a man, a being, individual and personal. This emotional character of a work has nothing to do with emotion in the other sense of the word. In the artist's sense it refers to what springs from the one who produces the representation; in the other sense it refers to something which comes from the outside, which is borrowed, so to say, by the work from the facts it presents.

This does not imply any distinction between the matter and form in the completed work of art. The formal element is the emotion in the artist's sense of the word; the material element is the mere extent of consciousness; but these two are not distinct in the work, they do not exist side by side. The representation is determined through and through by the personality of the artist, and the personality is incommunicable, unknown and unknowable except in so far as it moulds the representation. If the matter and form are distinguished at all, it is only because the work of art is the joint production of two causes, and the distinction is referred to the causes, not to the thing produced.

The relation between the two is very like that which Kant conceived to exist between the category and the sense intuition. Though each, from a philosophic point of view, had to be studied apart, yet the one was blind without the other, and the other was empty without the one. The category could only function through intuition. So here the emotion can only function through the representation. A representation without emotion would not be art; emotion without representation is unknowable in our present state.

In conclusion, a word may be said about beauty and its relation to art. Croce identifies beauty with art and makes ugliness the inartistic—i.e., *espressione sbagliata*. By making all art beautiful he does not really decide the controversy, about the position of ugliness in art, in favour of those who want to rule out all ugliness. If anything, he decides it in the opposite sense, for his definition of beauty embraces what ordinary people would describe as ugliness.

Quite a definite solution to the problem springs out of what has been written in these pages. If beauty means the physically attractive and ugliness the physically repulsive, then they are not the primary concern of art, which is emotion; and there is no reason why similar emotions should not be displayed in representations either beautiful or ugly. To many well-intentioned people Giotto's paintings are ugly. It is no good trying to convince them that they are beautiful. They simply are not beautiful in the sense that they use the word, in the sense that Correggio, or Turner, or Romney is beautiful. Giotto could not draw, and knew so little of perspective or anatomy that none of his figures could move, and never a limb would fit under the drapery that covers it. The most you could do in his defence, in this respect, would be to point out a certain beauty of decorative effect and design about his work. None the less he is almost as great as Michelangelo, possibly even greater, but chiefly because of his emotional values. Not only has he strength, vigour, and simplicity, but he is unrivalled in his power of distilling the very spirit of a narrative in paint. His charm consists very largely in uniting two qualities so difficult to bring together, delicacy of feeling and directness of utterance.

But if by beauty you mean not only what is pleasing to the senses, but what is great in its emotional quality, then, of course, it is of the very essence of art to treat only of beauty, and Giotto is certainly beautiful. But that is not the original significance of the word. Women are beautiful; men are not ordinarily called beautiful. The beautiful is generally touched with an element of

effeminacy. The work of Raphael, Corot, Marlowe, Keats, or Chopin is beautiful, and, if not definitely effeminate, it is at least sensuous.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the more virile art of the great men has nearly always a secret beauty and even delicacy about it for those who study it with patience. We may at first be intimidated by the strength of Michelangelo, Tintoretto, or Brangwyn, till eventually we come to see with what delicate affection they handled the rhythm of line and composition or the colour of their pictures. Perhaps we may go so far as to say that no work can be really great which has not got a hidden beauty about it, either of the sort described, or, as is common among the moderns, the beauty of the pure texture of paint. The emotional quality must be presented in a form that is attractive. Very often, however, people are so misled by association and prejudice that they regard as ugly what is extremely beautiful. They think that a picture of a turnip field or a still life composition of kitchen utensils is in its nature ugly and not to be redeemed. They forget that the colour of turnips is just as beautiful as grass, or may at least be more useful in a picture, and that they offer greater scope for the handling of paint and for the arrangement of the composition. To these persons we can only say, "Look and learn."

R. WILLIAMS, O.S.B.

ART. 4.—PREACHING AND HISTORY

- Preaching in Medieval England: An Introduction to Sermon Manuscripts of the Period c. 1350-1450.* By G. R. Owst, M.A. (Cantab.), Ph.D. (Lond.), Assistant Editorial Secretary to the Medieval Latin Dictionary Committee. 8vo. Pp. xviii+381. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1926.
- Sacred Eloquence: A Guide Book for Seminarists.* By Charles H. Schultz, M.A., LL.D.; Sacred Oratory, English, Sociology; Saint Francis Seminary, Loretto, Pa. 8vo. Pp. 269. Metropolitan Press: John Murphy Company, Baltimore, Maryland, 1926.
- The Bristol Pulpit in the Days of Henry VIII.* By the Rev. Father T. E. Bridgett, C.S.S.R. *THE DUBLIN REVIEW*, July, 1879, pp. 73-95.
- The Old English Bible and other Essays.* By Francis Aidan Gasquet, D.D., O.S.B.; Author of "Henry VIII. and the English Monasteries." 8vo. Pp. vii+399. London: John C. Nimmo, 1897.
- Homilies of the Anglo-Saxon Church.* Edited by Benjamin Thorpe. Ælfric Society, 1844-46.
- The Blickling Homilies of the Tenth Century.* Edited by Richard Morris. Early English Text Society, 1880.
- Old English Homilies and Homiletic Treatises.* Edited by Richard Morris. Early English Text Society, 1868-72.
- English Metrical Homilies.* Edited by John Small. 1862.

WHEN Johnson's friend Topham Beauclerk died and his fine library of thirty thousand volumes was sold by auction, some people were surprised to find that it contained a rich collection of sermons. For though other members of his circle, such as Johnson himself and Bennet Langton, were men of deep religious feeling, Beauclerk, a scholar, a wit, and a man of the gay world, could scarcely be suspected of a taste for spiritual reading or theological speculation, in spite of his keen interest in general literature and scientific studies. At the present day, it may be feared, a library collected by a general scholar or man of letters, without any professional or personal interest in theological literature, would not be likely to contain many volumes of sermons. But in the eighteenth century, in spite of the growth of unbelief and the widespread neglect of religion, the sermon still held a more important and a more generally

recognized position among the classic forms of a national literature than it can be said to hold in a later generation. Thus, Boswell tells how he was asked by Sir John Pringle to find out which in Johnson's judgement were the best English sermons in point of style. And accordingly we have a graphic account of a conversation in which the respective merits of Atterbury and South and Tillotson, etc., are discussed by the doctor and his inimitable biographer. In these circumstances, a man like Beauclerk might well feel that his library would suffer from a grave deficiency if it did not contain a goodly collection of sermons. He might possibly have little interest in their spiritual teaching. But as a lover of literature he would have them in his library as patterns of prose style and representative examples of English eloquence. In these days, as we have suggested, books of sermons would hardly take such a conspicuous place in general libraries, nor would the distinctive style of modern preachers be likely to furnish an appropriate subject for discussion in a symposium of literary critics. But this need not be taken to imply any marked depreciation in the intrinsic merit of present-day preaching, or any decline in popular interest in religion. The difference is more probably due to changes in social habits and to the rise of many new forms of popular literature.

It may be remarked that the greater prominence given to pulpit eloquence in eighteenth-century literature was in some part a legacy from earlier ages. In medieval Europe, as we know, the clergy had long enjoyed, or suffered from, a practical monopoly of literature and learning. The case was altered, in some respects, in the fifteenth century after the rise of Renaissance scholarship and the invention of printing, when reading gradually became a more and more common accomplishment, though a relic of the old state of things long survived in the iniquitous legal fiction by which it enabled educated criminals to claim "benefit of clergy." But even when the general monopoly had ceased, or was gradually coming to an end, the clergy, as was only natural in the circumstances, still maintained a predominance—and in some

cases a practical monopoly—in certain branches of learned labour; for example, in education and the making of educational literature. And, what is more remarkable, even when laymen would contend with them on equal terms, or take the lead, in other fields, the laws and customs of the time accorded the clergy an undesigned monopoly in the field of oratory or public speaking. The English Parliament, it is true, could boast some great orators in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, but in the days when their speeches were not duly reported or allowed to be published, the benefit of their eloquence was largely confined to their own colleagues, or rather to such of those colleagues who chose to listen. The preachers of that time, on the contrary, delivered their addresses in public churches open to all and sundry. And the sermons of the more learned and eloquent and popular preachers, as well as of many who cannot claim these titles, were freely printed and published and made accessible to wide circles of readers. A student of literature who wished to form a just estimate of English eloquence and oratorical style in the Victorian Age might find much to his purpose in the speeches of great statesmen such as Bright and Gladstone, as well as in the masterpieces of our foremost preachers. But in an earlier age his choice would be more restricted, and he might be content to follow the example of Sir John Pringle and ask some competent judge to show him the best English sermons.

But if sermons at one time very possibly received more than their due share of attention in view of the circumstances of the time when there was little scope for other methods of instruction and entertainment, and other branches of oratory were neglected, or laboured under serious disadvantages, in later years it would certainly seem that they have suffered from undeserved neglect and depreciation. For in more ways than one the competition of our rivals has tended to lessen the number of their readers and admirers. For those who used to read sermons for the sake of their spiritual teaching, there is now a varied abundance of popular religious literature. And, on the other hand, those students who formerly turned to

them for the sake of their literary form can now find many other models of eloquence and oratorical style. It is true, no doubt, that the works of great preachers of an earlier age are not likely to be neglected or forgotten by serious critics, or historians of a national literature. Thus, when Matthew Arnold is discussing the literary influence of academies, he institutes a comparison between certain masterpieces of French and English eloquence, and very naturally takes some of his first instances in illustration from sermons of Bossuet and of Jeremy Taylor. And while the works of the great masters of sacred eloquence, at any rate, receive some attention, even in these days, from general historians of literature, many other volumes of sermons, though now neglected by the general reader, will still very naturally find an appropriate place in ecclesiastical libraries, and may still be studied with profit by those who have a professional and practical interest in preaching. Yet, often enough, there may be reason to doubt whether the literary historian on the one hand or the theological student on the other has formed a just estimate of the high value and the historical importance of sermons. For though the student who is himself a candidate for the ministry of preaching will naturally study the sermons of approved masters of the art and take them as his models of form and method, he may very possibly reflect that the orthodoxy and accuracy of the doctrine he is to deliver is something of far more moment than the literary form and method of his preaching. And for this reason it may well seem that the classic sermons, which serve as his models of form and method, are on a lower level in point of dignity and importance than the writings of the great theologians and biblical commentators, who supply him with the doctrinal matter of his discourses, and guide him in the right interpretation of Holy Scripture. And no doubt this will hold good where the model sermons in question are the work of comparatively modern preachers, who have drawn their doctrines, directly or indirectly, from the *Summa* of St. Thomas, or from other masterpieces of scholastic divinity. Here, to be sure, the theological treatise is the source of

the most important part of the sermons—and in any case there can be no possible comparison between minor preachers and master theologians. But are there no other and older sermons which may be rightly reckoned among the primary sources of theology? At the basis of our medieval theology we find the famous four *Books of Sentences*, which furnished a general text for the commentaries and elucidations of St. Thomas and Scotus and the other great scholastic doctors. And it is well to remember that the said "sentences" were largely drawn from the sermons of the early Fathers. To take another notable instance in illustration, St. Gregory Nazianzen, one of the greatest of the Greek Fathers, is known as the "Theologian" *par excellence*. At first sight, some might be disposed to regard this as a misnomer, for St. Gregory has left us nothing but sermons and poetry and letters. And, indeed, some Western writers fail to appreciate his real importance in the history of theology, and seem puzzled by the reverence with which the Greeks regard him. But the solution of this problem is writ large in the pages of St. John Damascene's great work, *On the Orthodox Faith*. This work, as we are reminded in the lessons which Pope Leo XIII appointed to be read, on St. John's feast, in the Roman Breviary, was the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of theology as a whole, and prepared the way for St. Thomas. And those who are familiar with its pages know how freely and frequently the author draws his doctrine from the sermons of St. Gregory the theologian, citing his *ipsissima verba* and confidently appealing to his authority. Sometimes, indeed, the reader may recognize the influence and the language of St. Gregory where his name is not mentioned. And at every turn one is reminded of a phrase used in another Breviary lesson, with a more restricted application: "*Mea non est hæc oratio, quamquam alioqui mea; hanc enim divinissimam hæreditatem a theologo patre Gregorio accipit*" (*In festo S. Joachim*).

If modern critics and theologians are apt to underrate the importance of this particular branch of religious literature, it might be thought that historians, and more

especially historians of literature, would form a juster estimation of the true position of sermons. For, from the nature of the case, their view is not confined to the present age, and they are largely occupied with the literature and history of periods in which sermons held a more conspicuous and commanding place, and the preachers had a practical monopoly of public speaking and popular instruction. Yet in spite of this reasonable anticipation, there is some ground for fearing that even those who have made a special and extensive study of medieval history and literature have sometimes failed to appreciate the peculiar, not to say the unique, historical importance of sermons, both as potent influences in the growth and development of language and literature, and as unwitting and therefore more trustworthy witnesses to many forgotten facts of religious and social history. To some extent, this oversight, or want of application, may be regarded as a natural and almost inevitable result of the immense multiplication of books and the widespread practice of reading during the last four hundred years. For whatever benefits may have come from the invention of printing, it would hardly fail to have, however indirectly, some unfortunate effects. And one of these is a tendency to overlook or forget the primary and paramount importance of the spoken word. Gaels who find delight in old literature handed down through the centuries by our *beul aithris* or oral tradition, without the adventitious aid of writing or printing, should be able to see things from a different standpoint and in another aspect. For we have had a practical proof that the delights and the happy influence of literature can be enjoyed without reading or writing. The student of English literature when he turns the pages of a modern poet can learn something of his range of reading and catch some notes of the earlier singers whom he has made his models. And in the same way we can hear echoes of the old bardic music in the verse of Duncan MacIntyre or Mary MacPherson, though we may know that when these sweet singers composed their poetry they had never learnt to read. And this helps us to remember that written literature is but a mechanical record of words that were originally spoken.

The student of Sanskrit literature has a constant reminder of this in the elaborate laws of *sandhi*—possibly a result of the fact that the old Indian epics were handed down by oral tradition, long before they were committed to writing. No doubt the written or printed record has a high value, preserving literature with greater accuracy of detail, and making it more readily accessible for readers in other lands and in after ages. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that literature preserved by oral tradition has an advantage of its own. The old poetry sung or recited in the familiar evening gatherings becomes known to all the people and lives in the memory of the Irish peasantry or the simple fisher-folk of the Hebrides. Meanwhile the printed paper of other poets, revered as classics by more cultured or sophisticated people, may repose on the bookshelves, neglected and forgotten.

Now it may be safely said that whatever may be their respective artistic merit, a literature which is written not in books but in the mind of the people and lives on their lips must needs have a higher historical value than a literature which may be known by report to many, but is very possibly read by none outside a select circle of students. For the popular literature can exert a more powerful influence and help in the making of history. And, on the other hand, since this popular literature must in some measure reflect the minds of those who delight in it and feel its influence, its study must tell us much of the thoughts and feelings of the people. I know a very wise man, says Fletcher of Saltoun, that believed that if a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who should make the laws of a nation. This is the judgement of an astute statesman who would fain influence the people by means of popular literature. And on the same principle the historian, whose object is not to influence the people, but to learn the truth about them, may do well to study the literature in which they find delight, rather than the laws by which they are supposed (however erroneously) to be governed.

It may be said that this oral tradition of literature is a custom confined to certain primitive folk in remote

localities, that in most modern nations it has long been superseded by the practice of reading (or omitting to read) printed literature, and that even in those places where it still, to some extent, survives, it is now declining and is doomed to disappear. But, happily, there are some signs of a revival of the old practice in new forms, and under other names, in various modern literary, musical, and dramatic societies. And, what is more to our immediate purpose, there is one special form of this oral living literature that has a wider range and has lasted through all the ages. If we look at the collected writings of some of our great teachers in the Church, from St. Ambrose, or St. Augustine, or St. Bernard, in an earlier age, to more modern masters such as Bossuet or Newman, it is possible that we have a personal predilection for some of the other works; yet on reflection we must fain confess that a special interest attaches to the sermons. From the printed pages they still speak, like the other works, to new generations of readers, and still find out their own. But apart from this they have lived, withal, another life and have exercised another far-reaching influence on the lives of those who heard them when they were first spoken by the living voice of the preacher, and on the lives of others whose lot was linked with theirs. Many of them, moreover, more especially those which were spoken *ex officio* by a Bishop to his flock, or an Abbot to the monks of his order, besides having their appropriate place in the author's writings, are also links in a long and unbroken chain of similar pastoral instructions. So, at least, it would seem if we may take the high priori road, and argue from the obvious official duty of Christian pastors. Since the days of the first apostles and missionary preachers of the faith, it has ever been the pastor's office to preach and instruct his people, week by week, in divine worship. And if this plain duty has been in any measure fulfilled, there must have been a long continued stream of such pastoral instructions coming down from very early days. Many of these discourses, no doubt, may never have been recorded like those of the greater masters, and many records may have become food for oblivion. But, in any case, it may be safely said

that if any such records have been made and have come down to our days, they should surely throw a flood of light on the faith and morals, and on the manners and social habits of our fathers in earlier ages. For the doctrinal teaching given in the sermons would show what was really taught and believed in those distant days. And since the preachers would hardly fail to denounce the prevailing evils of their age and country, the same sermons would provide some valuable evidence as to the moral condition of the people.

But, it may be asked, was preaching, as a matter of fact, regularly practised in the Middle Ages? And are the surviving records of medieval sermons sufficiently full and numerous to furnish forth this very desirable evidence? It is well known, no doubt, that some medieval sermons have been preserved and published. And some of them have been cited in evidence in the course of discussions on the doctrinal and moral teaching of the time. To take a notable example, readers of Cardinal Newman's inimitable *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England* will readily remember his scathing exposure of Mosheim's garbled extracts from a sermon of St. Eligius. It may not be amiss to add, however, that the same famous perversion of facts had already been publicly exposed and rebuked, some nine years before, by Dr. Arnold of Rugby in one of his Oxford Lectures on Modern History. Lovers of English literature will remember that Chaucer has given us another excellent sample of medieval preaching, in his Parson's tale. For the said tale, unlike the poetical fables told by the other pilgrims to Canterbury, is neither more nor less than a plain prose sermon. To the average reader it may surely seem somewhat superfluous to use these descriptive epithets. For he would hardly expect a sermon to be in anything else but plain prose. But in the Middle Ages, and indeed in far earlier days, as we may see by the practice of St. Ephrem the Syrian, poetry and prose adorned with rhythmical alliteration were considered pleasing and appropriate vehicles of religious instruction.

Chaucer's worthy Parson, it may be remembered, takes

care to explain in his prologue that he has no taste for rhyme or alliteration.

But trusteth wel, I am a Suthern man,
I can not geste, run, ram, ruf by letter,
Ne, God wot, rym hold I but litel better.

He has already intimated that he will give his hearers no fable, but

Moralité and vertuous matiere.

But he still thinks it well to explain that he will do this in prose, and will not follow the fashion of those who indulged in metrical, rhyming, or alliterative homilies. Many modern readers, we imagine, will share the good Parson's preference for prose in this matter. But though they are no longer in favour or fashion, a peculiar historical interest attaches to the early and Middle English metrical and alliterative homilies. For this curious and attractive feature of these poetical instructions serves to emphasize the fact that, in this country at any rate, the sermon is a part and parcel of the national literature. And what is more, it affords a striking proof of the historical continuity of English preaching. It may be remarked, by the way, that in using verse as the vehicle of religious instruction, these medieval homilists were reviving or prolonging a primitive practice which had prevailed in this island in very early days. For Cæsar tells us (*B.G.*, vi 14) that the Druids enshrined their religious teaching in interminable verses which were learnt by heart and never committed to writing, although they were acquainted with letters and employed them for other purposes.

Even in homilies which were neither rhymed nor metrical, the early English preacher is prone to make his prose more impressive, and more readily remembered, by availing himself of "apt alliteration's artful aid"—to borrow Churchill's felicitous phrase. As a striking instance in illustration of the continuity of English homiletical literature, it is interesting to take Abbot Ælfric's homily on the feast of St. Cuthbert and set it beside Hugh

Latimer's sermon on the Ploughers. It is a far cry from the Anglo-Saxon Abbot to the Marian martyr. They are divided by five hundred years, and in some respects are yet further apart in doctrinal tenets; but, unlike Chaucer's Parson, they both betray the same marked partiality for the gentle art of alliteration. "His lic," says Ælfric, for example, "wrath bebyrged on Lindisfarneiscre cyrcan; thær wurdon geworhte wundra forwel fela, thurh gearnnumgum his eadigan lifes." And Latimer, in sarcastic vein, offers the following ironical excuse for certain unpreaching prelates: "They are so troubeled wyth Lordelye lyuinge, they be so placed in palacies, couched in courtes, ruffelynge in theyr rentes, daunceyng in theyr dominions, burdened wyth ambassages, pamperynge of theyr panches lyke a monke that maketh his Iubilie, mounchyng in theyr maungers, and moylyng in theyr gaye manoures and mansions, and so troubeled wyth loyteryng in theyr Lordeshyppes: that they canne not attende it."

This curious resemblance, though it is confined to a comparatively minor matter, is surely significant, and in the circumstances it can scarcely be due to any direct imitation. There is no reason to believe that Latimer had studied Ælfric or the earlier medieval homilists. But, on the other hand, it can scarcely be supposed that he is striking out a new line of his own, and that this resemblance to the Anglo-Saxon Abbot's work is the result of mere coincidence. For this literary form is a marked feature of many fifteenth-century satires. It must be remembered, moreover, that though Latimer was undoubtedly a preacher of the "new learning," it does not follow that his method of preaching was necessarily new and original. He had had some practice as a Catholic preacher before he came forward as a Protestant champion, and apart from his own native gifts and characteristics and the new doctrines he had adopted, it would seem, to say the least, antecedently probable that his sermons must owe something to the Catholic preaching to which he had listened in his youth, when, as he tells us himself, he was a strong Papist. But, it may be objected, the very words we have just quoted seem to suggest that preaching was

very generally neglected in those days. And, in any case, such sermons as may have survived from the period immediately preceding the sixteenth-century upheaval are buried in manuscript collections, for the most part neglected and forgotten. As we have suggested, they might throw some welcome light on the historical problems of the age. But, on the other hand, it may be that the remains are too slight to afford sufficient and satisfactory evidence. Has anyone taken the trouble to make them the subject of the patient and extensive study needed in order to form a just estimate of their value, and of the lessons they may have for our learning?

A short time ago we might have asked this question. But it would have been by no means so easy to find a satisfactory answer. For though a good deal has been said on more than one occasion by earlier writers in this Review on the importance of the extant sermon manuscripts for historical studies, the writers in question made it clear that very much remained to be done in this direction. And for many years it seemed as if no one was prepared to come forward as a pioneer in this field of labour. Happily, the appearance of Dr. G. R. Owst's valuable and illuminating volume on *Preaching in Medieval England* has dissipated this fear. And his successful completion of the arduous task he has so gallantly undertaken will surely be welcomed by all students of English medieval history. Although the book is modestly described as an introduction to the sermon manuscripts of a single period—from 1350 to 1450—it is really very much more than a mere introduction. And the instructive and interesting information set forth in its pages, based throughout on manuscript contemporary documents, to which due references are given, may enable the reader to form a just estimate of the history of preaching in medieval England. At the same time it fulfils the function of an introduction, and is well calculated to awaken the interest and attention of those to whom the subject is unknown, and to dispel the illusions of those too numerous readers who have been misled by the confident and wholly mistaken statements of many modern writers on medieval

history. Among serious historians, as distinguished from party writers and controversialists, we have long passed beyond the time when the Middle Ages were regarded as a period of blank ignorance and superstition. The enthusiastic reverence with which so many of our non-Catholic countrymen regard St. Francis of Assisi is really no isolated phenomenon, but is rather a hopeful sign of a change for the better during the past century—a change which is largely due to the good work done by such enlightened and fair-minded non-Catholic writers as Arnold and Maitland. If we may judge by the language sometimes held at the present day by some of our own more militant champions, it would seem that these services have been overlooked and forgotten. But in regard to this matter of the sermons, even those modern scholars who have made a special and sympathetic study of medieval history and literature are too often at a disadvantage, and remain under mistaken impressions. And here, in spite of the excellent work that has been done at our universities of later years in other fields of medieval history, England seems to have lagged behind Continental historians. This deficiency, we suppose, is one of the legacies left by the old Protestant tradition.

On these points it may be well to cite a striking passage from Dr. Owst's preface to the work, which he justly describes as "actually the first book to be written on the subject of English Medieval Preaching."

"To the average Englishman [he writes] modern sermons may be dull. But the medieval variety, if it has ever occurred to his mind, is probably associated with 'empty, ridiculous harangues, legendary tales, miracles, horrors, low jests, fireside scandal,' result in the main of a long Protestant tradition which even reckons Paul's Cross and the sermons on the Card among its triumphant inventions. If still left with a taste for devotional literature, therefore, he can hardly be expected to waste time upon 'monkish superstitions,' when the works of Latimer and Jeremy Taylor, Donne and South, already stand upon his bookshelves. Not John Wycliffe himself, 'morning star of the Reformation,' if he rose from the dead, could induce Professor Hearnshaw to listen to his sermons."

These strictures, it will be seen, only touch the average Englishman, innocent, we may suppose, of historical

criticism, and still suffering from the effects of the long Protestant tradition. But Dr. Owst goes on to deal faithfully with the shortcomings of more lofty and enlightened persons.

“English historians and archivists [he continues] have certainly done little enough to make known what M. Leroy de la Marche calls ‘the innumerable written monuments of the pulpit.’ Emancipated from religion and an old-fashioned culture (yet always the willing slaves of public opinion), they are naturally busy today with the mightier material concerns of modern politics and industry. Hence, the whole round of medieval existence is likewise compassed for them in the busy tale of buyings and sellings, the systems of the Courts, the endless reckoning of manor rolls and taxes. Such is the latest fashion in ‘History,’ which has now replaced one of treaties, campaigns, and royal escapades. Medieval scholars on the Continent, however, especially in France, while hardly neglectful of other branches of the great medieval tree of knowledge, have long done justice to their sermon manuscripts. The name of Hauréau, Delisle, Langlois, Leroy de la Marche, Bourgain, to quote but a few, represent but one group which worked industriously half a century ago on the vast collections in the libraries of Paris. Thomas Wright was apparently the first lonely antiquary in England to recognize the value of these quaint homiletic sources. But, apart from a few random editions of early English texts since his day, they remained wholly neglected until Dr. Gasquet (as he then was) uttered a rousing plea for their study in two essays originally published in the DUBLIN REVIEW. There, again, the matter has been allowed to rest up to the present time. For the survey so enthusiastically planned and recommended by the eminent Cardinal has never been undertaken. Miss Toulmin Smith’s hints at the History of Preaching in England, which will one day have to be written, in an article in the *English Historical Review*, called forth by the publication of Bozon’s *Contes Moralises* in 1889, still constituted a pious dream for the future. One work by an Englishman, Mr. J. A. Herbert of the British Museum, is alone worthy to stand by the monumental productions of French scholarship in this sphere. But that, after all, is a learned Catalogue, concerned exclusively with sermon *exempla*” (pp. ix, x).

Readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW will be interested to notice the allusion to Cardinal Gasquet’s rousing plea for the study of the MSS. English sermons. And no doubt this may lead some to turn back to the Cardinal’s inter-

esting article on "Religious Instruction in England in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," which first appeared in these pages in July, 1894, and was afterwards reprinted in *The Old English Bible and Other Essays* (1897)—a volume which also contains the author's paper on "A Forgotten English Preacher," to wit, Bishop Brunton, with translations of several striking passages in his sermons. It may be well to add in this connection that some years before this article by Cardinal Gasquet, another DUBLIN REVIEWER, the late Father T. E. Bridgett, C.S.S.R., had drawn the attention of our readers to the high historical value of sermons, in the opening words of his article on "The Bristol Pulpit in the Days of Henry VIII" (DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1879).

"Among the minor sources of history [he wrote] sermons sometimes occupy an important place, and of late years this vein has been worked with considerable profit. The Prize Essay of M. Leroy de la Marche on the MS. sermons in France belonging to the twelfth century is replete with the most interesting details not only of the preachers and their compositions, but of the history of the times and the manners of the people. The instructive and entertaining sketches of the Reformation by the Rev. Mr. Haweis are drawn principally from the old forgotten volumes of Protestant sermons published in the reign of Elizabeth."

And, accordingly, Father Bridgett proceeded to make a like use of a volume of sermons by Master Roger Edgeworth, Canon of the Cathedral Churches of Salisbury, Wells, and Bristol, who preached, for the most part, in the days of Henry VIII, but only published his sermons in the reign of Mary. In much the same way, Dr. Owst considers that one of the first things to be gained from the study of the sermons which form the subject of his work is "a contribution to our knowledge of social life and thought." After this he sets something of yet greater importance, to wit, "the contributions which our sermons will make to English ecclesiastical history, particularly to the much-debated problems of the state of the medieval Church and the causes of the Reformation" (p. xi).

The solution of these problems, it will be remembered, was one of the main objects which Cardinal Gasquet had in

view in writing the aforesaid article on Religious Instruction in England in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. Apart from any polemical purpose, it would have been a useful and a pleasing task to give some account of the way in which the Catholic clergy, secular and regular, preached to the people and taught them their religion in the period immediately preceding the Reformation. But there was a further reason for dealing with this question some thirty years ago. For many historical writers, Catholic as well as Protestant, had painted a very unfavourable picture of the state of the pre-Reformation Church, largely due, it was said, to the neglect of preaching and teaching, and the ignorance of clergy and people. Among others, one eminent Catholic writer, the late Mr. W. S. Lilly, had given a characteristically vigorous expression of this unfavourable view, in an article contributed to these pages in July, 1891, when it was stated *inter alia* that "the *Pater noster* and *Ave Maria* formed the sum of the knowledge of their religion possessed by many." In marked contrast to this pessimistic picture, Cardinal Gasquet comforted his readers by the assurance that he had himself been led to the opposite conclusion—"namely, that in pre-Reformation days the people were well instructed in their faith by priests, who faithfully discharged their plain duty in this regard" (*O.E.B.*, p. 186). And he proceeded to support this more optimistic view by citing the stringent regulations on the subject of preaching and teaching drawn up by Archbishop Peckham and later ecclesiastical authorities, and gave us an agreeable and very interesting account of various books for popular religious instruction, and pointed to the large mass of manuscript sermons belonging to this very period of supposed negligence and ignorance. We have used the words optimistic and pessimistic to mark the apparently extreme divergence of the views of these two eminent Catholic writers. But in all probability this would only be true of the impressions produced on many readers who accepted one view or the other. Mr. Lilly himself, with his wide and accurate knowledge of the history of the period, cannot have meant to imply that there was no religious instruc-

tion at all in those. The ignorance, it may be remarked, is ascribed to many, not to all. And if some more fortunate people had a real knowledge of their religion, there must have been some pastors who taught their people. On the other hand, Cardinal Gasquet, for all his just appreciation of the laws laid down about the duty of preaching, and his more favourable estimate of the learning and good conduct of the clergy, secular and regular, cannot possibly have meant that the excellent laws in regard to preaching and religious instruction were always obscured with irreproachable punctuality, that no pastor ever neglected his duty and none of the flock were left without spiritual food and guidance. In the best ages of Church history there have always been some black sheep in the flock and some faithless hirelings among the shepherds. And without heeding the railing of rebels and false reformers, we may well think that the need of the real reformation enacted at Trent, and the work of such reformers as St. Charles and St. Ignatius, may warrant us in considering that the fifteenth century was *not* one of the best ages of our history. But if optimism seems impossible, there can be no reason for rushing into the opposite extreme. When things are bad, it is the height of folly to make them appear worse than they really are. And we ought to be more ready to welcome the appearance of hopeful signs and favourable symptoms.

Those who welcomed Cardinal Gasquet's pleasing account of the fifteenth-century preaching and religious instruction when it first appeared in these pages more than thirty years ago will naturally turn with special interest to Dr. Owst's new introduction to the sermon manuscripts of the period 1350-1450. For one who has made that very study of the neglected manuscripts which the Cardinal recommended to the attention of historical students should surely be able to throw some fresh light on the subject. The mere fact that so many sermons and books of instruction had survived from that much-debated period was favourable evidence, so far as it went. But, after all, a good deal must depend on the intrinsic quality of these sermons and books of instruction. It would be but cold

comfort to know that the clergy obeyed the bare letter of the law, if the sermons and instructions were perfunctory efforts and little likely to have good effect on those who heard them or read them. And, so far as this goes, Dr. Owst's evidence is highly satisfactory. No one can make a careful study of his pages without sharing what is clearly the author's own view that admirable work was done by many of the zealous preachers of this period of medieval history. Much that the author has to say on this matter gives us a high opinion of the zeal and devotion of these good men. And it may occur to the reader that if a judicious selection of the positive teaching and spiritual exhortations in these sermons and manuals of religious instruction could be set apart from the rest, and studied by itself, it might seem to warrant the conclusion that the aforesaid charges of neglect and ignorance were unfounded. For the reader might reasonably argue that an age which has the advantage of organized spiritual instruction from such zealous and gifted teachers can scarcely have been as black as it has been painted by certain historians.

But unfortunately this result could only be obtained by confining our attention to the brighter side of the picture alone and turning away from the other. For the fact remains that these same sermons and spiritual manuals which afford such a pleasing proof of the zeal and learning and piety of many of the clergy of that century are likewise loud in their denunciation of the prevailing wickedness of the age, and *inter alia* the indolence and ignorance and the shameless vice of many other members of the clergy.

For this reason Dr. Owst, after alluding to the aforesaid much-debated problems, goes on to observe as follows :

“For such debates, indeed, the appearance of this little book might almost claim to be timely. For, in it, passages from English synodal sermons are printed for the first time. They will at least serve to remind us that here we have a literature far more intimate and telling in its disclosures than even the Episcopal Registers themselves; yet one which—so far as England is concerned—has been as little explored by the learned editor of this series as by his critics. Entering medieval chapter-house and Church as in a magic cloak, by means of it we are enabled to

listen unseen, 'behind closed doors,' to the clergy as they harangue their own clergy with a frankness and fearlessness only equalled by the confessions of memoir and diary in later centuries. Some of their remarks make peculiarly unpleasant reading. But until the *ut estimo* of Master Rypon and his kind is thus given heed to again, we shall be compelled to go on listening to the 'idle imaginations' of professors, propagandists, and journalistic historians on these points, a hardly less evil fate. Through ignorance of that insight which sermons alone can give into the popular as well as the ecclesiastical mind of the times, the people's arguments, excuses, religious and anti-clerical ideas, as well as the self-condemnation of the clergy, even so learned and restrained a work as Dr. Gairdner's *Lollardy and the Reformation* is vitiated. To Gairdner, indeed, Dr. Gascoigne's complaints were almost exceptional, as were those of Wycliffe himself to Professor Lechler and others. Yet, as a matter of fact, a hundred pulpits of orthodoxy in England must have been complaining then in exactly the same strain, if only our historians could have known it. What shall we say, too, for example, with the record of medieval preaching now before us of S. R. Maitland's pet objections to what he calls the 'Puritan style,' the unbridled language, and vulgar personal attacks of the Reformers which he delighted to hold up to our scorn? Did not the warning voices of the most faithful mariners, clinging to their post of duty in the storm-tossed, ill-steered Ship of the Church, ring hoarse and relentless enough, long before the Reformers' day?" (pp. xi, xii).

Some of the passages cited further on from some of the synodal sermons rebuking the vices of the clergy are certainly startling and show that the above language is in no wise unwarranted. And if the sermons anticipate the charges and complaints of censors in a later age, they serve to support and illustrate the language of contemporary poets and satirists. Thus on the sporting parson in *Piers Plowman* who says,

"But I can fynde in a felde, or in a fourlonge an hare,
Better than in *Beatus vir*, or in *Beati omnes*
Construe oon clause wel, and kenne it to my parochiennes,"

Dr. Owst observes:

"Like nearly all the sayings of Langland, this is derived straight from the current preaching"; and he cites from a Bodleian MS. the phrase, "swifter to collect hounds, and to track hares" (p. 27).

In connection with Mr. Lilly's statement that the *Pater noster* and the *Ave Maria* formed the sum of the knowledge of their religion possessed by many, it may be of interest to cite the following passage:

"Indications are not lacking [says Dr. Owst] in the kind of literature before us that the results of this seemingly widespread neglect of holy instruction were patent enough to the eye of the faithful observer. More than a hundred years after Peckham's elaborate Decrees, it is possible for the writer of a vernacular treatise to declare that none but a few of the common people knew even their *Pater noster*, *Ave*, or *Creed*" (p. 46).

This would seem to give some countenance to the hero of *Piers the Plowman's* Crede, who could patter his *Pater noster* and knew the *Ave* almost to the end, but knew not the *Creed* and vainly asked the Friars to teach him.

But to return to the brighter side of the picture presented in Dr. Owst's instructive and entertaining pages, over against those faithless hirelings and defaulters, there were clearly many faithful shepherds who did their duty to their flock. And if certain passages in the sermon manuscripts seem to show that Langland's unlettered coursing clergyman was no mere figment of the poet's imagination, the sermons themselves furnish a more convincing and practical proof that there were happily many others yet more closely resembling the perfect parson portrayed by the father of English poetry.

A good man was ther of religioun,
And was a pore Persoun of a toun;
But riche he was of holy thought and werk,
He was also a lerned man, a clerk
That Cristes gospel gladly wolde preche;
His parischens devoutly wolde he teche . . .
He waytud after no pompe ne reverence,
Ne maked him a spiced conscience,
But Cristes lore, and his apostles twelve,
He taught, and ferst he folwed it himselve.

W. H. KENT, O.S.C.

ART. 5.—LA VIE RELIGIEUSE EN RUSSIE SOVIÉTIQUE

S.G. Monseigneur d'Herbigny : *Orientalia Christiana*, N. 20,
"Les Etudes" et "Pâques en Russie."

Prof. Titlinoff : *L'Eglise pendant la Révolution*.

"NE voulant pas tenir compte de la législation nouvelle, écrit l'historiographe soviétique Titlinoff, l'Eglise s'est mise à vivre en dehors du temps et de l'espace." Telle, nous semble-t-il, doit être, en effet, la devise de toute véritable expérience religieuse. L'Eglise russe a continué sa mission au milieu et au dessus de la plus sanglante des mêlées.

Il est vrai qu'une grande partie de la classe ouvrière et de la jeunesse rurale, a été atteinte par la propagande anti-religieuse, et a facilement renoncé à toute vie spirituelle. Mais le nombre des fidèles en Russie, n'en demeure pas moins extrêmement important. Les paysans d'âge mûr voient dans l'Eglise un ensemble de coutumes et de disciplines séculaires dont ils ne sauraient se détourner. Les intellectuels persécutés, cruellement éprouvés, se sont tournés vers la vie contemplative et mystique. Les éléments traditionalistes du pays reconnaissent dans l'Eglise le seul organe capable de recueillir l'héritage de la monarchie. Les nationalistes enfin considèrent l'orthodoxie comme l'expression la plus parfaite de la culture slave.

Selon les témoignages les plus récents, la vie religieuse est très intense en Russie. Mais il est difficile, à l'heure qu'il est de recueillir à ce sujet une documentation exacte et détaillée. Les sources manquent, les informations précises font singulièrement défaut. Et cela s'explique d'ailleurs par la situation même de l'Eglise en Russie.

Le clergé, demeuré fidèle aux pures traditions orthodoxes, se trouve aujourd'hui encore en danger de persécution. Il est privé de la liberté de la parole et de la presse; l'attitude des pouvoirs officiels à son égard l'oblige à observer la discrétion la plus absolue. Et les paroissiens qui le suivent, imitent son exemple, refoulent leurs pensées, "rentrent dans les catacombes."

Quant aux Eglises dissidentes, et aux nombreuses sectes surgies pendant la Révolution ou encouragées par elle, leur existence demeure troublée et chaotique. Comment découvrir le fil conducteur dans ce creuset vivant d'idées et d'aspirations contradictoires? Ajoutons, que le Gouvernement soviétique, ayant subi de graves échecs dans sa politique antireligieuse, n'ose aborder le bilan de ses défaites, et se plaît à maintenir le désordre et la confusion, là où il n'a pas réussi à une laïcisation complète.

Afin de retrouver dans ce chaos les éléments d'une Foi véritable et vivace, nous aurons recours à un document précieux—les ouvrages de Monseigneur d'Herbigny, qui à la suite de ses voyages en Russie, nous apporte des informations du plus grand intérêt.* Il convient de joindre à ce témoignage, les renseignements qu'a bien voulu nous communiquer le Rev. Père Ticzkiewicz, dont la conférence récemment faite à Paris, a jeté une vive lumière sur l'évolution religieuse russe. Nous citerons, pour démontrer le point de vue soviétique, le livre du Professeur Titlinoff: *L'Eglise pendant la Révolution* (Petrograd, 1924). Nous puiserons enfin dans les articles publiés par les théologiens et les philosophes russes réfugiés à l'étranger tout ce qui pourra nous aider à définir l'idéologie orthodoxe.

Nicolas Berdiaeff, qui est le chef réputé de l'école philosophique orthodoxe, nous dit que l'Eglise Russe vient d'entrer dans une nouvelle période de son histoire. Sous l'égide du Tzarisme le clergé avait longtemps suivi la voix de la contemplation et de la mystique toute passive. Privée de son Patriarche par Pierre le Grand, l'Eglise avait remis l'appareil administratif aux mains des fonctionnaires; dès lors toute œuvre de création ou de libre initiative avait été refusée au clergé ou volontairement repoussée par lui; celui-ci ne se préoccupait plus, en effet que du salut individuel des âmes et des conquêtes personnelles de l'ascétisme. Atrophées dans leur vie sociale, les institutions religieuses ne tenaient plus aucun compte des nécessités pratiques de l'heure.

* "Les Etudes," 5 et 20 août, 1926; et "Pâques en Russie," éditions Spes (Paris, 1926).

“La chute de l’Empire Orthodoxe Russe,” écrit M. Berdiaieff, “apporte dans la conscience ecclésiastique un changement important. L’Orthodoxie ne saurait plus poursuivre un but purement ascétique. Le Christianisme ne peut plus se borner aux problèmes du salut individuel. L’Eglise se tourne inévitablement vers la vie de la société et du monde extérieur, elle est obligée d’y participer.”

Et voici, selon M. Berdiaieff, l’explication métaphysique de cette métamorphose : “L’Empire Autocrate,” dit-il, “est le type d’une théocratie Orthodoxe, et s’inspire non point d’un principe humain, mais d’un principe angélique. Le Tzar représente un degré dans la Hierarchie des Anges. Le Chute de cette Théocratie doit provoquer l’éveil d’une activité créatrice de la part du peuple orthodoxe—activité non plus angélique, mais humaine.”*

Si l’on s’en souvient, l’Orthodoxie n’avait que trop souvent reproché au Catholicisme cette tendance à l’activité pratique et humaine, à une construction sociale réelle et raisonnée. Une pareille exteriorisation du sentiment religieux, semblait en contradiction flagrante avec les aspirations du mysticisme slave. L’Eglise orthodoxe s’en était remise, en ce qui concerne les problèmes de l’ordre temporel, au Tzar autocrate, représentant lui-même un degré de la Hierarchie surnaturelle; elle était par conséquent soustraite, à toute nécessité de cristalliser et de concrétiser l’élan religieux qui l’animait.

Mais à certaines heures de leur histoire, les peuples font preuve d’un instinct quasi-prophétique. A peine le Tzar était-il tombé, et que son activité sociale et religieuse était suspendue, que l’idée du Patriarcat renaissait au fond de la conscience russe. Ce mouvement, en faveur d’un chef spirituel suprême, prenait à tous les yeux une signification d’autant plus grande, qu’il coïncidait avec la plus effroyable des crises sociales. Alors que l’Assemblée Constituante était balayée par l’assaut bolcheviste, le Concile de Moscou élisait le Chef de l’Eglise et le faisait monter sur le trône patriarcal (21 novembre, 1917). L’Eglise se reveillait de sa torpeur à l’heure du danger, et affirmait par un geste

* Extrait d’un article publié dans la *Revue Orthodoxe de Paris*, “Pout,” N. II.

solennel sa volonté de survivre à l'autocratie. Le Patriarche nouvellement élu, se faisait le porte-parole de la nation orthodoxe, et sa voix retentissait avec autorité d'un bout à l'autre de la Russie. Il osait blamer ouvertement la paix de Brest Litowsk ainsi que l'attitude impie des nouveaux maîtres de la Russie. Il adressait un appel vibrant à la population l'engageant à résister de toutes ses forces à la doctrine athéistique prêchée par les communistes. Tandis que les palais, les usines, les propriétés rurales étaient expropriées sans provoquer de résistance organisée, les couvents et les églises furent héroïquement défendus par des confréries de fidèles.

Un pareil sursaut d'énergie démontre l'extrême vitalité de cette foi, que le fonctionnarisme de l'ancien régime avait si longtemps emprisonnée dans ses liens. Là où les Bolcheviks n'ont vu ou n'ont voulu voir que les derniers spasmes d'un culte agonisant, nous devinons au contraire l'expression d'une volonté agissante et créatrice. C'est que cette Eglise, dont la structure pouvait paraître imprécise et fragile, venait de découvrir un noyau central autour duquel ses membres s'étaient spontanément groupés : la personnalité du Patriarche Tikhone exprimait les aspirations ardentes de tout un peuple menacé dans sa foi.

Nous reviendrons plus tard sur le rôle de ce prélat et sur ses hautes qualités autant spirituelles que pratiques. Mais examinons tout d'abord le caractère politique et religieux du groupe d'hommes qui en novembre, 1917, avaient apporté leur vote au Concile de Moscou.

Une des premières tâches du Gouvernement Provisoire avait été de proclamer la liberté religieuse et de procéder à la liquidation de l'ancien Synode. Aussi, le clergé russe, s'était-il senti brusquement libéré de ses entraves. Cet affranchissement avait contribué d'une part à donner un nouvel essor aux tendances libérales ou franchement révolutionnaires de certains milieux ecclésiastiques. D'autre part, les éléments traditionalistes, dévoués à l'ancien régime, trouvèrent un dernier refuge dans cette Eglise gardienne du passé, protectrice de la culture slave. C'est ce groupe traditionaliste, légitimiste et intégralement orthodoxe, qui l'emporta lors du Concile de Moscou. Son véritable chef,

Antony Chrapovitzky, Evêque de Volinie, avait brigué le trône patriarcal, mais le sort désigna le Métropolite Tikhone, qui avait longtemps séjourné en Amérique, et qui avait une réputation de sagesse, de libéralisme, et de culture tout à fait exceptionnelle. A la suite de son échec, Antony Chrapovitzky rejoignit l'Armée Blanche dont il suivit les fortunes, et finit par émigrer à l'étranger.

La personnalité du Patriarche Tikhone apportait une note de modération, là où l'ancien évêque de Volinie n'avait montré que fougue intempestive. Dès lors l'Eglise russe cessait délibérément toute action politique directe, pour ne plus se préoccuper que de la défense du front spirituel. Si bien que lorsque Antony chercha à organiser le groupement monarchiste à l'étranger, le Patriarche lui adressa une remontrance formelle, alléguant que toute outrecuidance légitimiste ne pouvait que nuire à la cause religieuse en Russie, à l'heure où l'Eglise nationale courait les plus graves dangers.

En effet dès le 23 janvier, 1918, le décret concernant la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat avait été promulgué par les pouvoirs soviétiques. Ce décret, conçu en plein communisme militaire, équivalait à une amputation brutale de toutes les institutions religieuses russes.

En abordant l'examen de cet acte, le Professeur Titlinoff lui-même reconnaît le manque de réflexion et de sagesse élémentaire qui ont présidé à son élaboration. En effet, des mesures aussi radicales ne pouvaient que provoquer une résistance opiniâtre. De même, les mascarades, les manifestations antireligieuses, la profanation des lieux saints n'avaient servi qu'à exaspérer le sentiment religieux du peuple. Menacée dans son existence même, l'Eglise resserrait ses rangs, se préparant activement à la lutte suprême.

Le décret du 23 janvier privait le clergé de toutes les ressources mises à sa disposition par le trésor, ainsi que de tous les revenus mobiliers et immobiliers de ses paroisses. La nationalisation appliquée aux propriétés des particuliers, s'étendait aux domaines ecclésiastiques. Les prêtres ne devaient plus toucher leurs émoluments que pour un mois, sans espoir de pouvoir trouver d'autres ressources dans un

aussi bref délai. Le culte n'était point interdit, mais les processions en dehors des murs des églises étaient suspendues, ainsi que l'enseignement religieux. Les édifices sacrés étaient soit mis à la disposition des œuvres et associations laïques, soit confiés à la "collectivité des fidèles" dans le cas où les institutions civiles refuseraient d'en faire usage. L'Eglise cessait d'être considérée comme une personne juridique, et les registres de l'état civil lui étaient retirés.

Le Professeur Titlinoff ajoute qu'aucune réglementation détaillée ne venait éclaircir les points obscurs de ce décret. Les autorités locales étaient obligées de se rapporter à leur initiative propre en ce qui concernait la réquisition des biens ecclésiastiques, le contrôle exercé sur les membres du clergé et sur les diverses manifestations de la vie religieuse.

Le caractère confus de la législation soviétique, ne faisait qu'accentuer le conflit entre le clergé et les pouvoirs laïques. Aussitôt après la publication du décret, l'Eglise, représentée par la Réunion du Concile, lançait une déclaration solennelle adressée au peuple orthodoxe qu'elle invitait à se rallier autour du Patriarche. Des confréries religieuses se formaient auprès des cathédrales, des églises et des monastères, et celle de Saint Alexandre Nevsky comptait bientôt 60,000 membres, d'après l'évaluation du Professeur Titlinoff. "Deux ou trois semaines s'étaient à peine écoulées depuis la publication du décret," écrit l'auteur soviétique, "et déjà le front de l'Eglise, dressée contre l'acte du 23 janvier, était constitué. La vague des processions religieuses déferlait sur toute la Russie. Le clergé soulevait le peuple par tous les moyens, menait une agitation intense dans les églises; il affirmait qu'il n'aurait recours qu'au glaive spirituel—la persuasion, la prière, la Croix. Mais il aurait dû prévoir, que la rencontre du glaive spirituel et du glaive matériel, devait entraîner inévitablement une effusion de sang." Et Titlinoff cherche plus loin à rejeter toute la responsabilité de la lutte sanglante qui devait s'en suivre, sur les milieux ecclésiastiques, ennemis de l'ordre: "Le Concile qui avait déclaré la guerre au décret du 23 janvier, aurait dû prévoir les conséquences de son acte; ses membres, en véritables fanatiques qu'ils étaient, allaient, d'eux-mêmes au devant

du martyre. Ils entraînaient à leur suite le clergé et la population orthodoxe toute entière."

L'indignation provoquée par la législation laïque dans les milieux religieux russes, amena autant à Moscou qu'en province un renouveau puissant de la foi. Une réaction aussi immédiate ne manqua pas d'inquiéter les partisans de la politique antireligieuse. Le journal *La Vie Nouvelle*, dirigé par Maxime Gorky, signala le danger des mesures par trop brutales. On se demandait de toute part si le gouvernement ne serait pas obligé à capituler. Le mot de Canossa fut prononcé—et rejeté avec mépris. Toujours est-il que le danger subsistait. Les unions paroissiales s'organisaient en un véritable front de combat, dirigé par l'ancien Procureur du Saint Synode, Samarine. Une garde de volontaires bien armés fut mise à la disposition du Patriarche. La "ligue des zéloteurs et prédicateurs orthodoxes" complétait cette imposante armée spirituelle. En province, le clergé et les paroisses se retranchaient à leur tour. Voici le bilan de cette résistance, telle que nous le présente le Professeur Titlinoff :

"A Samara, le Clergé proclamait un jeûne de trois jours et des prières solennelles en guise de protestation contre le décret du 23 janvier. Le Soviet local répondit à cette démonstration par un ordre de traduire les prêtres récalcitrants devant le tribunal révolutionnaire. A Yaroslave, au cours de la session des conseils des paroisses, il fut décidé de n'admettre aucune ingérence étrangère dans la répartition des biens sacerdotaux, dont seule la population orthodoxe avait le droit de disposer. Le Clergé refusa de dresser des inventaires, et la confiscation des biens sacrés provoqua une agitation populaire qui obligea les pouvoirs locaux à proclamer l'état de siège. Il y eut des bagarres, et on compta plusieurs victimes. A Voronèje, la tentative d'inventorier les biens du Monastère Mitrofany provoqua des représailles populaires infligées au commissaires, et fut suivie d'une procession à laquelle prit part un grand nombre de fidèles. A Toula, une procession religieuse essuya le feu; il y eut treize tués et un grand nombre de blessés." Des incidents du même genre se produisirent à Kharkoff, Saratoff, Nijny Novgorod, etc., etc. Dans les villages,

écrit Titlinoff, "le terrain était encore plus brûlant; on compta les victimes par dizaines et centaines."

La laïcisation des écoles provoqua de la part des paroissiens une série de mesures défensives du même ordre. "Afin de résister à la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Ecole, nous conte le Professeur Titlinoff, la province organisa, à l'exemple de Pétrograd et de Moscou, des comités de parents. Il n'y eut pas de localité, où sous une forme ou sous une autre, des résolutions en faveur du maintien de l'instruction religieuse ne furent pas rendues publiques."

Dans ces conditions, on peut concevoir à quelles difficultés l'application du décret du 23 janvier dut se heurter. Les pouvoirs centraux et locaux procédèrent néanmoins à la nationalisation des biens sacerdotaux, à la réquisition des registres de l'état civil, et à la remise des édifices sacrés aux œuvres d'utilité publiques. Cependant, les autorités laïques ne parvinrent jamais à briser définitivement la résistance de l'Eglise. Les séminaires et autres collèges d'ecclésiastiques ne fermèrent point leurs portes. De nombreuses paroisses refusèrent de transmettre aux représentants du pouvoir les registres de l'état civil; et même celles qui firent semblant de s'incliner, continuèrent de tenir comme auparavant les registres des baptêmes et des mariages, auxquels le peuple attache aujourd'hui encore la valeur d'actes authentiques de l'état civil. Malgré le contrôle exercé par les autorités sur les biens ecclésiastiques, elles ne réussirent jamais à exproprier les fabriques de cierges, qui représentent dans les paroisses une source de revenu considérable. Quant à la personne juridique dont l'Eglise se trouvait dépouillée aux termes mêmes du décret du 23 janvier, elle réapparaissait sous une autre forme; le Professeur Titlinoff constate dans son livre que les unions du clergé, les unions paroissiales, et les comités diocésains se faisaient officiellement enregistrer par les autorités civiles au même rang que les syndicats et les unions professionnelles. Sans se rendre compte du danger de ces opérations, le pouvoir soviétique conférait à ces organisations religieuses le droit à l'existence légale.

Les monastères, qui, selon l'expression de Titlinoff, formaient une "citadelle solide" dressée contre la législa-

tion laïque, trouvaient une formule toute faite afin de maintenir leurs organisations. Le camouflage des communautés religieuses en communautés dites "de travail" nous offre un exemple curieux d'adaptation à l'ordre nouveau, adaptation toute extérieure, et qui ne changeait en rien le fond de la vie religieuse.

Enfin, l'enseignement du catéchisme, interdit dans les écoles, était repris en dehors des murs des institutions communistes. Les jeunes gens, âgés de plus de 18 ans, obtenaient le droit de recevoir s'ils en exprimaient le désir, une instruction religieuse.

Telle fut l'éclatante victoire de l'Eglise lors des premières années du régime communiste en Russie; elle fut en grande partie due à la valeur spirituelle, intellectuelle et morale du chef suprême, de ce Patriarche dont de Professeur Titlinoff lui-même n'hésite pas à louer les dons exceptionnels; il rend hommage dans son livre à "la douceur, à la droiture, au libéralisme modéré" de ce grand prélat, "dénué de toute outrecuidance politique et de tout fanatisme."

Lorsque la vague des persécutions religieuses se fut brisée contre le rempart de l'Eglise, le rôle immédiat du Patriarche semblait terminé. Tout en conservant dans son entière pureté la doctrine dont il s'était fait l'apôtre, Tikhone trouva opportun de reconnaître le pouvoir temporel des Soviets, réalisant que toute action politique ne pouvait qu'affaiblir le prestige de l'Eglise. Il compta jusqu'à sa mort des partisans fervents et des adversaires acharnés. En 1922 il fut emprisonné et mis en jugement; en 1923 un nouveau Concile, auquel participait un grand nombre d'ecclésiastiques de gauche, le dépouilla de son rang; le Patriarche de Constantinople, invité comme arbitre, confirma la décision du Concile, mettant ainsi fin à l'activité officielle de l'Eglise Patriarcale. En 1924 Tikhone fut à nouveau emprisonné au Monastère Donskoy; il mourut le 7 avril, 1925, léguant son domaine spirituel au Métropolitaine Pierre Kroutizky, désigné comme "gardien du trône patriarcal."*

* Le Métropolitaine Pierre Kroutizky est actuellement emprisonné au Monastère de Souzdal.

L'Eglise de Tikhone absorbe aujourd'hui encore la majorité des fidèles. Elle est ainsi que nous l'avons vu, essentiellement traditionaliste. Le rite orthodoxe y est conservé dans toute sa pureté. Mais elle est aussi le symbole d'une église émancipée du joug du fonctionnarisme, poursuivant à travers les vicissitudes politiques et sociales un but à la foi spirituel et patriotique. Selon la belle expression d'un théologien russe, le Professeur Karsavine, le Patriarche "a donné sa bénédiction au peuple russe, afin qu'il perpétue sa tâche de culture nationale." Plusieurs années avant la révolution, l'Eglise orthodoxe, extérieurement rigide, avait subi une évolution intérieure, qui devait se manifester dès les premiers jours de la révolution. Nombre d'intellectuels vivaient dans un détachement complet à l'égard du sentiment religieux. Ceux qui y étaient demeurés fidèles, cherchaient un moyen de renouer et de moderniser l'Eglise. Des prêtres à tendances libérales, élus à la députation, des laïques théologiens et philosophes se mirent à la tête de ce groupe de gauche; on y recrutait souvent les ouvriers les plus zélés de la foi, mais c'est aussi de ses rangs que devaient sortir les membres du clergé rouge.

Au moment de la révolution, ces ecclésiastiques de gauche, tels que le futur évêque Alexandre Védensky, le prêtre communiste Krassnitzky, et l'évêque Antonin formèrent un contingent de prêtres et de paroissiens prêts à réaliser une réforme religieuse des plus hardies. L'Eglise Vivante fut créée par Antonin et cette organisation ne tarda pas à gagner les suffrages du pouvoir soviétique.

L'évêque Antonin est un ancien député de la Douma, connu pour son érudition, et l'originalité de ses discours. Protestant contre ce qu'il appelle "le scandale mondial du cléricalisme," il cherche à émanciper ses paroissiens de toute entrave dogmatique ou rituelle. Selon l'expression de Monseigneur d'Herbigny, sa doctrine représente "un mélange de cantisme, de calvinisme et de pseudo-mystique." Il proclame que l'église a le droit de modifier la liturgie, et que cette diversité même est le symbole de la liberté de la prière. Ses sermons ressemblent à des conférences universitaires et sont dirigées soit contre la "tyrannie" de

la caste religieuse, soit contre la présence réelle, ou ce qu'il appelle dans son langage faussement scientifique—"la substance physico-chimique de l'Eucharistie." Il trace enfin une parallèle entre le communisme et le christianisme et considère le Christ comme "l'expression de la volonté collective divine et humaine."

Dans son organe officiel, autorisé par les Soviets, l'Eglise Vivante (qui s'appelle encore l'Eglise Renaissance) publia le programme de son activité future : * émancipation des fidèles, et réforme autant dogmatique que liturgique; traduction en langue russe des anciens textes liturgiques slaves; lutte contre les préjugés et les superstitions des prêtres et des paroissiens. Le programme insistait tout particulièrement sur la nécessité de reprendre l'enseignement évangélique dans l'esprit du christianisme primitif; il définissait le travail comme "l'expression joyeuse de la plénitude de la vie, et le gage du bien-être social."

Cette doctrine, qui peut sembler à première vue, pénétré d'un véritable esprit de réforme évangélique, devait porter parmi les fidèles auxquels elle s'adressait, des éléments de désagrégation extrêmement pernicieux. Si elle prêchait le retour au christianisme primitif, elle cherchait également, aux termes même de son programme, "à développer la théorie de la nature humaine du Christ."† Si elle louait le travail et se préoccupait du "bien-être social," ce n'était que pour témoigner de son loyalisme à l'égard du gouvernement communiste, et l'organe réformiste ajoutait que l'égalité des travailleurs devait être considérée comme "la base de l'Etat." Pour conclure, il proclamait la nécessité de faire participer (en grand nombre) les paroissiens aux offices divins, et de leur confier le choix des prêtres. Ceux-ci seraient élus par une assemblée composée de membres du clergé et de simples fidèles, constitués en "congrégation liturgique." Et le programme stipulait qu'il fallait confier un rôle sacerdotal actif aux paroissiens, chaque fois que ceux-ci "répondraient aux exigences spirituelles de cette vocation."

En tant que mouvement de rationalisme dans le domaine des idées, et d'empirisme dans celui du dogme et de la

* *Eglise Vivante*, 1^{er} octobre, 1922.

† *Idem*.

liturgie, la doctrine de l'Eglise Vivante apparaît fortement entachée de tendances protestantes. Cependant, elle ne s'est pas détournée entièrement de ses origines slaves, et a cru pouvoir supplanter en la rajeunissant, l'ancienne Eglise orthodoxe. Notons que la participation active des paroissiens (poussée par l'Eglise du Métropolite Antonin à son plus haut degré) se retrouve sous diverses formes dans toutes les manifestations de la vie religieuse russe actuelle. Elle se rattache d'ailleurs à une tradition ancienne, datant d'avant Pierre le Grand, et conférant aux paroissiens un rôle actif dans la gestion de leur église. La formation de nombreuses congrégations mi religieuses mi laïques, qui fut une des conséquences de la lutte entre les communistes et les fidèles, a fortement contribué à développer ce mouvement. Les Eglises dissidentes l'ont défiguré en y introduisant un véritable principe électif. L'Eglise Ukrainienne, dont nous parlerons plus loin, en donne un exemple plus frappant encore. Mais revenons à l'Eglise Vivante. Les membres de son clergé tendent à modifier leur aspect extérieur, afin de se rapprocher le plus possible de celui des pasteurs protestants. Ils coupent leurs cheveux, se rasent, et arborent divers costumes depuis la redingote noire, jusqu'à la longue pèlerine violette revêtue par Antonin.

"En 1925," écrit Monseigneur d'Herbigny, "j'ai pu constater que l'Eglise Vivante agonisait. L'ex-Métropolite Antonin n'a plus de prestige ni d'influence. Archevêque d'ancien régime, protégé jadis par certains grands-ducs, membre éloquent de la Douma, il avait essayé de dominer le concile de 1923 et de s'imposer à la tête de toute l'orthodoxie russe. Il échoua. Ce n'est plus qu'une ruine maintenant. Son 'Association panrusse des Eglises de la Renaissance' n'est admise que par quatorze paroisses. C'est peu pour toute la Russie." Et l'auteur ajoute, afin d'expliquer cette impopularité croissante du chef de l'Eglise Vivante ou Renaissance: "Antonin présidait à Moscou la Commission des Inventaires, il dirigeait en 1922 la spoliation des églises, il n'a plus aucun crédit." C'est en vain que le gouvernement soviétique chercha à soutenir ce réformateur, qui semblait destiné à saper les fondements mêmes de la foi orthodoxe. "Aujourd'hui," conclut

Monseigneur d'Herbigny, "les fidèles se sont éloignés de lui, et il cesse même d'être utilisable contre leurs âmes."

D'autres tentatives de réforme ont été opérées sans beaucoup plus de succès : l'Eglise communiste de Krassnitzky, l'Eglise des Premiers Apôtres, l'Eglise libre des Ouvriers luttèrent entre elles pendant les premières années de la révolution. Leur rivalité n'a fait que hâter leur agonie. Tant qu'elles ont vécu, elles ont combattu le Patriarche, et ont été protégées par le pouvoir soviétique, qui n'a pas réussi à leur assurer la survivance.*

Ajoutons à cette liste de dissidents vingt millions de Vieux Croyants, de nombreuses sectes d'origine orthodoxe ou protestante, et enfin les *Eglises séparatistes*, qui ont rompu avec l'Eglise russe sur le terrain national : Eglise de Georgie, Eglise d'Esthonie, Eglise Ukrainienne. Cette dernière compte de cinq à six millions d'adeptes répandus en Ukraine, en Pologne et aux Etats-Unis. Un particularisme national fervent y domine toutes les manifestations de la vie religieuse. Nous y assistons de plus à une vaste participation des paroissiens dans les affaires ecclésiastiques; ainsi, par exemple, l'ordination des évêques ukrainiens fut confiée au peuple tout entier. Cette Eglise fait preuve d'une haine égale à l'égard des communistes de Moscou et des prêtres catholiques de Rome.

La décadence de l'Eglise Vivante du Métropolite Antonin est aujourd'hui manifeste. Mais un autre groupement continue à lutter contre l'Eglise traditionnelle, héritière du Patriarche Tikhone. C'est l'Eglise Synodale, qui à la suite du Concile de 1923 a reconnu la destitution de Tikhone. "L'Eglise Synodale," écrit Monseigneur d'Herbigny, "se compare volontiers aux évêques concordataires français de 1801: ni réfractaire comme les Tikhoniens, ni assermentée comme les Rouges, mais canoniquement sanctionnée par le Patriarche de Constantinople, comme les concordataires par Pie VII, elle ne discute pas le régime de fait, mais elle combat sa propagande anti-

* Tout en encourageant l'action des Eglises dissidentes, le gouvernement soviétique n'a nullement renoncé à sa propagande antireligieuse proprement dite. Des milliers de brochures antireligieuses sont expédiés jusque dans les villages les plus lointains. Les théâtres, les fêtes populaires, les démonstrations publiques de tous genres, continuent à lutter contre le sentiment religieux.

religieuse. Forte de deux cents évêques, et de dix sept mille prêtres, elle détient seize mille églises. Un quart des fidèles seulement la suit; un tiers maintenant, me disait un évêque Tikhonien. Sa faiblesse est d'avoir sacré évêques quelques prêtres mariés. Son vrai guide intellectuel est le Métropolitain Alexandre Védensky." Cet évêque de 36 ans, pasteur actif et orateur de grand talent, a récemment triomphé dans une discussion publique de l'un des piliers de l'athéisme officiel, le Commissaire de l'Instruction Publique, Lounotcharsky. Monseigneur d'Herbigny décrit dans son livre cette séance émouvante, qui s'est déroulée devant un auditoire de 6,000 personnes.

Tel est actuellement le bilan de la vie religieuse en Russie. Nous pouvons dès à présent affirmer, que malgré l'assaut de l'athéisme et du modernisme, le culte orthodoxe a été sauvegardé. Les églises sont ouvertes et des milliers de fidèles assistent au service divin. Les prêtres ont conservé leur costume traditionnel, leurs rites et leurs coutumes séculaires. Un grand mouvement spiritualiste se dessine parmi les intellectuels, et ce mouvement contribue à élever le niveau du clergé, qui cherche à opposer à la science matérialiste une solide culture religieuse. A mesure que l'Eglise se fortifie, son action sociale tend à augmenter. Les confréries et les unions paroissiales développent de jour en jour une activité plus féconde. En ce qui concerne le fond de la vie religieuse, nous assistons à un mouvement eucharistique, qui est une des manifestations les plus importantes de cette renaissance de la Foi. La communion fréquente, jadis blâmée par l'Eglise Orthodoxe, est aujourd'hui chaudement recommandée.

La Liturgie, elle aussi, a subi une véritable renaissance. Jamais, au dire de nombreux témoins, les prières et les chants religieux, n'ont été emprunts d'une plus grande solennité que dans ces églises arrachées toutes sanglantes aux mains de l'athéisme.

Avant de terminer cet article, il nous reste à dire quelques mots d'un mouvement qui a pris naissance à l'étranger, mais qui apparaît comme l'expression même de l'évolution religieuse et nationale russe. C'est le mouvement eurasiatique auquel nous avons consacré ailleurs un com-

mentaire détaillé.* Ses représentants, qui sont pour la plupart "des jeunes," ont repris l'ancienne doctrine "Slavophile," qu'ils ont transformée et modernisée. Profondément nationalistes, ils répudient la culture et la dialectique occidentale, la discipline latine, les méthodes scolastiques, c'est à dire tous les éléments de la pure civilisation européenne. La Russie, disent-ils, située aux confins de l'Europe et de l'Asie, n'est ni européenne, ni asiatique, mais *eurasienne*. Elle n'est pas uniquement héritière de l'occident, mais aussi, mais surtout de l'orient, où elle est allée puiser sa culture, sa mystique, son système philosophique propre. S'inspirant de ce principe, le groupe des Eurasiens considère l'Etat russe indissolublement lié à l'Eglise Orientale, il conserve pieusement les grandes traditions de la culture religieuse slave, afin de les appliquer dans leur intégrité à toutes les réalisations de l'avenir. La tâche des Eurasiens est à la foi politique, sociale et religieuse, et leur parti (car aujourd'hui c'en est un, et des mieux organisés) comprend des groupements de droite et de gauche, qui travaillent à l'étranger et en Russie même. Leurs chefs, parmi lesquels on compte des penseurs profonds et des écrivains brillants, tels que le Professeur Karsavine et Pierre Souvtchinsky, ont donné un puissant essor spirituel à l'activité intellectuelle russe.

Malgré le triomphe de la Foi, nous avons vu que l'Eglise Orthodoxe a subi de grandes et de tragiques divisions. Le groupe de Tikhone, le groupe synodal, le groupe des prêtres rouges, se disputent le domaine spirituel. Parmi l'émigration même, les fidèles sont divisés en deux camps hostiles, celui du Métropolite Euloge, qui séjourne en France, et celui du Métropolite Antony Chrapovitzky, qui a établi son état-major en Serbie.

Un pareil flottement des consciences, un pareil fléchissement des disciplines religieuses, ne manquent pas de paraître dangereux, à l'heure où l'union des fidèles s'impose de plus en plus. Cependant la complexité de l'évolution religieuse russe n'est pas un signe de décrépitude. Souvenons-nous, en effet, que nous avons à considérer une Eglise qui a toujours cherché à échapper à l'unité et

* *Revue de France*, 15 mars, 1926.

aux disciplines d'une hiérarchie absolue. En matières religieuses, le peuple russe se montre au plus haut degré individualiste, libéral, voire démocratique. L'Eglise Russe s'inspire de la volonté collective des prélats, des prêtres et des fidèles, érigés pour ainsi dire en collège mystique. Clergé et paroissiens, évêques, moines, tiers ordres et confréries forment un vaste corps qui conserve le libre jeu de ses organes. C'est cet esprit collectif ou collégial* qu'on appelle en Russie "Sobornost" et qui se trouve à la base de toute activité orthodoxe. Ajoutons que la tradition, considérée au même rang que la doctrine, demeure la constante inspiratrice autant des pasteurs que des fidèles.

Le Père Boulgakoff, Professeur au Séminaire Orthodoxe Russe de Saint Serge à Paris, définit de la façon suivante l'évolution de l'Eglise Russe à travers les siècles :

"L'Eglise Orthodoxe est basée sur la tradition, et remplace la doctrine par la contemplation. Son histoire n'est que l'histoire éternelle et ininterrompue d'une expérience religieuse constamment réalisée, pleine de liberté et d'inspiration" ("Pout," N. II).

Esprit de tradition, esprit collégial—tels sont en définitive les deux grands principes qui caractérisent la conception religieuse orthodoxe. Il convient d'y joindre le principe national, si étroitement mêlée aux préoccupations mystiques de l'Eglise Russe. Quiconque veut étudier de près le problème religieux, tel qu'il se pose actuellement en Russie, ne saurait négliger ces éléments, qui ont une importance primordiale dans le développement de la conscience orthodoxe. Nous n'avons pas à soulever ici un autre vaste problème, celui de l'Union, telle que l'a rêvée à la veille de sa mort, le grand ami des russes, Son Eminence le Cardinal Mercier. L'auteur de ces lignes, s'étant pliée aux disciplines catholiques, appartient à l'Eglise Orientale unie à Rome. C'est donc avec ferveur qu'elle appelle cette Union en masse, l'avènement de l'Eglise Universelle, entrevue également par un autre grand esprit, le philosophe russe Wladimir Solovieff.

* Il serait plus exact de dire "esprit de concile," le mot *Sobornost* étant dérivé du mot *Sobor*, qui signifie "concile" en russe.

Mais qu'il nous suffise de dire ici, que la pensée prophétique de l'Archevêque de Malines s'est portée avec amour vers l'Eglise Russe, dont on ne connaît pas assez la sublime épopée. Et les catholiques russes, observant, selon la volonté formelle de Sa Sainteté, le rite oriental en ce qu'il a de plus pur, ne doivent jamais oublier les racines profondes que les rattachent à leur Patrie. Puissent-ils prier sans cesse pour cette église martyre, héroïquement dressée contre les ennemis les plus acharnés du Christianisme.

Le miracle de la foi continue à opérer en Russie, alors que toutes les normes politiques, économiques et sociales ont été bouleversées de fond en comble. Une fois de plus le Christ a vaincu, une fois de plus les forces spirituelles ont triomphé des forces aveugles de la nature.

HÉLÈNE ISWOLSKY.

ART. 6.—CARDINAL PACCA AND NAPOLEON

Memoirs (English translation). By Cardinal B. Pacca. Two vols. Longmans, 1850.

Mémoires. By Cardinal H. Consalvi. J. Crétineau-Joly, La Bonne Presse, 1895.

La Rome de Napoléon. By Louis Madelin. Plon-Nourrit, 1906.

L'Avènement de Bonaparte. By Albert Vandal. Two vols. 1912.

Histoire Religieuse de la Révolution Française. By Pierre de la Gorce. Tome V. Plon-Nourrit, 1924.

THE long life of Cardinal Pacca has for the student an interest that is more than biographical, for it embodies a full and momentous chapter of European history. Pacca grew up during the years that saw the combined and converging assault upon the Church which began with the attack upon the Jesuits and culminated in the French Revolution. He played an important part in those events that were the outcome of Napoleon's attempt to subject the Holy See and thereby the Church itself to the aims of his personal policy. He was one of the most distinguished of those who suffered at Napoleon's hands. Next to Consalvi, he was the ablest and wisest of Pius VII's counsellors. He saw at close quarters "Febronianism," "Josephism," and "Illuminism" in Germany before the Revolution; then the First Empire, the Congresses, the epoch of the Carbonari and the conspiracies, and survived till the eve of the next great storm. The span of his long life thus connects the day of Louis XV and Joseph II, of Choiseul and Pombal, with that of Ricciotti and Mazzini—almost with that of Garibaldi*—so that in his later years this Nestor among the Cardinals was a link with a world that had passed utterly away. There are two periods in Pacca's active career to which it may be deemed worth while to return: the struggle with Napoleon, and the part he took in the government of the restored States of the Church during the years 1814 and 1815. Both are phases of the perennial but ever-changing Roman Question, which even in its modern aspect had reached a critical stage before Garibaldi and Cavour were born.

* In 1844 Garibaldi had graduated as a filibuster in Uruguay, and was already in command of the Italian Legion at Monte Video.

Bartolommèo Pacca was born of a noble family at Benevento on December 27, 1756. He was sent to the College of Nobles at Naples, a school that had belonged to the Jesuits before the Suppression, but then taught by clerics, who gave their pupils Pascal's *Provinciales*. In this atmosphere he imbibed a dislike of that famous Company for which he was one day to make a conspicuous *amende*. Thence he passed to the Collegio Clementino, where he read widely and stored his mind with Latin, French, and Italian literature, which in after life he was never tired of quoting; his memoirs contain citations from Cæsar (on the levity and credulity of the Gauls!), from Cicero, Vergil, Horace, Ovid, Seneca, Dante, Ariosto, and Tasso, as well as from the Scriptures, Tertullian, Lactantius, and the Fathers from St. Cyprian to St. Bernard. In 1778 he entered Pius VI's Accademia Ecclesiastica, three of his contemporaries being Severoli, Consalvi, and Della Genga.

His career in the *prelatura* began in 1785 with the appointment to the titular archbishopric of Damietta on his acceptance of the Nunciature at Cologne—a position that had been declined by Consalvi. He was accredited to the German ecclesiastical Princes—that is, to the three Electors, the Archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier, the Archbishop of Salzburg, the Bishops of Munster, Hildesheim, Paderborn, Osnabruck, Worms, Spire, and to the Prince-Bishop of Liège. The mission, difficult enough at any time, was at that moment exceptionally so, for there was immediate danger of schism. The unity of the Church and the authority of the Holy See had been gravely threatened by the spread of Febronianism, by "Josephism," and, above all, by the *Aufklärung*, of which these very secular prelates were thinly disguised adepts. Well aware that the journey to Vienna undertaken by Pius VI in the hope of inducing the Emperor to modify his policy of interference had been fruitless, and ignorant of their approaching doom, the German Metropolitans thought that the hour had come to free themselves from the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff. The Nuncio was promptly told by the Archbishop of Cologne that he would

not be recognized unless he promised not to exercise any act of jurisdiction. In the following year they drew up at the Congress of Ems their famous "Punctuation" (Twenty-three Points), which they intended to impose upon the Pope by means of a German National Council to be convened by the Emperor. Pacca lost no time in useless diplomacy. He simply quashed their acts, and, disregarding their appeal to the Emperor, exerted himself to obtain their condemnation from Rome, for he felt instinctively that he was in the presence of a conspiracy against the Church. A writer in the *Cambridge Modern History* (vol. x, p. 159) says that he "indiscriminately" ascribed the movement to the Jansenists, the Gallicans, the Philosophers, and the Freemasons. His discrimination was, on the contrary, exact. Febronianism was as certainly the German equivalent of Gallicanism, with a touch of Jansenism (though St. Cyran and Pascal would have shuddered at those hunting prelates), as Illuminism was the livery of the "Philosophers" and the Freemasons. These were precisely the elements of that nefarious coalition that on the other side of the Rhine produced the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The Nuncio was, in fact, resisting a movement that is now known to have had a strong and sinister influence upon the course of the French Revolution.

In 1791 he was in Paris for a time to aid and counsel the hapless Louis XVI after the return from Varennes. But nobody could do anything there, and he soon returned to Cologne, where already the effects of the Revolution had begun to be felt. He was eventually succeeded, as Nuncio in Germany, by Della Genga. In 1795 he went as Nuncio to Lisbon, where the effect of his German experience was reinforced by what he saw of the fruits of the policy of Pombal. In March, 1798, he heard the news of the deportation of Pius VI by the French, and immediately withstood the attempts of certain Portuguese bishops to render themselves independent of the Holy See. He had now seen almost identical manifestations of the Revolution in three European countries, and what he had seen he never afterwards forgot. To him there was henceforward one clear and overpowering issue. We can imagine him

saying with his ever-ready habit of quotation: *Domine, demonstrasti mihi et cognovi: tunc ostendisti mihi studia eorum* (Jer. xi 18).

Before his recall in 1801 he was created a Cardinal by Pius VII. On his way home he landed at Gibraltar, visited the Governor, who happened to be the Duke of Kent. The Duke was most cordial, kept him to lunch, insisted on his coming next day to dinner, and himself showed him round, these hospitalities adding another link to the good relations that were then rapidly being formed between the Holy See and the Court of St. James's. He there met another son of George III, Augustus, Duke of Sussex, and Lord Keith, whose active career began by opposing Napoleon at Toulon and ended by shipping him to St. Helena.

Cardinal Pacca became Pro-Secretary of State to Pope Pius VII on June 18, 1808, after Cardinals Casoni, Doria, and Gabrielli had in turn followed Consalvi into enforced retirement. The quarrel which Napoleon had forced upon the Holy See had by that time gone far. It is clear enough that Napoleon had long designed to take possession of Rome and to reign therefrom as Cæsar. He seems to have looked upon himself as an ancient Roman reincarnate. From boyhood his head had been full of Livy, Tacitus, and, above all, Plutarch; his favourite painter was David, his favourite actor Talma, his sculptor Canova. When in 1797 he formed the Lombard Republic, he had startled the Directory in Paris by baptizing the new State the "Cisalpine" Republic. Interpreted as a concession to Italian nationality, it expressed in reality his secret point of view—he was gazing northwards from the Capitol. So, after *Brumaire*, we find him designated First Consul, and the rapid growth of the imperial idea in his mind strengthened his design upon Rome. As yet he had not visited the Eternal City. He would not go there until he could go as Cæsar. Hence the necessity of overthrowing the temporal sovereignty of the Pope and of removing him from the City. This preoccupation explains Napoleon's Italian policy up to the dethronement and deportation of the Pope. Whether part of the country was called the

Kingdom of Italy or another part the Kingdom of Naples, the whole was, in fact, to be absolutely subject to himself. "J'établirai un Sénat à Rome," he said in front of Caprara, as early as 1806, "et, quand une fois Rome et l'Etat pontifical seront entre mes mains, ils n'en sortiront plus." Methodically, he postponed the annexation until the only remaining Catholic Powers, Spain and Austria, had been so badly mauled by him that they could not intervene. By the middle of 1809 two of the three obstacles to a united kingdom of Italy were deemed to have been removed. The dynasts had long since been expelled, and Italian particularism was much diminished (Napoleon believed it was being rapidly eliminated) by uniform and modern administration. The third obstacle, the Temporal Power, would not give him a moment's difficulty. Looking back on it all from St. Helena, he said: "I purposed, when I had a second son, to make him King of Italy, with Rome for his capital."

Thus the position of the Papacy would have been permanently altered. Whether the Pope eventually returned to Rome "merely as Bishop of the City" or remained at Avignon, or maintained two palaces, "one necessarily at Paris," as a kind of Imperial Chaplain, would not have made much difference.

Napoleon, master of Rome, would have been crowned there as Cæsar and Lord of the World. Had Pius VII died at Savona or at Fontainebleau, the design would have been fully disclosed. The Emperor would have interfered with the Conclave, procured the election of one of his French or Italian subjects, and there would almost certainly have been a second Great Schism.

Beyond these dynastic ambitions, which are intelligible enough, lies the difficult question which in practice meant so much suffering to Pope, Cardinals, and clergy—What was the reason for his extraordinary attitude towards the Church from 1810 until his downfall? When Rome and the Patrimony had been annexed to the French Empire, Pontiff and Cardinals deported to Paris, recalcitrant Italian clergy exiled and imprisoned by hundreds, all resistance crushed, there followed the strange attempt to wrest from

the captive Pope the spiritual prerogatives of his office, the campaign to enforce Gallicanism upon the Church in France and even to spread it in Northern Italy, the "National Council" of 1811, the extorted Concordat of Fontainebleau. What did it all mean? Why, with enormous military and administrative problems pressing upon him, should he occupy himself with such questions? I think he never forgot the advice sent to him by the Directory in February, 1797, when he was General of the Army of Italy, and they wished him to march upon Rome and extirpate Catholicism, that it was "essential to destroy the centre of unity." I think, too, that though he may not have repented of the Concordat of 1801, he had become convinced that the Church had already burst the shackles of his *Articles Organiques* and was obtaining something like her natural influence. Hence the necessity for repression, for he intended to tolerate no influence of any kind but his own. "Tout influence qui ne vient pas du gouvernement est un crime en politique," as he himself had said to Bourmont. Religion was to be one of his *instrumenta regni*, and nothing more. The phrase "crime en politique" is the key and the literal explanation of his behaviour.

When Pacca became Pro-Secretary of State, a French force under General Miollis had occupied Rome for more than four months—that is, since February 2, 1808. The difficulties intentionally created by this species of *condominium* soon became acute. Pacca relates them in his *Memoirs* and shows how his position necessarily made him the centre of resistance to the usurpation. Matters came to a head when the French attempted to form a Roman civic guard, and the Pope naturally forbade his subjects to serve in it. Miollis thereupon decided (September 6) to arrest Cardinal Pacca and deport him to his native city of Benevento, conceiving that without the firm and vigilant Minister the Pontiff would be helpless. This, however, was prevented by the personal intervention of Pius VII, who, acting with unwonted and remarkable energy, appeared on the scene in the nick of time and personally took Pacca out of the hands of those who came to arrest

him. From that day the Pope's kingdom was reduced to the actual building of the Quirinal, which was barricaded and put into a state of defence as for a siege.

"From his imperial camp at Vienna" on May 17, 1809, Napoleon launched the decree "recalling the donation of Charlemagne, his august predecessor," dethroning the Pope and annexing Rome and the remaining States of the Church to the French Empire.* On June 10 following the decree was carried out by force of arms, and amid salvoes of artillery the tricolour was hoisted over the Castle of Sant' Angelo. As the guns went off, the Pope and Pacca looked at one another and simultaneously uttered the words: "Consummatum est." The long delayed blow had fallen at last. There was general consternation in the Quirinal, and some of the Cardinals believed that their last hour had come. Pacca, however, preserved his serene intrepidity, and the same evening the Pope's protest appeared on the walls of St. Peter's, of the Lateran, and of St. Mary Major, side by side with Napoleon's proclamation. The Bull of Excommunication, *Quum Memoranda*, which had been prepared and kept in readiness for the event, followed in a few hours. This was to cost the courageous Minister three and a half years' imprisonment in a fortress.

The Bull of Excommunication did its work, and the French soon found that they could not overcome the passive resistance of the Roman clergy and people. Though he was practically imprisoned in his own palace, the Pope's little finger, as Radet said, was stronger than their bayonets. The end came on the night of July 5-6, when the Quirinal was taken by assault. The doors leading to the private apartments were broken open with axes. Radet entered the Pope's room, axe in hand, led by a couple of scoundrels, who, Judas-like, had offered to show him the way, and followed by his officers and gendarmerie. He was confronted by the Pope, who stood crucifix and breviary in hand, with Cardinals Pacca and Despuich on his right and left, the minor prelates, officials,

* The Legations had been taken at Tolentino in 1797; the Marches were annexed to the Kingdom of Italy in 1806, whilst Benevento and Ponte Corvo were given to Talleyrand and Bernadotte respectively.

and clerks ranged on either side. "General Radet and the above-mentioned persons having formed line opposite the Holy Father and ourselves, both parties stood face to face some minutes in perfect silence . . . while no one uttered a single word or changed his position." The tense scene was soon over. Radet told his errand. The Pope signified that his Minister would accompany him. A few minutes more and without a change of clothing, without even his glasses, the Pope was led to a carriage of which the blinds had been nailed down. Pacca followed and sat beside him. It was then four in the morning. Radet himself jumped up on to the box, and with a sharp order, "Fouette, cocher!" they started off. The Pope was still clutching his crucifix and breviary, Pacca had absolutely nothing. Before long they bethought themselves of their purses; the Pope had on him just tenpence, the Cardinal sevenpence halfpenny. That same night the walls of the City were placarded with the Pope's solemn and pathetic farewell, which Pacca, knowing what was to come upon them, had taken care to have ready. Underneath it soon appeared the immortal words in which Dante sings the outrage of Anagni:

E nel vicario suo Cristo esser catto :
 Veggiolo un altra volta esser deriso :
 Veggiolo rinnovellar l'aceto e il fele.*

The hardships of the journey northwards are brought home to us by some half-pathetic, half-absurd incidents related by Pacca, who, acting as personal servant as well as companion to the Pope, did much to alleviate his sufferings. At Florence they were separated until the journey's end at Grenoble. There he contrived to send the Pontiff a note warning him that he would soon be without minister or counsellor, and begging him especially to beware of the Cardinals whom the Government would appoint to "assist" him. On August 1 Pacca was placed under arrest and heard that it was an open question whether he would be put to death for having published the Bull of Excommunication, because Napoleon had openly sworn

* Dante: *Purgatorio*, xx, 86-89.

that he would shoot anybody, cleric or layman, who had had any hand in the preparation or publication of the Bull. Six days later the Cardinal was sent to the fortress of Fenestrelle, a prison with a sinister reputation, for its very name, he tells us, "excited a horror as profound as that of Siberia." It was perched upon a ridge in a chain of the Alps, separating Piedmont from Dauphiné. The climatic conditions were frightful: deep snow in July and August; in winter sixteen hours utter darkness out of twenty-four, the crash of avalanches, the howling of wolves. He was placed in a cell, in solitary confinement, at first forbidden even the usual exercise in the prison-yard. For ten months he was not able to say Mass. When he asked for books, he was given a volume of Voltaire. Only by elaborate stratagem was he able to receive Holy Communion at Christmas and Epiphany. In this dreadful place the unfortunate Cardinal was destined to spend three and a half years. To one who had been reared in the climate of Southern Italy the physical suffering must have been acute, while apprehension, like the very chill of death, must have weighed upon the heart. Yet his equanimity did not desert him even here: *non moriar sed vivam, et narrabo opera Domini*.

The severity of this imprisonment was, however, gradually relaxed after the first year until ultimately he was able to enjoy a round of occupations: saying and hearing Mass, devotions, writing (for he began his memoirs here, as Consalvi did at Reims), walking exercise in the courtyard, seeing the newspapers, and, finally, a social hour in the rooms of the commandant. On Sundays and holy days he gave Benediction to all prisoners. These greatly increased in number while he was there. All had come there for the same cause. Pacca justly observes that while much had been written (even then) about *lettres de cachet* and the Bastille, in order to arouse hatred for the Bourbons, Napoleon had, as a fact, far surpassed all the Bourbons in arresting and imprisoning multitudes on the sole order of his Minister of Police. Not one Bastille, but eight* were

* Vincennes, Ham, Château d'If, Pierre Châtel, Saumur, Landscronn, Fenestrelle, and Compiègne.

needed to hold Napoleon's state prisoners. The persecution of the clergy in the Papal States was at its height in 1810-11, and the Piedmontese fortress was rapidly filled up with the more distinguished victims. Pacca knew and names them all.

The Concordat of Fontainebleau extorted by the Emperor from Pius VII on January 25, 1813, was the occasion of Pacca's release. He heard the news of the agreement and of his own consequent liberation about a week later. Knowing from the newspapers what had befallen the Grand Army in Russia, he saw a new chapter opening, and instantly decided that his place was at the Pope's side. On February 5, 1813, he was in his carriage again on the way to Fontainebleau. His fame went before him. At Lyons he received an ovation, "being hailed as a Confessor of the Faith who had suffered in the cause of Jesus Christ."

At Fontainebleau he found his colleagues Di Pietro, Gabrielli, and Litta, and learned from Pius VII that Napoleon had proposed the exclusion of himself and Cardinal Di Pietro from the benefits of the amnesty and their perpetual banishment from the Pope's person. He heard also with dismay and disgust that he would have to go to Paris to be presented to the Emperor. Consalvi arrived the same evening, and Pacca interrupts his narrative to describe the influence of Consalvi over Pius VII in the words that Dante puts into the mouth of Piero della Vigne, the minister of Frederick II:

Io son colui che tenne ambo le chiavi
Del cuor di [Chiaromonti] e che le volsi
Serrando e disserrando. . . *

On the 22nd took place the curious interview with Napoleon. The latter walked straight up to the Cardinals and addressed Pacca first: "Pacca, have you not been a little while in a fortress?" "Three years and a half, Sire," was the reply. Then suiting his action to the words, the imperial comedian pretended to write, and asked, "Was it not you who wrote the Bull of Excommunication?" For

* *Inferno*, xiii, 60-65.

fear of bringing upon himself "some rabid invective," the Cardinal made no reply, whereupon Napoleon calmly said, "We must now forget all that has passed." To Consalvi he made an almost equally strange remark and then went on to the others. Pacca, perplexed but rejoicing that he had got off cheaply (he asks the reader to pardon the colloquialism), could only attribute the singular behaviour of the Emperor to some exaggerated estimate of his own influence over the Pope. Despite his own emphatic disclaimer, that estimate persisted and is still found in French writers on the period.

He was not in the mood to enjoy his visit to Paris, as he everywhere encountered something that had melancholy associations. The Museum (Louvre) and the Library were full of plunder from the Vatican, the statues still bearing on their pedestals the familiar words, "Munificentia Pii VI P.M." More painful were the feelings aroused in those places where so many innocent victims had perished and where a multitude of venerable priests had been barbarously done to death. In the secularized church of the Patron Saint of Paris he contemplated the unhallowed sepulchres of Voltaire, Rousseau, Mirabeau, and Marat, and, on hearing that if he were to end his days in France* his remains would be laid "in this antechamber of the Devil," rushed from the place in horror.

In all the events that ensued at Fontainebleau, Pacca played a notable part; he was, in fact, one of the inner group with whom the Pope concerted everything. For all this the Memoirs are first-class historical material, for he gives many interesting details and the text of important documents. By the end of the year Napoleon found that neither violence nor trickery had succeeded. The Pope had yielded nothing, had repudiated what was wrung from him under duress, and had contrived to send to the Emperor Francis a statement of his claims to be placed before the European Powers at the following Congress. Napoleon then resolved to send the Pope back to Savona, to disperse the little court at Fontainebleau, and to exile

* Cardinals Erskine and Vincenti died in Paris during 1811 and were buried in the Pantheon.

afresh the Cardinals who had thwarted him. On January 21, 1814, Pacca received the order to betake himself to the small city of Uzès, in the department of Gard. The others were sent southwards to similar places, because already the Allied armies were in Eastern France. When passing through Orleans, Pacca saw the statue of the Maid, and could not refrain from observing to the officer-in-charge that the French would soon need another Joan of Arc. On Easter Sunday, April 10, 1814, it was known in Uzès that the Allies had entered Paris. The white cockade soon appeared, and "Vive le Roi" was followed by "Vive Sa Sainteté" and "Vive le Cardinal." The latter had to spend hours at the window of his inn or out on the balcony acknowledging fervent salutations and giving his blessing. One can imagine his mild and benignant countenance while they roared "Vive le Cardinal," and he responded with "Vive la bonne cité d'Uzès!" One enthusiast walked up and down banging a drum and alternating "Vive le Roi!" with "A bas les droits réunis!"* The next fortnight was passed in receiving visits and responding to popular ovations. On the Sunday he went in procession to the parish church, said Mass and gave Holy Communion to hundreds of people; in the evening solemn Vespers and Benediction. On the 22nd he set out for Italy. It was the same thing at Avignon, at Nîmes, and at Aix-en-Provence, where Good Shepherd Sunday was made the occasion of a religious, personal and political festival. As he passed through the towns of Provence he saw the statues of Napoleon thrown down and dragged through the mud. At Le Luc, near Fréjus, he had a conversation with Pauline Bonaparte, Princess Borghese, whom he found stunned by the news of her brother's fall. So gracious and consoling was his discourse that the Princess remained to the end of her days his grateful friend and eventually left him a considerable legacy. He had not gone much farther when he was told that Napoleon himself had just reached the frontier. These incidents are the foundation of the well-known but apocryphal story of Napoleon and Consalvi crossing each other when the

* "Down with the Excise."

former was on his way to Elba. On May 11 Pacca joined the Pope at Senigaglia and thence accompanied him in the long triumphal progress Romewards through Ancona, Loreto, Macerata, Tolentino, Foligno, Spoleto, and Terni. On May 21, 1814, he sat with Cardinal Mattei in the Pope's carriage when all Rome came out to meet the Pontiff at the Milvian Bridge and drew him in frantic triumph to St. Peter's.

The wheel had come full circle. Napoleon was in Elba and Pius VII was back again in the Quirinal which had been recently embellished for the reception of the Empress and the King of Rome. Pacca returned to Rome profoundly thankful for the great deliverance, and profoundly convinced that "the Finger of God" (one of his favourite expressions) was clearly visible in the whole course of events. This conviction is triumphantly formulated in his Memoirs, and the passage is, perhaps, worthy of being quoted:

"1. The liberation of Italy from the French in 1799, only a few days before the death of Pius VI, thereby affording sufficient, though barely sufficient, time for the dispersed Cardinals to assemble at Venice and elect a Pope.

"2. The restitution of the temporal dominion of the Holy See brought about by the armed forces of Powers that were not Catholic.

"3. The prompt and terrible effects of the Bull of Excommunication upon the destiny of Napoleon, whose prodigious prospects began from that hour to decline.

"4. The tragic and fearful deaths of Berthier, Salicetti, and Murat,* accomplices and abettors of the two sacrilegious usurpations of Rome."

And here he does not forget to quote Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum*.

While in the same vein Pacca carefully notes two coincidences. "On June 20, 1812, the Pope arrived, a prisoner, almost in a moribund state, at Fontainebleau, and on the 22nd day of the same month Napoleon, intoxi-

* He is writing in 1818.

cated by uninterrupted success for fifteen years, invaded Russia, thus beginning the fatal war that hurled him from his throne." But far more impressive and memorable was that grim fulfilment of words that the conqueror had used in derision. On July 22, 1807, writing from Dresden to the viceroy of Italy, Napoleon asked ironically: "Does he [the Pope] not know how much the times have changed? Does he take me for a Louis le Débonnaire, or does he imagine that his excommunications will make the weapons drop from the hands of my soldiers?" Napoleon was so pleased with this quip that he several times repeated it in public to the unhappy Legate at Paris, Cardinal Caprara, of whom he had come to make a butt. But the muskets did drop by tens of thousands from the frozen hands of the soldiers in 1812.

There again the pious Cardinal saw the Finger of God. But excepting always Napoleon's slow agony at St. Helena, nothing was more striking than the way in which Murat came to his end—an example indeed of the adage that God pays debts without money. Consalvi, while at Vienna, penetrated Murat's intention of supplanting Napoleon in Italy—with his designs on Rome they were already well acquainted—and, by a triple treason, of "dishing" impartially the Pope, the French, and the Hapsburg, and emerging as king of the united peninsula; and the great diplomat had predicted (February 15, 1815) to Pacca that the restless Gascon would certainly walk into a trap—"nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futuræ!" On May 2, 1815, Murat was overthrown at Tolentino, where Pius VI's woes had begun with the disastrous Treaty of 1797. On October 13 following King Joachim met the fate of the Duc d'Enghien, for whose execution, eleven years before, he had made, by Napoleon's order, arrangements exactly similar to those now adopted for his own. On the same day Napoleon first sighted St. Helena.

J. J. DWYER.

ART. 7.—THE CRISIS OF THE WEST

OF all the changes that the twentieth century has brought, none goes deeper than the loss of that unquestioning faith in the future and in the absolute value of our civilization, which was the dominant note of the nineteenth century.

The Great War, and still more the period of disillusionment and economic strain that followed it, has caused men to realize what a fragile thing civilization is, and how insecure are the foundations on which the elaborate edifice of modern society rests.

Moreover, the European crisis and the weakening of social stability have given an opportunity to all the forces that were hostile to the nineteenth-century order. The Russian Revolution supplied a rallying-point and a model of action for all the discontented elements in Western society, and in every country a vigorous propaganda is being carried on in favour of the Communist programme of class war and social revolution. At the same time the peoples of the East are in revolt against Western Imperialism, and against the economic and social dependence of Asia on European civilization.

But perhaps the most serious symptom of all is the spirit of pessimism and disillusionment which prevails so widely among the leaders of opinion in Europe itself. In the nineteenth century both the reformers and the conservatives were fundamentally optimistic with an immense belief in the superiority of modern civilization and a sturdy confidence in the future. Today we find Socialists like Mr. Bertrand Russell who believe that the civilization of modern Europe has lost all moral justification and has become a menace to the human race, while many of the ablest conservative thinkers in this country, and still more on the Continent, maintain that it is all up with England and with Europe, and that our civilization has entered on a phase of inevitable decline, like that which brought about the fall of Rome and so many other flourishing cultures of ancient times. Thus in the prevalent mood of pessimism and national self-depreciation there is a general

tendency to deny or underrate the value of the nineteenth-century achievement.

The revolutionary takes it for granted as the bad old order of things against which he rebels, the reactionary is prepared to wipe it off the slate as a failure. Neither of them understands that the nineteenth century was one of the great creative epochs in the history of the human race—that it was not an age like other ages, but a rare peak of achievement, after the attainment of which the life of humanity can never be the same as it was before. It entails a radical modification of men's relation to this environment, for it marks the definite conquest of nature by man, the taming of the tyranny of circumstance and the harnessing of the forces of brute matter by the power of human intelligence. This change was indeed implicit in the great scientific discoveries of the seventeenth century, and its possibility was already envisaged by thinkers like Bacon and Descartes, and even Campanella and Leonardo da Vinci. For it was the abstract thinkers, and not the men of action, who were the creators of the new civilization.

As Henri Poincaré has well said, "The conquests of industry, which have enriched so many practical men, would never have seen the day if these practical men had been the only ones to exist, and if they had not been preceded by disinterested madmen, who died poor, who never thought of the useful, but who nevertheless were guided by something more than their own caprices." *

The greatness of the nineteenth century consists in the fact that it was an age both of great thinkers and of great men of action, of "disinterested madmen" like Cauchy and Gauss, Faraday and Clark Maxwell, as well as of the captains of industry, the financiers and the engineers, who planned the railways, and sunk the shafts, and laid the cables which have transformed the face of the earth. And all these individual activities are but the manifestation of the great co-operative effort by which Western society summoned up its forces for the conquest of the world.

We have grown so accustomed to look at the dark side

* *Science et Méthode*, p. 9.

of the Industrial Revolution, the ruthlessness of the factory system, and the selfishness of the capitalists and the profiteers that we are apt to forget the elements of self-sacrifice and asceticism that characterized the beginnings of Industrialism. Historians such as Troeltsch and Max Weber have shown that the origins of the modern industrial movement have a very close connection with the moral and social ideals of Puritanism. The Protestant asceticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not lead men to fly from the world and give up all their goods to the poor as in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, it inculcated the duty of an unremitting industry and thrift, while at the same time rigorously discountenancing any kind of self-indulgence or extravagance in the expenditure of what had been gained. This was the ideal of the classes that contributed most to the economic revolution, and it favoured the rise of that type of man who was so characteristic of English and American middle-class society a century ago—the hard-headed, hard-working conscientious man of business who spared himself no more than his employees and looked on his work as a sort of religious vocation.

Just as the ideal of disinterested scientific knowledge made possible the technical achievements of the nineteenth-century culture, the narrow and intense Puritan religious ideal gave the latter its moral driving power. Without this intense conviction of a providential mission the Western peoples—above all the “Anglo-Saxons”—could never have made so deep an impression on the rest of the world. Religion went hand in hand with trade to the conquest of the earth. It inspired soldiers and administrators like Gordon and Lawrence no less than missionaries and explorers like Livingstone and George Grenfell, and the flag followed the missionary into the remotest regions of Africa and the Pacific. Thus in the course of the nineteenth century this combination of economic expansion, missionary propaganda, and military conquest has led Europe step by step to a position of world hegemony.

The great Oriental civilizations which have existed for ages as closed worlds have been drawn into the net of the

new industrial scientific culture of the West. By the twentieth century regions in Africa the very existence of which were unknown a century earlier were producing wealth for the European market, and were in closer economic relations with England than England herself had been with the Continent in the eighteenth century, while in America and Australia great modern cities with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants had sprung up on the hunting-grounds of savage tribes, whose manner of life had little changed since palæolithic times.

Nor is this expansion of the European culture confined to colonization and economic penetration. There is also a general process of assimilation owing to which the non-European peoples are adopting Western manners and dress, Western arms and military organization, Western education and political institutions. Republics and parliaments on the Western model have replaced sacred monarchies that had ruled from immemorial antiquity. Everywhere the old independent cultural ideals and the old self-sufficient agrarian economy have broken down, and the world has become a single community with an international economic life and common political and educational standards.

The whole process bears a remarkable resemblance to the unification of the ancient world by Rome in the first and second centuries B.C., though it is on a vaster scale and involves far wider issues. It is true that the Roman Imperial movement was essentially military and the economic factor was secondary, whereas the modern world organization is primarily economic and the military aspect of it has been subordinate. Nevertheless, the builders of the Roman roads were fulfilling the same function as the constructors of the modern railways; and the Roman financiers and societies of publicans took the same part in the development of the Empire as the European capitalists and bond-holders in modern times. Cicero's famous speech in support of military intervention in Asia Minor might almost have been made by an English politician at the time of the South African War, except for its outspoken *naïveté*. "Unless the enemy is quickly

suppressed," he says, "not only will the publicans themselves, who are the prop and support of all the other orders of society, use their wealth, but so will all the private citizens who have invested their money in Asia, and this in turn will produce a series of failures on the Roman Forum. For Roman credit and the state of the money market are inextricably bound up with the capital invested in Asia. So now," he concludes, "see if you can hesitate to throw all your energies into a war in which you are defending at once national glory, public revenues, and private investments." (*Pro Lege Manilia*, VII.)

The Roman, no less than the Victorian Englishman, was fully convinced of his inborn superiority to the clever and immoral Greeks and the superstitious and feckless Orientals. He also inherited a strict moral code, and a high ideal of duty and laboriousness from the religion of his peasant ancestors. A type like the elder Cato, with his forbidding appearance—"all teeth and red hair," as a contemporary said—his moral censoriousness, his personal probity, and his devotion to money-making, is utterly alien to the modern Italian character, but finds plenty of parallels in the England of the Industrial Revolution. But it was the Nemesis of this society that it destroyed the foundations on which its own strength rested. The old Roman virtues withered away when the peasant republic had become a capitalist oligarchy, based on a mercenary army and a horde of tax-gatherers. The successors of the Catonian tradition—model republicans like Brutus—were millionaires, who exploited the provinces and lent great sums of money to subject communities at an interest of 48 per cent. The small-holdings of the citizen farmers were absorbed by the vast estates of the new nobility, worked by cheap slave labour imported from abroad, while their former owners drifted away to become mercenaries or to join the ranks of the urban proletariat, who lived by State doles, and were ready material for the revolutionary agitators. Meanwhile, would-be reformers attempted to mend matters by applying the remedies of Greek social democracy—the confiscation of the great

estates and the proscription of the capitalist class. Thus in the first century B.C. Roman society was faced by a revolutionary crisis, complicated by the rebellion of the subject nationalities and the horrors of a civil war. It seemed as though society would tear itself to pieces, and that the complete collapse of ancient civilization was at hand.

Now in the modern world also economic progress and the success of material organization have been accompanied by a process of social disorganization, which produces grave discontent and the danger of a revolutionary crisis.

The capitalist organization of industry has led, no less than military conquest, to the exploitation of subject classes and nationalities. It is true that the modern industrialism at its worst has never led to the horrors of the Roman slave system, but the existence of the modern ideals of humanity and liberty has caused the evils of the modern system to be far more strongly felt. And it must be admitted that the industrial movement, while raising the general standard of life, has caused a retrogression in the position of the ordinary worker. Politically he gained full rights of citizenship such as he never possessed at any other period of the world's history; economically he lost the control that the craftsman possessed under the old system of hand industry over the conditions of his work, and became a mere cog in the vast machinery of modern industrialism.

Consequently, it was inevitable that the earlier revolutionary propaganda on behalf of the Rights of Man should ultimately take an economic form.

Socialism was, in fact, the heir of the earlier revolutionary Liberalism. In spite of the scientific interpretation that it received at the hands of Karl Marx and his disciples, it was like the doctrine of Rousseau—no cold rational theory, but a creed and a religion. It owed its popular appeal to the belief in a social apocalypse, the coming of a kingdom of justice, in which the poor and the oppressed should triumph, and the rich and the oppressor should be cast into outer darkness. All the

great Socialists were equally Utopians. The only difference was that Marx believed that his Utopia would be won by the bomb and the rifle, while Godwin and Owen and St. Simon believed that it would come by a change of heart and a reign of universal benevolence. The Marxian interpretation of history and social evolution must be judged as an economic, or rather philosophic, theory; but, considered as a sociological phenomenon, the revolutionary socialism of modern Europe must be classed with the obscure movements of revolt that shook the ancient world in the first and second centuries B.C. It marks the failure of the great movement of material progress and organization to satisfy the instincts of the human element, on whose labour the social edifice rests. It is not merely a dissatisfaction with material conditions, it is a movement of spiritual disaffection against the modern social order and a demand for a new life.

But it is not only the Socialists and the revolutionaries who threaten the modern European order. As in the case of the militarist capitalism of the later Roman Republic, the greatest danger to the industrialist capitalism of modern Europe comes from its own inherent instability.

The exploitation of the world by the new industrialized societies of Western Europe, like that of the Mediterranean lands by Rome in the first and second centuries B.C., has been too rapid to continue indefinitely.

The prosperity of the industrialized societies of the nineteenth century rested on a temporary monopoly of the new methods—on a limited output combined with a continually expanding world market.

But today these factors are reversed. The new methods are becoming common to the whole world, and the old monopoly enjoyed by the leading industrial Powers of Western Europe is rapidly disappearing. Every nation—even those of the Far East, like Japan—is organizing itself to take its share in the world markets, while at the same time restricting those markets by a rigorous protective tariff.

Nowhere has the influence of these new conditions

been felt more strongly than in England, the classical home of the old industry. At the present moment we see its effects, not only in the crisis of the coal industry, but in the disastrous state of all the so-called "heavy industries" subsisting by the foreign market, which has resulted in the work of a dustman being often better paid than that of a skilled engineer. Moreover, during the period of Free Trade and open markets the industrial population increased far beyond the limits of the national agricultural capacity, so that England is almost entirely dependent on an imported food supply, which must be financed by the industrial export, in the face of growing competition abroad and prohibitive duties.

Thus the vast and rapid development of the new economic order has produced a serious reaction, and Europe's position of world leadership seems threatened less than a century after its attainment. For if the organization of the world by Europe was in the main due to her economic supremacy, the passing of that supremacy would seem to portend the breakdown of her international leadership. Already the East is reacting against the supremacy of the West and claiming an equality of position ; and the internal power of resistance of European civilization is weakened alike by national rivalry and disunion, and by the social discontent of international labour.

The ancient world passed through a similar crisis in the age of Mithridates and the Civil Wars. Then also the power of the West was threatened alike by the reaction of the Oriental world, and by its own disunity and the forces of social revolution. Had Rome failed the whole history of the world would have been different, but she succeeded in surmounting her difficulties at the cost of immense suffering ; and, thanks to the achievements of the Augustan age, the Roman work of material unification became the basis of a new order which has influenced the whole later development of civilization.

In our own days the future of civilization depends no less on the solution of the present crisis. If modern Europe breaks down, either through internal revolution or through loss of her world leadership, modern civilization

falls with her. For that civilization was entirely a European creation, and there is no force outside Europe today capable of carrying on her work, whatever might be the case a century or two later.

Either the incipient world order that has been the work of the last century of Western progress will break down and disappear, or it must be completed by a further process of stabilization and organization which will make possible an age of true world civilization under Western leadership. Now modern Europe is faced with three great problems.

First there is the international problem—the reconciliation of the claims of nationality with the unity and common interests of European culture.

Secondly, there is the Oriental problem—the reconciliation of the legitimate claims of the subject and dependent peoples of Asia and Africa with the leadership of Western culture.

And thirdly there is the economic problem—not only the reconciliation of the demand of labour for a higher standard of life with the capitalist control and organization of industry, but also the whole problem of stabilizing economic conditions and adjusting the relations of the industrial societies to the world markets and to the sources of supply. All these problems are especially vital to the future of this country, for the British Empire occupies a unique position between Europe and the East, as well as between Europe and the New World, and if it is no longer the leading industrial power of the world, it still retains economic supremacy as the centre of world finance and international trade.

Moreover, it is in Great Britain that the problem of the relations of capital and labour is most acute, and it is generally recognized that the fate of the present economic order depends on its stability in this country.

It is, of course, far too early to foresee how these problems will find a solution, or whether they will find a solution at all. Socialism, of course, is one alternative, and in so far as the Socialists predict the growing control and organization of economic life by the State, they are

undoubtedly right. The great State has come to stay, and we can never return to the old individualism and *laissez faire* of the Early Victorian age. But State organization in itself is no solution ; it merely heightens the bitterness of national economic rivalry. And here the Socialist panacea of world revolution is far more likely to hasten the collapse of Europe than to avert it. The capitalist organization of industry and trade has played the same part in the unification of the modern world that the military organization of Rome played in the ancient world, and Rome was saved not by revolutionaries like Spartacus or Cataline, but by men like Julius Cæsar and Augustus, who made Roman militarism constructive and pacific instead of destructive and selfish. Western civilization today is waiting for its Augustus ; it needs consolidation rather than revolution, not, of course, in the sense of an Imperial unification by military power, but in the form of a social consolidation and a stabilizing of economic conditions.

The foundation of the League of Nations proves at least that there is a general realization of the need for world peace and international action for common ends. But it also shows how far these ideals are at present from practical realization, and how deep is the inner disunity of our civilization. There is not only an opposition of material interests and ambitions among the peoples of Europe, there are fundamental differences of mental outlook and ideals. Our culture has lost its unity, not only internationally, but morally, even within the limits of the individual societies of which Europe is composed.

And this brings us to a deeper problem than any of the three we have already discussed, for it is upon the moral and spiritual unity of a culture that its external life ultimately depends. For Europe is not, as we are often inclined to believe, a group of peoples held together by a common type of material culture, it is a spiritual society which owes its very existence to the religious tradition which for a thousand years moulded the beliefs, the ideals, and the institutions of the European peoples. Even the Reformation and the centuries of religious and

international strife that followed it did not entirely destroy this common tradition. Europe remained Christendom, though it was a Christendom secularized and divided. The vision of its lost unity haunted the mind of Europe, and inspired the men of the eighteenth century with their enthusiasm for the abstract ideals of humanity and a new social order. They felt that Europe was being born again and that the union of humanity was at hand.

But the new age saw the frustration of all these hopes. The vast progress of material civilization and of man's control over nature in the nineteenth century was not accompanied by the corresponding advance in spiritual unity.

It seemed as though the new powers had outstripped all social control, and that man was becoming the slave of the machinery that he had created. While the ancient Greeks, or the men of the Middle Ages, had used their poor resources to create great artistic works as the material embodiment of their social and spiritual ideals, the men of the nineteenth century used their vast powers to build up the ugly, unhealthy, and disorderly cities of the industrial era, which seem devoid of form or of any common social purpose.

It is true that there was no decline in the activity of intellectual life, but here also there was a complete absence of cultural unity; science, religion, philosophy, and literature each went on its way regardless of the others.

The mind of the age was divided against itself; it no longer possessed a common conception of reality capable of uniting the different activities of individual minds. This intellectual division and the consequent failure to achieve spiritual unity were the inevitable consequences of the spirit that had dominated European thought ever since the Reformation. They were in fact the price that modern culture had to pay for the conquest of nature and the immense progress of physical science.

For the downfall of the great mediæval synthesis destroyed the inner unity of European thought. It was a victory for physical science, which was emancipated from

the dead hand of the Aristotelian cosmology, and left free to enter into its new heritage. But it was a defeat for philosophy, which now lost its former undisputed intellectual hegemony, and became a wanderer and an outcast with no sure foothold in the world of reality. Like a discredited political leader, it was continually offering its services as a mediator between the opposing parties, only to be disavowed by both sides and left to bear the responsibility for their blunders.

From the seventeenth century onwards the modern scientific movement has been based on the mechanistic view of nature which regards the world as a closed material order moved by purely mechanical and mathematical laws. All the aspects of reality which could not be reduced to mathematical terms and regarded as resulting from the blind operation of material forces were treated as mere subjective impressions of the human mind, and since man himself was viewed as a by-product of this vast mechanical order, they were inevitably deprived of any ultimate reality.

A universe of this kind seems to leave no room for moral values or spiritual forces ; indeed, it is hard to see what place the mind of the scientific observer himself has in the blind and endless flux of configurations of atoms which is the substance of reality. This was pointed out forcibly enough by philosophic critics, but their arguments fell on deaf ears ; whatever theoretic objections could be brought against the mechanistic hypothesis, it was undeniably successful as a basis for scientific research, and consequently it was accepted without further question as an established truth. As Professor Whitehead has said, "While the Middle Ages were an age of faith based upon reason, the eighteenth century was an age of reason based upon faith"—*i.e.*, on the unreasoning acceptance of the mechanistic hypothesis.

The physicists lost all interest in metaphysics, and renounced the attempt to solve the ultimate problems of being, while the philosophers for their part turned away from physical reality to an ideal world which had its only existence in the human mind. A great deal has been

written, especially during the nineteenth century, on the conflict of religion and science, but the opposition of science and philosophy was actually more fundamental. As a matter of fact, a large number, perhaps the majority, of the greatest scientists have been profoundly religious and orthodox Christians like Volta and Cauchy, Dalton and Faraday, Pasteur and Mendel, and Wallace; hardly one of them since the eighteenth century has been a philosopher. For, strange though it may appear, a faith in the mechanistic hypothesis is far more easily reconcilable with a belief in theological dogmas than with any kind of metaphysical system.*

On the other hand, nineteenth-century philosophy, by turning in the direction of absolute idealism, had lost all contact with the world of science. Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* is far more widely removed from contemporary scientific thought than are the systems of Plato and Aristotle.† To quote Professor Whitehead again: "The history of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is governed by the fact that the world had got hold of a general idea which it could neither live with nor live without." Scientific materialism introduces order into the world of natural phenomena which had so long defied all attempts at rationalization; but at the same time it produces anarchy in the moral and spiritual order. Thus it bore fruit in the nineteenth-century individualizing of morals; for, as Professor Whitehead points out, the reduction of non-material values to subjective impressions, or even the Cartesian doctrine of minds as separate substance, "leads directly, not merely to private worlds of experience, but also to private worlds of morals." "Also the assumption of the bare valuelessness of mere matter led to a lack of reverence in the treatment of natural or artistic beauty."‡ And in the realm of

* It is true that Comte aimed at creating a philosophy, which should be thoroughly scientific, but to do this he had not only to abandon all metaphysics, but to attempt the purging of science itself of its theoretical and abstract elements and its limitations to strictly practical and "positive" objects. Thus all he actually achieved was the synthesis of a partial aspect of science with an even more limited type of religion.

† Cf. E. Meyerson, *De l'Explication dans les Sciences*, vol. ii., for an interesting criticism of the Hegelian attitude to natural science.

‡ Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 281.

economics and sociology the consequences were no less disastrous. The nineteenth-century economists, such as Ricardo and James Mill, conceived economic laws on the analogy of the mechanical laws of physical science, thus excluding all moral factors and preparing the way for the Marxian "materialist interpretation of history," which represents the complete application of mechanistic ideas to social phenomena.

In biology Darwin himself was influenced both by the physicists and the economists in his central doctrine of the evolution of species through the pressure of population on food supply and the consequent struggle for existence in which only the fittest survived. But a world that is the product of chance and the blind working of material forces leaves no room for the golden hopes for the future of humanity which had been so characteristic of the eighteenth-century creed. Even social reform and humanitarian ideals seemed difficult to reconcile with the mechanical view of social evolution, and the theory of the survival of the fittest was popularly interpreted in the crudely selfish form that used to be known to the French as "*le struggle for lifeisme*." Today all that is changed. There is a reaction all along the line against the old scientific materialism, whether in physics, biology, or sociology, and the mathematicians and physicists themselves are abandoning the old mechanistic hypothesis in favour of new and wider conceptions of reality.

This change is to some extent due to the theory of Relativity and to Einstein's criticism of the Newtonian physics, but it is not confined to Einsteinian circles. It is now almost universally admitted that science cannot pretend to give an exhaustive causal explanation of reality, but is merely a translation of reality into mathematical symbols or imagery. Scientific laws have a somewhat similar relation to nature as the printed musical score has to the sound of one of Beethoven's sonatas, or, as Professor Eddington has said, they have as much resemblance to the real qualities of Nature as a telephone number has to a subscriber. Thus the aspects of reality that are revealed in religion, philosophy, and art may be no less

true and no less ultimate than the knowledge that is derived from physical science. Only their method of approach is different; for they conceive reality in terms of substance, quality, and value, whereas science views the world exclusively in terms of quantitative relations. Hence the representatives of the most advanced school of scientific thought, like Professor Whitehead or Professor Eddington, are entirely at one with the adherents of the scholastic and theological tradition such as Jacques Maritain in their criticism of the mechanistic theory of nature and their demand for a return to the eternal spiritual values. Thus the intellectual schism between scientific knowledge and moral and spiritual values, which has introduced so much division and anarchy into European culture, seems no longer inevitable, and conditions seem favourable to a return of Western civilization to spiritual unity. Europe today stands in the same need of moral and social reconstruction as did the Mediterranean world in the first century B.C.

The Augustan movement attempted to solve the problem by the restoration of the traditional religious foundations on which the political and family life of the Roman State rested, and in spite of the impossibility of a real return to the peasant simplicity of the Religion of Numa, the effect was not wholly unsuccessful, for it inspired the highest spiritual expression of the Latin genius. After the arid Puritanism of Cato and the scientific pessimism of Lucretius there comes the profoundly spiritual and catholic genius of Virgil, which expressed itself in one of the greatest religious poems of the world.

It is a mistake to regard the religious policy of Augustus as a mere piece of political expediency. If his attempt was ultimately a failure, that was due more to the intrinsic poverty of the tradition which it sought to restore rather than to any lack of moral earnestness.

The task of modern Europe is at once more complicated and more hopeful. We possess an incomparably richer spiritual heritage than that of the Roman culture. The Roman world-empire was an artificial unity with no

common cultural tradition behind it, whereas the modern civilization is built on the foundations of an age-long community of religion and intellectual culture.

The two essential elements that have gone to the making of European culture are the Christian religion and the scientific tradition. To the former it owes its moral unity and its belief in its world mission, while the latter has given it its power of material organization and its control over nature. Without religion, science becomes a neutral force which lends itself to the service of militarism and economic exploitation as readily as to the service of humanity. Without science, on the other hand, society becomes fixed in an immobile, unprogressive order like that of the great Oriental civilizations or the Byzantine culture. It is only by the co-operation of both these forces that European civilization can succeed in reaching the goal that it has set before itself during the last two centuries. The reconciliation of religion and science is the function of philosophy which has been temporarily thrust out of its proper kingdom by the victory of the mechanistic world view.

The specifically Western ideals that found their expression in the Liberalism and Humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have temporarily broken down, because they were based on a superficial synthesis which only succeeded in uniting the etiolated ghost of the Christian tradition with the phantasm of a pseudo-scientific rationalism. Consequently it was rejected alike by the most living religion and by the most genuine scientific thought of the new age. Nevertheless the central idea that inspired the movement—the belief in the possibility of a new world order based on justice and fraternal charity—is as living as ever, and waits only for a new intellectual foundation to become a constructive force in the world today. The present crisis is due as much to an excess of misdirected idealism as to the destructive forces of class hatred and international strife, and if the former is once more directed towards positive ends, there is no reason to doubt the possibility of a further great development of European culture. After the age of civil

war and military exploitation came the centuries of the Roman peace, and the strife and discords of the transitional period of modern Europe may also be the prelude to an age of world civilization under Western leadership.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

ART. 8.—THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF FASCIST ITALY

(PART I)

THE crisis now disturbing the economic life of France and Italy is apt to be misrepresented by critics who too often forget to connect it with the post-war movement that has upset the financial mechanism of every country, meeting now in Germany and now in England, now in Belgium and now in France or Italy, with varying treatment according to the economic traditions or state of politics of each country. Obviously, however, this is far more the case with Fascist Italy than with France. Such facts as the rapid, favourable, and sound settlement of Italian war debts have led foreigners to fancy an efficient but untraditional interference of Mussolini in the economic life of the country. An interference the nature of which stands like a mysterious sphinx to most correspondents on economics, the methods of which remain to all a very puzzling problem, certainly does not make for a clear understanding of the subject.

First of all, the financial policy of Italy must be considered in its proper setting in the whole life of the country; and the alternating good and bad economic years must be connected with the economic life of the whole Western world. To this end it will be helpful to follow the annual reports made by the Governor of the Banca d'Italia, Comm. Bonaldo Stringher, to the shareholders of this private bank, the capital of which is subscribed by private shareholders. This eminent financier has governed the bank since 1900, and is therefore no creature of Fascism, although he may be devoted to the régime that has enabled him and his friends, the best liberal economists of Italy, to carry out their dearest plans for the economic construction of their country with the eagerness with which their fathers built Italy as a nation—the Stringhers were eminent among the patriots of Udine when the whole of Venezia was still under Austria. The preference given here to such documenta-

tion is due to the strict soundness of the lines on which this bank, one of the greatest of the civilized world, is run, and the strict accuracy of the information imparted to the shareholders.

Mussolini entered Rome in the autumn, 1922. The state of the national finances was doubtless the most serious question facing the country at that time; the budget deficit of about 160 million lire in the fiscal year 1913-1914 had grown to almost 23 billions in 1918-1919, whilst the internal public debt, which from about 15 billions in pre-war days had risen to 60 billions on June 30, 1919, was still steadily increasing through the dangerous growth of the floating indebtedness. The Treasury had to sustain tremendous expenses for fuel, food, supplies, pensions, allowances, subventions, etc., and taxation, though heavy and even destructive of private estates, was returning only about one-eighth of the total outgoings. Continuity and stability, so essential to constructive work in such abnormal times, were entirely lacking to Government programmes; the executive power, passing too frequently from one party to another, could not allow of any consistent financial policy. So ominous were the prospects that De Nava, Minister of the Treasury in the Bonomi Cabinet announced a further deficit of about 5 billions in the State budget, admitting that: "For some years to come we may still expect a deficit only to be covered by means of fresh debts, which will contribute to increase still more the heavy burden of interest already weighing upon the budget for a yearly sum of 4,508 million lire. It is, therefore, necessary not to conceal from ourselves the truth, which is anything but a pleasant one. We must adopt with firmness and energy the only course that can bring about the balancing of our accounts—that is, the most absolute and rigorous economy." Thus De Nava, on July 26, 1921.

The situation thus indicated furnishes one of the best illustrations of Mussolini's "tampering" with the nation's finances. De Nava's conclusion was shared not

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only by all experts in the State finances, but by all reasonable business men; yet nobody even dreamt of actually adopting the wise course that he advised. November, 1922, found it still a desideratum, and Mussolini, as he rose to power, made his own will to act upon the will of the country, and set his ministers to cutting down expenses. The discontent of innumerable people had to be faced, the more so owing to the fact that much of the demagogic taxations on capital had to be withdrawn, as experts agreed in the view that it was destroying private property and thereby the commonwealth. Of the thirteen taxes that had been voted during and since the war, ten were abolished and three kept to form a system of taxation that can be compared to the *income tax*, the repartition of which was so arranged and organized as to increase gradually according to the financial possibilities of the taxpayer. More rational taxes were more readily paid, *definite* propositions for rigorous economy in expenditure were put forward by the Hon. de Stefani, and acted upon by the Government in which he was minister of the Treasury.

Thus the financial year 1922-1923 that was ruled by Fascists during the last eight months closed with a deficit of 3,029 million lire, as against an estimated deficit of 4,000 millions.

The financial year 1923-1924 closed on a deficit of only 418 million lire, as against an estimated deficit of 1,087 millions.

The financial year 1924-1925 had a cash surplus of 479 million lire, an amazing event at that time, seeing that since 1911 Italy had never been able to balance her yearly budget.

Finally the budget of 1925-1926 closed with a huge surplus of 2,268 millions; an immense sum, considering the difficulty in increasing the yield of State revenue, and the reduction of State expenditure in the period we are now going through.

This was achieved through a very complex economic reorganization of public administration, a selection of the bureaucratic elements, the working out on sounder and

strictly economic lines of the monopolies of the State, but above all through an entire revision of the system of taxation, which had been greatly perturbed by the fiscal policy of the *dopo-guerra*, when considerations of politics had taken the place of economic criteria during the years of demagogic administrations. Last, but not least, the valuations of property or income were strictly revised, and all sorts of frauds exposed by means of which the taxpayer had hitherto either escaped payment, or misled the fiscal authorities by underrating both property and income.

The above sequence of reforms was completed by the prohibition of striking on non-economic grounds, and it seems rather natural that such protection of production should have been in many quarters considered as a protection of capital, as a reactionary and antidemocratic policy. But such a deduction, however natural it may appear, was altogether erroneous, as much so in fact as that of a foreign Socialist paper, which lately was forecasting the gradual bending to the left of Fascism on account of Mussolini's policy in the matter of house rents and relation of labour and capital. In reality the greatest novelty of Fascism is this catholicity of politics, and after so many generations witnessing the triumph of party politics, it is no wonder that people should be so slow to realize that the emblematic Fascio is a well-chosen symbol for the black shirts movement, since their ranks count indifferently men of the right, the centre, the left. In their synthetic conception of life all points of view meet, as in their meetings all parties are represented . . . that is indeed the novelty which is but too often overlooked. To come back, however, to 1923, people were profoundly mistaken whether they praised Fascism, or abused it as an anti-democratic movement. At his coming to power, Mussolini chose the best man that could be selected as an expert and thoroughly reliable administrator of the Treasury; he forthwith entrusted him with the task of patching and mending the ominous gaps that previous administrations had made in the sides of the ship of finance. And as such gaps were due to Bolshevist pressure intent on the destruction of capital, after expenditure

had been heavily reduced, the first step to be taken was obviously to foster the development of capital. But Fascists and non-Fascists were equally mistaken when they saw in this fact a proof of Mussolini's reactionary tendencies. His men of the *Squadristo* and, later, of the *Milizia*, fought Socialism and the no less Bolshevist *popolari*, because they were destroying Italy; the ministers did their best to save capital and to promote an increase of production, because the country's finances were being sunk in consequence of the ship being steered on a party-politics compass, instead of an economic one. To restore the country and make the most of victory, Mussolini had to bid ministers to conduct their business on sound technical principles, and one could trust Alberto de Stefani to do so. The Prime Minister's share in this first victory over the destructive forces of Russia-inspired Socialism, and of Don Sturzo's party, which was no less destructive, consisted in his power to ensure the technical experts the liberty to attend to their task independently of party politics, and to the industrial, agricultural, and business world that atmosphere of security without which no concern can thrive and develop. And one should not lose sight of the fact that in spite of the aforesaid necessity of keeping capital from destruction and, furthermore, of fostering an increase of business, the income tax that has been established at a ratio of 13·30 per cent. in the United States and in Belgium, then 27·30 per cent. in England, and of 29·20 per cent. in France, reached in Italy 38·10 per cent. It is true that at the end of last July important reductions of taxes were announced as a contribution of the State to the deflation of currency; but none the less the efforts of Italian taxpayers would have been unbearable for several years under any Government less trustworthy.

One question may arise: why exact so much, after not only huge budget surpluses, but even greater cash surpluses had been reached? This is not the place to enter into a technical discussion of the matter; but it may be sufficient to inform the reader that the Hon. De Stefani and Count Volpi in so doing were following the opinion of the greatest economists of their country, among whom

the best known of them all, Luigi Luzzatti, was very clear on the point. Here we must see what steps in advance became possible through this settlement of the yearly budget, and put in evidence a factor that is usually not taken in consideration and that had it not been for the information supplied by Comm. Brocchi, Head of the Department of Finance, would not be pointed out here either.

Anybody familiar with the Italy of pre-Fascist days knows perfectly that law and regulations seemed formulated only to be ignored in that delightful land. All tourists knew that tips would take them anywhere, and buy for them the right to go against any regulation; they knew also that people often travelled in carriages of a class superior to that of their ticket, and that the more popular the traveller the less the ticket-collector would dare to say. What they did not know was that this cheating of the State proceeded on a much greater scale without the shadow of a scruple. Owing to the lack of political and national consciousness, which I have pointed out elsewhere,* the State was considered fair game to everybody in the lower classes, and to most people even amongst the educated. A business man of Rome was fined in 1923 for leaving several waggons loaded with coal addressed to him in the station of that city waiting nearly a week to be unloaded; and he told the present writer that when his chauffeur rung him up to tell him he had to pay a considerable sum, he went to the station with a tenth of it, sure that he would get out of the fine by bribes or, as he put it, *tips*, since he had done so regularly for more than twenty years. He soon found out that the bribe or tip days were over. When he got there the same clerks and porters were there all right, but they pointed out to him a man of the *Milizia* calmly smoking his pipe. Being a good business man he gladly paid his fine, considering that if all the State concerns could be run on such lines they would cease to present deficits in their balance-sheets, and the whole finances of the State would have a better chance of standing on their

* See the *Hibbert Journal* of January, 1927.

own. He concluded his story by saying that he had never been fined again. Now, since a very honourable firm had such methods of dealing with the State railways in the capital of the kingdom, the reader can well imagine what went on in smaller places among humbler people. To the public the State, as we have said, was fair game; to the civil servants the State was an abstraction, and either through indolence or actual ignorance they did not realize in the least that it was their business to apply regulations.

Thus out of the "*Milizia Volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale*" arose by decree of October 30, 1924, a special body, the *Milizia Ferroviaria*, with the purpose of watching over the interests of the State Treasury, enforcing order among the public and regularity in the service. The result went so far beyond expectation,* that by a decree of June 14, 1925, the *Milizia Portuaria* was instituted to discharge the same duty in the harbours; and on July, 1925, another decree gave birth to the *Milizia Postelegrafica*, always with the main duty of protecting the interest of the State Treasury, besides its collaboration with the police. Last year with another decree of May 16 the *Milizia Volontaria Nazionale Forestale* came into being, to bring the living presence of the law into the remotest woods and hills. The men of the *Milizia* have had an influence on the State finances that can hardly be understood out of Italy, and above all in England, where people enjoy the result of nine centuries of national and political life, and, what is more, have fought so much and so long for *their* laws that the law has to them a "divine right." In Italy people never thought of laws *as their laws*, and the law, far from a divinity, was until recently a black bogey, on which it was pure sport to play tricks. Here again it must be recalled that since the Commune days in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the people of Italy have never had a form of government that was theirs, that sprang from their history; and it is difficult for us to see how perfectly St. Paul's

* The State railways immediately contributed to the budget surplus instead of presenting a huge deficit, as they had done hitherto; and the same may be said of the postal and telegraphic services.

ideas of law—which by the way coincide with the most modern philosophy—are illustrated here. Nobody could realize the law and its moral nature as long as it did not abide in their minds, so that most moral people defrauded the law in a way that shocks our northern ideas.

The most characteristic quality of the *Milizia* is that its absolute discipline rests on its being a body of volunteers, not only coming out of their free will, but *staying freely*. According to the statutes of that body, *Il milite che sente di non poter sopportare il duro vincolo disciplinare, può chiedere di essere congedato dai ruoli della Milizia*, so that, free to go at any time, the men can be called upon to perform duties that could hardly be required from the army, the navy, or even the police; whilst their prestige in the remotest place is incredible, owing to the fact that their head is Mussolini himself. It is owing to this prestige that they have been able to clear Sicily of its brigands, accomplishing in two years what had been attempted in vain many times with huge displays of force.

Going back to the budget not only settled, but settled with huge surplus, one has to consider the use that was made of such surpluses. The *Economist* of July 10, 1926, in its correspondence from Italy, pointed out one of the reasons for which not only a considerable amount of the cash surpluses, but even the best part of the increase of public internal debt, which rose from 90,847 million lire on June 30, 1925, to 92,033 million lire on May 31, 1926, were deposited at the Bank of Italy. Such a public deposit was needed in order to cover the outlet of the three Banks of Issue in banknotes and commercial discounts, which, already considerable, was to be increased so that trade could be freely encouraged. As a matter of fact, the year 1924, which was far from being a favourable year for Europe as a whole, was rather good for Italy's finances, owing to the sacrifice of the taxpayers and to the soundness of the public administration, evidenced by the reduction of the debt. During the financial year 1923-1924 the National Debt was reduced by 1,614 million lire, and, accounting for the fall in Treasury balances during that period, there was a net improvement in the

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capital account of 1,114 million lire; and in the second semestre of 1924 the favourable tendency had further developed.

That year witnessed a remarkable diminution in the amount of Treasury bills outstanding and of the shorter-dated Treasury Bonds (three and five years) as against an increase in the amount of debts maturing at more distant dates. This change, according to Bonaldo Stringher, was very useful to the Treasury, and it involved the reduction of outstanding securities which were more easily interchangeable with currency. In the same year the Treasury notes in circulation decreased by 28 million lire, and 512 million lire of banknotes issued for Treasury accounts were redeemed, the amount of notes under that heading being then in round figures about 7,100 million. The amount of notes issued by the three banks for the Treasury account had moved for ten years as follows in million lire:

1915	2,069	1920	10,743
1916	2,554	1921	8,505
1917	5,833	1922	8,077
1918	7,165	1923	7,754
1919	10,630	1924	7,242

But on the other hand the amount of notes issued for *trade* account increased so much that the aggregate circulation of banknotes, accounting for the reduction of the issue for Treasury account and the expansion of the issue for trade requirements, was altogether larger by 8,676 million lire.

IN MILLION LIRE.

	Banknotes—		Treasury Notes.	Total Notes.
	For Trade.	For Treasury Account.		
December 31, 1923	9,492.2	7,754.4	2,427.8	19,674.4
December 31, 1924	10,872.7	7,241.5	2,400.0	20,514.2
	+ 1,380.5	- 512.9	- 27.8	+ 839.8

This tells eloquently what was the policy of Italy's Government and leading economists. The reduction of issue of banknotes was enforced by every means as long as it did not interfere with the other purpose of the Fascists, which was the development of trade to be fostered in every way. Now during that year the expansion of the number of notes in circulation was due, first of all, to the larger requirements of the manufacturing and trading activities of the country in a period of higher rates of exchange and prices, which neutralized the favourable effect of reduced needs of currency in other departments; then to the deficiency of the wheat crop and the consequent soaring of prices of foodstuffs; and again to the after-effects of the credit readjustment and reconstruction; finally, a reduction of the resources at the disposal of the note-issuing banks for their usual profit-earning business apart from those available through the issue of notes. Private deposits were bound to drop or remain stationary in a period of intense industrial expansion, whilst the public deposits were reduced. The fall in the available resources of the three banks, when they had to increase daily their trade discounts, was obviously connected with the issue of additional notes, so that Signor Stringher, as early as March, 1925, remarked in his report to the shareholders that steps should be taken for checking efficiently such tendency.

Passing to the events that were then influencing the international and home market, 1924, we find that provisions had been enacted for the reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, and the efforts of the Great Powers were concentrating on the economic, financial, and currency problems of Germany. The two committees, with their respective chairmen, General Charles C. Dawes and Mr. Reginald McKenna, produced their reports on April 9, 1924. Then the Conference of London saw to the application of the Dawes plan, which was nearly as important for Europe as a whole as for Germany. Finally, the Paris conference fixed the distribution of the first annuities. Thus Germany was placed on her feet again, implying the obvious criticism that in common justice the

fate of the victors should not be worse than that of the vanquished. Then the British Government had sent a memorandum to the French Government expounding the views of the English Cabinet regarding the settlement of the amount due by France to England, and the matter could not leave Italy indifferent. The state of uncertainty on this question affected the rates of exchange, the vagaries of which were comparatively out of proportion with the then actual conditions of the country.

The financial relations between England and the United States were deeply modified by the gradual repayment of the former's war debt as a result of the agreement of June, 1923, so that the pound sterling compared to the American dollar underwent a gradual revaluation tending to reach par of exchange between the two currencies. This important feature, that was to involve a return of the British currency to pre-war condition, was discussed in financial circles, but on the subject of this momentous argument there was no general agreement. Some were doubtful as to the outcome of a too rapid revaluation of the pound and of a too speedy return to par, fearing that the result might be some unpleasant uncertainty in the banking world, and the reaction on prices and wages, in fact exactly all that is heard now about the lire. Italy's best experts were watching the English market, not only in view of its bearing on the general currency problem, but also because they considered that stabilization, deflation, and revaluation were not simply for them a matter of academic arguments and discussion, but a sternly practical matter.

Coming back to Italy's home market, we find that the favourable development of national activity was reflected in its tendency as a whole. Government securities reached excessive prices, whilst, owing to the influence of the aforesaid international factors, a less favourable tendency was noticeable in the foreign exchange and in the average prices of commodities. International traffic developed in such a way as to reduce the adverse balance of trade. In 1923 imports augmented in million lire to 17,189, and exports to 11,086, leaving an adverse balance

of - 6.103. In 1924 the imports augmented to 19,388, and exports to 14,318, with an adverse balance of - 5,070. And whilst in the compensation of trade deficit the remittances of emigrants did not proceed as favourably as usual, other elements of compensation were in greater or lesser progress, such as to encourage prospects of a gradual redemption of the masses of Italian currency which had found their way across the borders. Manufacturing activity was very keen and productive in that year, though the development was not homogeneous. Such improvement was evidenced by the greater demand for raw materials, fuel, and electric power, by the fall in unemployment figures due to the larger employment of non-seasonal labour, and by the rise in traffic returns both by land and sea. The causes of it were : (a) Social conditions which favoured production ; (b) larger output per head, though labour did not resume as yet its pre-war efficiency ; (c) increased capacity of the home markets ; (d) a more decided tendency to invest savings in industrial securities ; (e) larger amount of available capital.

The depreciation of the lira, which occurred in the last months, and the higher prices of many raw materials on the exports markets, were *partly* compensated by the advantage of larger exports, due to the strong but artificial impulse of the adverse rate of exchange.

Silk had a very favourable year both for quantity and quality, owing to favourable climatic conditions and better breeding facilities. The price, falling in the first eight months on account of the world's large output and the sale in North America of cheaper Asiatic silks, rose at the end of the year. Competition in artificial silk products had led to more perfect technical methods, which enhanced their beauty while lessening the cost of production. Factories worked at full speed, obtaining large profits and doubling the exports.

The cotton industry started the year in difficulty, owing to the high cost of the raw material in the former season, but as prices fell in the second semestre, and the high rates of exchange contributed to increase the demand from foreign markets, the year closed favourably.

To the whole home market the same remark may apply, and nothing there calls for particular notice, except that the motor industry was able to dispose abroad of a very large output in spite of high tariffs owing to improved commercial and technical organization. Emigration, restricted by the United States, found an outlet in South America, and the solution of the outstanding problem of subsidized shipping lines gave fresh work to the shipyards.

As to legislation, no changes directly affecting the circulation of banknotes for trade requirements were introduced. Only two decrees affecting rediscounts are to be recorded—one restricted the faculty of rediscounting agricultural bills with the note-issuing bank to a number of approved agrarian banks; the other tending to a reduction of the banknote circulation, which was already a matter of anxiety to every sound economist, who had accepted it merely as an inevitable consequence of the heavy liquidation of the war, involving as it did the displacement of large sums.

Passing to the year 1925, the events to which Italian economists had to pay the greatest attention abroad were the settlement of war debts of Great Britain and Belgium; the fact that the British Government abandoned the so-called "managed currency," and resumed the gold standard; the annihilation of Germany's paper currency following inflation and the consequent creation of the gold mark; then the monetary reforms which took place in smaller countries for the purpose of achieving a relative stability, a financial move which was not in every case successful. It was considered in Italy, even two years ago, that however necessary it might be to modify a currency subject to excessive fluctuation, it was impossible to disregard the difficulties to be overcome in stabilizing at the right level the purchasing power of a currency which had undergone for several years fluctuations as violent as had the lira.

In England the addresses of the Chairmen of the great banks to their shareholders, such as those of the Midland, Lloyds, and so on, are sufficient revelations of the difficulties presented by such measures even under the very best

conditions. In poorer countries, like Belgium and Poland, Italian financiers had a better illustration of what they would have to face when the time had come in which their country would be unable to shrink any longer from that ordeal and the consequent tightness of money. By the beginning of 1926 one may say that a whole literature on the subject was flourishing as well in Italy as in France.

At home the great economic events that year were undoubtedly (a) the *Battaglia del grano*; (b) the settlements for the payment of the war debt to the United States and to Great Britain—although the agreement with the latter was signed in January, 1926, it is certainly to be considered as due to the financial policy of Mussolini's Government during 1925; (c) the undue increase of commercial discounts and the growing urgency to catch hold of the helm in currency matters.

The so-called battle of wheat was really a battle towards a more intense productivity in every industry. Agriculture had been practised with very highly scientific and industrial methods in the Po valley for at least a generation, and, what may be of interest to the readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW, it has had a very ennobling influence on the lower rural class, as it presents their daily work no longer as a material necessity, but as the religious accomplishment of the loftiest duty. But the present writer has already dealt with this moral superiority of the Fascist view of work to the views which were consequent on the materialistic conceptions of man's daily activity, and considerations of space require that the present article should deal exclusively with matter-of-fact data. The acreage of land sown with wheat in 1925 increased by 130,000 hectares, owing to the general consent with which private initiative rose to meet the Government's propaganda. A considerable improvement in the methods of cultivation took place, the standard methods of the best provinces spreading where agriculture seemed to be still at the level where the ancient Romans had left it. The initiative of the Prime Minister gave rise to a number of legislative measures affecting agriculture.

Besides reinstating the pre-war duty on imported wheat, increased provisions were made for agricultural schools, land experiments and demonstrations, encouraging the use and production of selected seeds, the adoption of special machinery for ploughing areas suitable for wheat cultivation, but so far uncultivated owing to scarcity of labour. Further stimulus was added by national and provincial competitions and by large subventions for agricultural credit.

The cash surplus of the budget was at first mainly dedicated to bringing down the debit of the State accounts with the banks of issue; then it was decreed that from three-quarters to four-fifths of it might be spent on works of public utility, *provided that the purpose of such works should be to ensure the real economic reconstruction of the country*, the remainder being required to improve the position of the Treasury, so that from November, 1926, the improvement of land absorbed 4,000 million lire, the object being to increase labour, and thereby production. In the south of Italy this amounts to a real economic renaissance. Professor Petrocchi, who is entrusted with the direction of the "Lavori idraulici e delle Bonifiche," has recently remarked* that the whole south was wont to absorb its credits for public works almost completely in harbours, railways, and roads, which could have no meaning as long as the lowlands were infested by malaria, and therefore left uncultivated. It is hardly necessary to point out that such public works are bound to diminish unemployment, not only now, but in the future as well, through the improvement of the provinces, whose population were forced to emigrate on account of large areas of land that were left bare owing to malaria or want of water.†

The settlement of the war debt to the United States was indeed made much easier by the sound administration of De Stefani, so that when Count Volpi went to America

* *Giornale di Agricoltura della Domenica*, July 17, 1927.

† La trasformazione fondiaria that has taken place to the advantage of the country and landowners and tenants is a very good instance of the capacity of the Fascist Government to satisfy the desiderata of the Left without destroying or paralyzing capital.

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he found that his country's moral position was excellent, and the settlement could take the form adopted by the United States in dealing with Great Britain and Belgium. On June 15 the debt of Italy to the United States amounted to 2,042.2 million dollars: 200,000 dollars were paid in cash, and the balance, 2,042 million dollars, was funded according to plan below (in thousand dollars):

<i>June 15 of Years—</i>	<i>Annuities.</i>		<i>Total of Principal.</i>	<i>Interest per Annum.</i>
	<i>Amount.</i>	<i>No.</i>		
1926 to 1930	5,000	5	25,000	nil
1931 to 1940	from 12,500 to 12,500	10	135,500	1%
1941 to 1950	from 16,400 to 22,000	10	191,700	1 1/4%
1951 to 1960	from 23,000 to 31,500	10	270,900	1 1/2%
1961 to 1970	from 32,500 to 44,500	10	379,500	1 3/4%
1971 to 1980	from 46,000 to 62,000	10	537,000	1%
1981 to 1987	from 64,000 to 79,400	7	502,400	2%
		62	2,042,000	

The debt to Great Britain, which was secured by special Italian sterling treasury bills for £610,840,000, including principal and accrued interest, was actually funded at £276,750,000, to be repaid without interest in 62 years, by half-yearly instalments increasing in the first seven years and remaining equal for the following fifty-five years, leaving a half-year instalment to be paid on balance in the financial year 1987-1988.

The annuities to be paid by Italy to Great Britain in half-yearly instalments in respect of the War Debt are given on p. 294 (in thousand pounds).

Thus Italy, after having provided for the reconstruction of her invaded and devastated areas out of her own resources, and not from war-indemnities, has now devoted all that she is owed as reparations from Germany to meet an obligation incurred when she took the field on our side.

<i>Financial Years.</i>	<i>Annuities.</i>		<i>Total Amounts.</i>
	<i>Amount.</i>	<i>Number.</i>	
1925-26 	2,000	1	2,000
1926-27 to 1927-28 ...	4,000	2	8,000
1928-29 to 1931-32 ...	4,250	4	17,000
1932-33 to 1986-87 ...	4,500	55	247,500
1987-88 	2,250	(balance)	2,250
		62	276,750

As to legislation no changes took place during that year with regard to the circulation of notes issued for trade account. Concerning the notes issued on State account, the Minister of the Treasury provided for a further reduction of the amount of extraordinary advances and supplies of notes made to the Treasury by the three note-issuing banks. During 1925 the Italian National Institute of Exchange co-operated with the Government Department to provide funds for payments abroad, and took a prominent part in the control and support of the lira abroad. To do this, the I.N.I. of E. made use, in addition to its own funds, of sums placed at its disposal by first-class foreign banks, specially by Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Co. of New York. As a matter of fact, the three note-issuing banks arranged jointly a revolving credit of 50 million dollars in favour of the aforesaid institute; but this credit has been subsequently paid off since the Government floated the loan of 100 million dollars in November, 1925. The I.N.I. of E., under the personal guidance of Count Volpi, enabled the country thus to overcome for that year the worst phase of exchange depression.

The turnover of current accounts, debits and credits, passed in the books of the Banca d'Italia, aggregated 77,910,825,323 lire, whilst in 1924 the same amounted to 62,421,742,593 lire; the balance of deposits being 619,210,865 lire, that is to say, 135,065,299 lire less than

at the end of 1924, whilst the average amount of bills discounted in 1925 was 4,390.3 million lire as against 3,254.7 million in 1924, the aggregate amount presenting an increase of 6,560,990,619 lire. No wonder that well-informed people should have felt some anxiety in spite of the fact that such a phenomenon was obviously due to trade development.

ALINE LION.

(To be continued.)

ART. 9.—SOME RECENT ANGLICAN
APOLOGETICS.

- Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience.*
Cyril H. Valentine, M.A., Ph.D. (Lond.). S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.
Reality. A New Correlation of Science and Religion. Burnett
Hillman Streeter, D.D. Macmillan and Co. 8s. 6d.
The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin. An Historical and
Critical Study. Norman Powell Williams, D.D. Longmans,
Green and Co. 21s.

THE intention of these three books is apologetic and constructive. The two former aim at a positive presentation and defence of Christian theism, the third discusses the great difficulty with which it is faced—the problem of evil and especially of moral evil.

Unfortunately, of the three only the last is clear and coherent. Whether we agree or disagree with Dr. Williams's presentation of history or his theory of Original Sin we cannot doubt his meaning or lose touch with his arguments. The same cannot be said either of Dr. Valentine's or Canon Streeter's work. Of loose structure and nebulous outline, they are not easy to grasp as a whole and leave the reader asking what precisely has been proved or argued. Of the two Professor Valentine's book is the more obscure. From time to time the mist clears and discovers a pleasing prospect of truth, but it soon gathers again about the reader's path. No doubt we must expect mist to cling to the mountain-summits of ultimate truth. But there is also the mist of the low-land marsh. And the mist which clouds Dr. Valentine's exposition and, in a lesser degree, Canon Streeter's, is not always the former.

Dr. Valentine endeavours to prove that religious truth—the truth of ultimate reality—cannot be discerned by the unaided intellect but only by the entire personality, and that the witness of personality is reliable in proportion to the intellectual sanity and moral perfection of the witness. Since our Lord was supremely sane and morally perfect His witness is therefore completely reliable. With this thesis we must heartily agree. But the author should

have devoted more space to proving the perfect sanity and moral perfection of Christ. His treatment of this crucial point in his argument is insufficient. Canon Streeter's discussion of the same theme brings forward many valuable considerations which Dr. Valentine might well have adduced.

The two most serious flaws in Dr. Valentine's book are: (1) his doctrine of God; (2) his attitude towards mystical experience. For him God is not the Absolute (78), merely "a part of the Absolute" (196). This is a fatal error implicitly destructive of monotheism. Yet, he tells us, the Absolute depends on God, is indeed "God's experience of the universe" (80), and "God is the *formative* energy that sustains the Absolute" (81). That is to say, the Absolute is the creation of a part of itself. But a created or partially created Absolute is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, the universe as God's eternal experience—the "eternal object" of "the eternal subject"—is not the "physical universe" but the Son. As he states it Dr. Valentine's doctrine trembles on the verge of ditheism. Later (211) he makes creation eternal and necessary to God. What creation is this? Is it the Son or the Ideal World? Apparently a process of which the physical universe is a phase. In any case it is "God's self-limitation." Confusion worse confounded. And we are sorry to find our author accepting the fashionable sentimentalism which ascribes suffering to God. (2) On the whole Dr. Valentine appears to deny the objective reference of mystical experience. "It is difficult," he writes, "to resist Professor Leuba's contention that these experiences" (of the mystic) "reveal not the Christian God but the lawful workings of our psycho-physiological organism" (40). To capitulate on this point is to yield the citadel. If the deepest and highest form of religious experience is illusory, what form of religious experience can we trust? On p. 56, however, we are told that "some place must be found in the complete system of religious doctrine for the mystic's direct sense of God." Again we ask, What does Dr. Valentine mean? Apparently he identifies mystical experience with ecstasy, which he refuses to admit as a valid form of experience on the

ground of its superficial anæsthesia. But this entirely insignificant epiphenomenon has no bearing whatever on the nature and meaning of the positive experience of God enjoyed by the ecstatic. Dr. Valentine might as reasonably refuse to accept the intuitions of the artist or thinker because of the abstraction from his external surroundings which often accompanies them. He treats the mystic as abnormal (45), whereas he is quite as normal as the artist or philosopher. He can even write, "Extreme mysticism, with its accompanying emotionalism or ecstasy, is a form of perverted religion due to undeveloped personality." Were SS. Catherine of Sienna and Genoa, Theresa and John of the Cross undeveloped personalities? Was St. Augustine, was St. Paul an undeveloped personality? The chapter on Determinism and Responsibility shirks the question of free-will with which it professes to deal. A man of formed and unified character is self-determined. This is easily granted. But the fundamental question remains unanswered: Is it in my power to form and unify my character if I desire to do so? The good man can choose the right in the face of temptation. No one denies it. But could the bad man who yields and makes the wrong choice have acted otherwise? Dr. Valentine does not reply. On p. 27 we are told that only the morally perfect are completely responsible for their actions. Responsibility is determined by mental rather than by moral development. Regeneration, as the Christian religion understands it, is far more than "the acceptance of a loftier ideal." Indeed, Dr. Valentine himself writes (60): "Christian personality is not merely an adaptation to existing environment, it is an adaptation to the environment of the Kingdom of God." These pregnant words contain in germ the Catholic view of the supernatural order, and therefore of Regeneration. Unfortunately, their implications are not logically worked out.

The author has been led astray by an exaggerated subservience to the latest psycho-analytic phraseology when he treats identification with Christ as a psychological trick (87). It is a real change, effected gradually by the process of sanctification, which Dr. Valentine names trans-

ference, and which he even opposes to itself under the former name. "Catholic worshippers," we read (120), "whose belief in a transcendent God had vanished, and who attached no meaning to the supernatural . . . would have the objective element in their worship very much reduced." No doubt—but what sort of "Catholic worshippers"? A bad piece of wool-gathering. Moreover, Dr. Valentine over-emphasizes the social aspect of worship at the expence of its essence—adoration of a transcendent God. The facts of Divine Revelation and Pre-eminence are no sufficient proof of the Incarnation (133). Nor does the sinlessness of Christ prove that He was God Incarnate (191). Mary is not Divine. The grossly unphilosophical doctrine of Kenosis is assumed (191). Even the author's psychology is not always satisfactory. Fear is the father rather than the servant (160) of hate. Indeed, Dr. Valentine admits it himself on the following page. And the argument (170-1) that if I fear an evil, I am likely to love the person who realizes my fear, strikes us as far-fetched.

But the fog lifts at times, and when it lifts the view is worth seeing. The fundamental thesis of the book that Truth can only be apprehended by the entire personality, and that the Personal Response of a Personal Deity is implicit in the intelligibility of the world, is stated clearly and forcibly, especially on pp. 164-5, to which, indeed, the reader who would not lose his way should often return as to his guiding clue. The objection that religious belief is an illicit projection on to the outside world of man's purely subjective wishes is cogently answered (pp. 15 and 28 *sqq.*), and the pragmatist form of the subjective error excellently refuted (19-20, 132). To employ Puritan terminology Dr. Valentine has "the root of the matter" in him. But the root is not enough—we need the full-grown plant. Possibly he has not given it sufficient time to grow.

Though Canon Streeter's book is always easy reading, which cannot be said of Dr. Valentine's, and the mist is less thick, there is still a distinct haze over the landscape. The Canon opposes religious knowledge to

scientific as being, like æsthetic perception, an intuition of quality, whereas scientific knowledge is of quantity. To know Reality as adequately as it can be known, both ways of knowledge are necessary. There is much truth in this contention, but it is not the whole truth. Besides the distinctively religious intuition of God, there are philosophical arguments addressed to the discursive reason which support the theistic conclusion implicit in religious intuition. Moreover, the crude datum of religious experience needs to be interpreted and developed by ratiocination. We do not suppose Canon Streeter would deny this. Indeed, the refutation of materialism which opens his book is a form of religious apologetic in terms of the discursive reason. Nevertheless, he certainly underestimates the rational—the discursively rational—factor in religious knowledge. And his book is ill-arranged. The chapter (iii.) on the Crucifixion and the Problem of Evil is misplaced. It should occur later in the argument.

Though Canon Streeter is certainly no pantheist, he uses at times language which is unfortunately patient of a pantheistic interpretation. The passage in which he speaks of the "Universal Life" of the Universe, "the Life of the Whole" (126), suggests that God is the World-Soul; and the impression is strengthened by a similar passage (137), which, whatever the writer's intention, can only mean that the Universe is the Body of God, "the Life in the Universe." Twice (68 and 210) the phrase "Totality of Things" occurs—Totality being printed with a capital T. Moreover, in one passage (65; see also 178) the Incarnation appears to be understood as the unique realization of "a Divinity potential in all men, even if actualized only in one." And if these passages are no more than passing confusions of thought or statement, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that for Canon Streeter God is temporal (131), mutable (129-30), and passible (243, 252). Nor does He possess perfect foreknowledge (246).

Even the personality of God is not sufficiently distinguished from created personality; it is human personality "with a large plus" (135). Here the Absolute

Transcendence of God is implicitly denied, and indeed Canon Streeter deliberately refuses to identify God with the Absolute. Like Dr. Valentine, he has failed to build his theology on the foundation of a logically coherent theism.

In common with many theologians whose standpoint is the opposite of his own, Canon Streeter misconceives the nature of doctrinal formulæ. For him they are pseudo-scientific statements intended to convey truth immediately. He therefore rejects them as vehicles of religious truth in favour of artistic myths of the Platonic type. He fails to see that they are the score of which religious intuition is the corresponding melody. Though the music is of an altogether different quality from the score, the score, which moreover is a scientifically accurate—indeed, a *quantitative*—construction, is an indispensable presupposition of the music. For Canon Streeter the "intellectualized definition" of the theologians "desiccates" the mystery of the Eucharist, valuable "for a dynamic quality that cannot be defined" (46). Does the score of Wagner's *Parsifal* "desiccate" the opera because by itself it cannot convey the "dynamic quality" of the music? Not only Religion but Art, to which the Canon compares it, is destroyed by this refusal to recognize the rational factor without which neither could exist.

We would suggest that it is this failure to understand the true nature and function of dogma which makes Canon Streeter conceive and reject the Anselmian explanation of the Atonement as the statement of a juristic transaction (228). We are rather inclined to think that when contemplated intuitively St. Anselm's doctrine is closely akin to that propounded by our author himself (230-1). But whereas St. Anselm's score is scientifically constructed, Canon Streeter's is a loose and amateurish piece of work.

Nor can we agree with the view of mysticism taken in this book. In mystical experience (290), and particularly in the Prayer of Quiet (301-2), we are, we read, in contact with God "through the medium of an idea" which "works in the subconscious mind."

Mystical prayer is an immediate though obscure apprehension of God, and the Prayer of Quiet is sharply distinguished from any form of meditation by the absence of distinct ideas. "I can never see or touch the Infinite" (290). In this life, to be sure, no man can see God; but the mystic, and, we think, though even more obscurely, every human soul touches Him. Canon Streeter does not approve of asceticism. "The power," he writes, "of the ascetic ideal to make noble minds indifferent or even hostile to the highest moral and intellectual movements of their day has been the tragedy of religion" (198). It is a pity that before he penned this unfortunate *obiter dictum* the writer did not stop to think of St. Paul, Origen, SS. Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas.

These misstatements and misunderstandings are the more regrettable because the main line of argument is valuable and well managed. The author's thesis that the universe is explicable neither by physical energy nor by a subrational life force—the latter argument especially is conducted very skilfully and convincingly (see 122 *sqq.*)—and that therefore the Ultimate Ground of Reality must be *at least* rational and personal, is made out with a force and clarity of proof not unworthy of its fundamental importance. And in the section devoted to our Lord as the supreme Revealer and Incarnation of God we found many helpful considerations—for example, a very necessary attack upon the weakly sentimental and self-pitying caricature which popular piety, both Catholic and Protestant, has too often substituted for the authentic picture as drawn in the Gospels. And all who have thoroughly assimilated the Platonic axiom that God is the author only of good will heartily agree with Canon Streeter when he insists that God only permits, does not directly send, calamity. But to the present reviewer's mind one sentence stands out from the rest of the book: "Science," writes Canon Streeter, "is the great cleanser of human thinking; it makes impossible any religion but the highest" (272). The religious value of science, on which Baron Von Hügel has insisted so powerfully, could not be better expressed than in this truly golden aphorism.

Dr. Williams's lectures are a work of far greater importance than the two books with which we have been hitherto engaged. Solid erudition and clear thinking make them a book with which the student of theology must seriously reckon. The complex of doctrines concerning the Fall and Original Sin is of fundamental importance for Christian theology, yet presents in the present intellectual situation a number of difficulties which, if they may, and indeed we think to some extent should be shelved, cannot be shirked. Dr. Williams's book raises these issues frankly and plainly, and sets them in their historical context. And whatever we may think of the solutions which he offers, that at least is an undeniable and not a slight merit. With a masterly hand he traces the history of the Fall doctrine from the Old Testament to the present day. Where necessary his interpretation can be checked by the materials he has himself set before the reader. He argues with partial, though only with partial, success that Christianity (we would say with Dr. Williams the Church—but of course his understanding of the Church is not ours) is not committed to the Augustinian view of the Fall, and the enormous influence of Augustine for evil as well as for good upon the development and presentation of the doctrine of Original Sin is well brought out. Dr. Williams concludes by a statement of his own views. His doctrine of Original Sin is woefully inadequate, his doctrine of the Fall a novelty. For he understands by the Fall not the fall of the first man and woman, but a pre-human fall of a created world-soul. And by Original Sin he means no more than an excessive weakness of the social instinct in man by comparison with the self-regarding instincts. Dr. Williams's radical error is, we think, a failure to grasp the notion of the supernatural as distinct from the merely natural. Indeed, in one place he appears to identify the supernatural with the spiritual. Though the doctrine of the two orders of reality—supernature and nature—was only gradually worked out, and its complete development was reserved to the thirteenth-century schoolmen, it is of fundamental importance. Without it no satisfactory doctrine of Original Sin is

possible. Indeed, as Father Joseph Rickaby has shown, the defects of St. Augustine's formulation are due to his inadequate and confused grasp of this all-important distinction. Unless that distinction is clearly seized we must either treat Original Sin as a defect of nature, an evil from the standpoint of natural ethics—hence the denial, implicit or explicit, of free-will and the doctrine that unbaptized infants are condemned to eternal torment—or, if with the Pelagians we take a more optimistic view of actual human nature, we must follow them in denying Original Sin and maintain that a man's natural free-will can, at least to some degree, merit the vision of God. Thus for lack of a *sure* grasp of the twofold quality of human life and action, of the two levels nature and supernature, Augustine and his opponents exchanged blows in the dark and often beat the air. Dr. Williams would go *behind* the Augustinian controversy and formulation to the more undeveloped doctrine of the primitive Church which, moreover, he explains in a naturalistic sense which evacuates the indubitable, if unformulated, supernaturalism of the Fathers. He should rather have advanced *beyond* it to the more fully developed doctrine of the schoolmen. This, however, he misconceives as a watering down of Augustinianism, whereas it was in fact a higher synthesis which sought, on the whole successfully, to combine and conciliate the valuable elements in Augustinianism and Pelagianism alike, rejecting the excesses of the former and the naturalism of the latter. Dr. Williams's treatment of concupiscence is also vitiated by his failure to understand the supernatural. He vehemently combats the Augustinian, and indeed, as is clear even from his own exposition, the Pauline view that concupiscence, which he rightly identifies with the natural life urge, libido in the wider sense in which Jung understands the term, is in itself evil. For him it is neutral, being determined to good or evil by the fashion in which it is indulged, restrained, or redirected. From the standpoint of purely natural ethics his contention is no doubt correct. But neither St. Paul nor, in his intention, St. Augustine regarded the question from that standpoint. If man is

intended by his Creator to live on the supernatural level, a natural force acting in a *purely natural* mode and exclusive of the supernatural is *for him* evil. Only when concupiscence or libido is informed, to use psycho-analytic language, sublimated by the supernatural virtue of charity, is it good for a being whom God wills to raise to supernature. We are not blameworthy because we are born with concupiscence, but our nature is supernaturally, *not naturally*, sinful—that is to say, opposed to God and His Will for man, inasmuch as concupiscence before regeneration is not dominated, informed, or sublimated by supernatural love. Hence the profound truth of St. Thomas's dictum in which Dr. Williams can see little more than verbal jugglery that the matter of Original Sin is concupiscence, but its form—*i.e.*, the factor which makes it sinful—is the lack of original justice (righteousness) with its informing and sublimating charity. Dr. Williams, however, strangely misapprehends the meaning of original justice. He understands it to signify a complex of extraordinary but at best merely preternatural endowments—*e.g.*, immortality and extraordinary knowledge believed to have been possessed by unfallen Adam. To the Catholic theologian it means his original endowment of supernatural life.

It is because Dr. Williams seeks Original Sin in some natural disorientation and discord of the human soul that he is driven to define it as an atrophy of the social instinct. Such a purely naturalist, indeed scarcely religious, view of Original Sin is amazingly superficial and unsatisfactory when compared with the profoundly religious explanation given by Catholic theology.

It would, we think, have been conducive to clearness if Dr. Williams had not distinguished between Original Sin and Original Guilt, using the former term as the equivalent of original defect or original vice. If Original Sin is original defect (of *supernatural* justice, Catholic theology; of the social instinct, Dr. Williams), it is original defect *as contrary to God's will for mankind and unduly excluding man from the supernatural union with God for which he was created*, and thus involving a racial guilt—a guilt of

human nature inasmuch as it is not what God wills it to be. Nor is there, as Dr. Williams seems to think, anything irrational or morally repugnant in the notion of a guilt of nature, or racial sin. On the contrary, it is simply one application—the Atonement is another—of the principle of solidarity for which religious experience abundantly vouches, and which, indeed, is implicit in Dr. Williams's theory of a fallen world-soul. The difficulty which at present must be faced by upholders of the Catholic doctrine lies not against the doctrine of Original Sin, which has, on the contrary, been strikingly confirmed by the discoveries—we might even say by the exaggerations and perversions—of psycho-analysis, but against the historic fall of the first man and woman. But that is a question to be discussed between theologians and professional anthropologists, and to them we will leave it.

So far as we are aware no condemnation has been passed on the belief in a *created* world-soul which, indeed, was held by one of the greatest modern Catholic thinkers—the Russian philosopher Solovieff. And *if* there is a world-soul, it, equally with angels or man, *may* have fallen from God's purpose. But however this may be, Dr. Williams is surely mistaken in thinking that the fall of a world-soul (if such there be) provides any better answer to the problem of evil than the fall of Lucifer or Adam. We believe that the answer to the difficulty raised by the existence of evil in the creation of a good God must be sought along the lines sketched by Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (*In an Indian Abbey*). This explanation finds the ultimate ground of evil, not only its possibility but its necessity, in the essential imperfection of created being. There is to be sure no positive evil element in creatures—that would be Manichæanism; but their comparative lack of being—that negative element of non-being which essentially distinguishes the creature from the Creator—necessitates the existence of evil in the universe, and, in beings endowed with free-will, of moral evil. Hence, although there is no necessity that any one man should sin, the possibility, nay the probability, that all would sin involves the necessity that some at least

should actually do so. If we adopt this explanation, we can understand why the lack of supernatural justice must leave man, practically at least, incapable even of natural moral perfection, and it becomes clear that evil of all kinds must arise, if God should create at all. Dr. Williams entirely ignores this argument, partly, we suspect, because he denies that evil is negative. No doubt, if evil were as he thinks positive, the view just adopted would involve Manichæism. But Manichæism is already involved in Dr. Williams's doctrine that evil is a positive reality. He also seems to think that God's omnipotence involves His ability, if He willed, to create a universe in which evil could not arise. This, however, is to assume that such a universe is possible and does not involve an inherent contradiction, an assumption which Dr. Williams makes no attempt to prove. We believe, on the contrary, that no acceptable theodicy is possible which is not founded on the intrinsic impossibility of a creation without evil, the self-contradiction of a perfect imperfection.

We are surprised at Dr. Williams's assertion that according to Scotus natural good works merit grace *de condigno* (414). Scotus was not a Pelagian. *De condigno* must be a mistake for *de congruo*. To rank Luther's "conversion" with the conversions of SS. Paul and Augustine is absurd. Luther's spiritual course took the opposite direction to St. Augustine's. St. Augustine was converted from lust to purity, Luther from purity to lust. Nor do we like the use made of James's distinction between the once-born and twice-born type of character and religion. Whatever his temperament, no one who sincerely believes in regeneration and the supernatural holds a once-born type of religion. In this belief the Greek Fathers whom Dr. Williams treats as once-born were in entire agreement with the twice-born St. Augustine. And when Dr. Williams appears to identify his twice-born with introverts and mystics (331), it is for once difficult to believe that he is sure of his own meaning. He would scarcely deny that the religion of the Cappadocian Fathers—whom he regards as typical exponents of the

once-born attitude—was mystical. Dr. Williams's lectures are far indeed from an authoritative or final treatment of the Fall and of Original Sin. But they are based on wide knowledge, and are always stimulating and suggestive. If the Catholic must often disagree with the theologian, must indeed find his position fundamentally inadequate, he must respect a sincere erudite and, within the limits imposed by a naturalistic and too exclusively ethical standpoint, a well-thought-out essay. Alike as a presentation of Original Sin and as an explanation of evil the book must be pronounced a failure ; but it is among the failures which pave the way for future success.

THE VISITATION

"How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince's daughter !"
(CANT. vii. 1.)

How beautiful thy steps !
Love, uncreated, guides thy ways,
Created, hid within thee stays—
How beautiful thy steps !

How beautiful thy steps !
Each, jewelled with perfection rare,
The Angels guard in loving care.
How beautiful thy steps !

O Mary, keep my steps !
Let them be all for God, like thine.
Mother of Jesus, Mother mine,
How beautiful thy steps !

T. M.

BOOKS REVIEWED

The Passion of S. Perpetua. An English Translation with Introduction and Notes. By R. Waterville Muncey, M.A. Dent. 3s. 6d. net.

A PREFACE proclaiming the recent operations of the Holy Spirit; an introduction to a little group of martyrs at Carthage in the year 203, two of whom are then left to tell for themselves the tale of their sufferings in prison and the visions which consoled them; a return to the third person with the story of the martyrdom itself, and a great peroration to the glory of the same Spirit; such is the matter of the *Passio S. Perpetuæ*.

The Latin text in its complete form, discovered by Holsten at Monte-Cassino and first published at Rome in 1663, had in 1891 the good fortune to be edited by Dr. Armitage Robinson (*Cambridge Texts and Studies*, vol. i, No. 2). His brilliant recension, for a reprint of which we should be grateful to the Cambridge University Press, remains much the best of the various editions; and his introduction disposes, conclusively, we think, of the theory that not the Latin, but the Greek version of the *Passio* found at Jerusalem in 1889 is the original. He produces, moreover, a number of excellent reasons for identifying with Tertullian the unnamed redactor who brought the visions together and added prologue and epilogue. The evidence which he draws from style is probably sufficient; but it can be supported by certain technical considerations, hitherto, we believe, unregarded, which may perhaps be published elsewhere before long.

This earliest record of Christian martyrdom is fairly well known; and it would not be appropriate here to give a detailed account of the visions which are its greatest beauty. It is hardly necessary to add that the charge of Montanism commonly brought against the redactor of the *Passio*, perhaps with justice, can in no sense be allowed to touch the martyrs themselves, whom the Church has venerated for seventeen centuries, and two of whom, SS.

Perpetua and Felicity, are not only annually commemorated on March 6, but are named daily in the Canon of the Mass.

Mr. Waterville Muncey's little book is advertised as the first English translation of the *Passio*. It is the first complete translation to be published, but in 1900 Mr. T. H. Bindley printed a version of the greater part of it together with Tertullian's Epistle to the Gallican churches and his *Ad Martyres*. However, the canons of interpretation adopted by the two translators seem to be much the same, and there is a general stylistic kinship between the two works. Later, indeed, we shall have to regret that, though Mr. Muncey has often hit upon the same word or phrase as Mr. Bindley, the word is too infrequently the right one and the phrase too seldom felicitous; but first let us give what praise we may to the new book. It opens pleasantly with a reproduction of the mosaic of S. Perpetua at Ravenna. The introduction discusses briefly and satisfactorily the date and place of martyrdom, the authorship of the *Passio*, and its editions and MSS. We can commend the majority of the notes, which give several useful references to other documents of early Christianity; and here our satisfaction ends.

The first chapter of the translation opens with a sentence of puzzling syntax, which seems best explained as a misprint to be corrected (after Mr. Bindley's version) by the insertion of "as though" before "it" in the fourth line. Similarly in the first sentence of Chapter IV "and" should be restored before "that." "After," on p. 33, should, of course, be "alter." A sentence is omitted at the foot of p. 25 and again on p. 61.

The translation is given as from the Cambridge text, and in the main follows it, though there are three cases (*auream* for *aeream*, p. 29; *indigni* for *indigne*, p. 52; and *quem* for *quam*, p. 64) where Mr. Muncey follows a variant or conjecture as against the reading of Dr. Robinson. So far quite plausibly; but less plausible is his following of Dr. Robinson's theology as against that of St. Augustine in the article on Baptism (note on p. 37).

There seems no reason to believe that *matronaliter nupta* on p. 25 (curiously misprinted in a footnote) signifies more

than "lawfully or honourably married." On p. 44 "*percepimus promissionem*" should mean "we have received His promise"; and on the next the translation of *alii* as "those" seems an unnecessary piece of perversity. On p. 52 *nobilissimi* is a possible reading, but "*noxiis Cæsaris*" should not have been rendered "objectionable to Cæsar." On p. 53 it is clear, both from the immediate context and from what follows, that "*credente*" refers not to the "trusting" of the prisoners by their keeper, but to his conversion and "belief." And on p. 51 the translation of "*in me*" as "by my side" fails to do justice alike to the Latin use of prepositions and to the Catholic doctrine of grace.

These mistranslations, though irritating by their multiplication within so small a compass, are perhaps individually excusable. Even when Mr. Muncey seems (p. 41) to render (as did Mr. Bindley before him) *expoliata* as if it were *expolita*, we may admit he is translating some conjecture, his own or another's, to that effect; but what are we to say when we realize that Mr. Bindley (and Mr. Muncey after him) has translated (p. 23) "*proinde et hæc uetera futura quandoque sunt*" as "equally with these those ancient examples were destined sometime to be"?

Unfortunately it is not by mistranslation only that Mr. Muncey displeases; by a consistently unhappy process he has caused the atmosphere of the original entirely to disappear and reduced alike the passionate rhetoric of Tertullian and the grave simplicity of the martyrs' words to the shallow commonplaces of contemporary unthinking speech. "Why should not modern instances also be collected which are equally suitable for both purposes?" "Not one of us will hold up his head again if anything happens to you." "The people shouted out to him what amounted to a testimony of his second baptism." Who, reading such sentences as these, could conceive any idea of the dignity and pathos of the Latin?

A work like the *Passio* has particular difficulties for the translator. Abounding in quotations from the Vulgate and everywhere suggesting its influence, it must inevitably evoke here and there in any English version some echoes of

that diction which the tradition of the language associates with Biblical prose. With those echoes the whole must be consentient; yet a self-conscious archaism would betray the simplicity of the original.

Well might anyone who takes upon him such a task demand a more than usual share of consideration; and we would not seem to deny to Mr. Muncey a generally accorded indulgence which we ourselves in a like position might be glad to claim. But there are limits even to clemency. Not everyone is capable of writing stately English, but it should be possible for anyone to avoid writing untidy English. To preserve the poise of the literal and seemly may well be difficult; but to forsake the highroad of truth with no apparent prospect of stumbling upon the track of beauty is a piece of hardihood scarcely to be justified. And finally, from anyone who translates at all from a foreign tongue, we expect some assurance: first, that he does appreciate the subtleties of that tongue; secondly, that he has exerted himself reasonably to convey them into his own. W. S.

"Spanish Art," *Burlington Magazine*, Monograph II. London : Batsford. 1927. 42s. net.

A COUPLE of years ago the *Burlington Magazine* published a monograph on Chinese art which went out of print a few days after publication: now Spanish art is dealt with in similar fashion, and there can be no question as to this new volume satisfying a long-felt want. Till now, indeed, it has been impossible to find between two covers any general account of Spanish art; painting apart it has, in fact, been difficult to know where to find any trustworthy guide to most of the subjects dealt with in "Spanish Art." Now, thanks to the energy of Mr. Tatlock and his fellow-workers, we have, at any rate, an introductory review of architecture, sculpture, textiles, ceramics, wood-work and metal-work; whilst the admirable bibliography, a monument of erudition and industry, compiled by Mr. Van de Put, deputy keeper of the art library in the Victoria and Albert Museum, will enable the student to pursue his

investigations to considerable length. The letterpress throughout is lavishly illustrated, the volume containing some hundred and thirty plates, five of them coloured, comprising between them close upon three hundred illustrations.

With one exception, the article on metal-work, by Señor Don Pedro de Artinaño, the letterpress is the work of English writers; as is the case with such productions, it differs considerably in value. The two most striking papers are certainly those on architecture and Hispano-Moresque pottery, written respectively by Mr. Royall Tyler and Mr. Albert Van de Put; not only on account of their mastery of the technique of their subjects—others, for example, Mr. Kendrick (late keeper of the department of textiles in the Victoria and Albert Museum), show this—but also for their obviously extensive knowledge of Spain and things Spanish. We should like to deal at length with these two articles, but limits of space compel us to keep close to matters of especial interest to ecclesiologists. That means passing by Mr. Van de Put's article: but it is impossible to resist one quotation which bears out what has just been said, and at the same time is a delightful specimen of his profound knowledge of Spanish—one should rather say European—family history. Few probably know that the founder of more than one of the feudal houses of Spain was a Moorish or Arab prince. This is what Mr. Van de Put says of him (p. 76): "The Almohade prince Cid Abu Said, legitimate ruler of Valencia and Murcia, at the fall of [Valencia] . . . became a Christian (by name Don Vicente de Belvis) and had founded feudal houses in Aragon and Valencia ere he died in 1247."

Mr. Royall Tyler sums up an intensely interesting paper on architecture in Spain in the words: "Take both [styles] together, the native and the foreign and the country can show as brave an array of architecture, in a climate which is particularly kind to man's creations of stone, as any in the world." Elsewhere (p. 12) he points out that the three most celebrated of all Spanish churches, the cathedrals of Burgos, Toledo, and León, "have no forbears in the peninsula," and that their origin must be sought in the

royal domain of France—namely, in Paris, Bourges, Chartres, and Amiens: further that they had no effect on the subsequent trend of Spanish architecture. But it is futile to give short excerpts; the whole article must be read and the excellent illustrations which accompany it studied. Among them is an example of the double cloisters found in the peninsula, the one given, Santo Domingo at Salamanca, having the peculiarity of a glazed upper story.

In his account of Spanish metal-work, Señor Artinaño speaks of the gigantic monstres which are found here and there in Spain, and gives some curious statistics of the one at Toledo, which is of silver and weighs about three hundredweight. He also mentions the silver throne of King Martin of Aragon and gives it among his illustrations: he notes that it is at present in Barcelona Cathedral, but does not add that it is used for the throne on which the monstres rests during exposition. And, of course, he treats of and illustrates the iron screens for which Spanish churches are so famous.

Mr. Geoffrey Webb, writing of sculpture, calls attention to another common feature of Spanish churches—the retables, which, he truly says, though not exclusively Spanish, yet in Spain “enjoyed a popularity and were constructed on a scale and with a magnificence that seem to make them peculiarly her own.” One wonders why Mr. Webb describes the statue shown in his plate, 13C, as St. Bernard. The distinctive Carthusian hood makes it quite clear that it is intended for a Carthusian saint, probably St. Bruno, as the statue reproduced on the next plate, 14D.

Mr. Kendrick, among the illustrations accompanying his paper on textiles, gives us a couple of interesting chasubles: one, Spanish sixteenth century, from the Victoria and Albert Museum; the other, thirteenth century, from the Church of St. Quiriace, Provins, said to have belonged to, or been used by, St. Edmund of Canterbury. The latter might be studied by those good people who foist their sham antiques upon us as thirteenth-century patterns!

It would be interesting to know why more than one of the authors writes of the *Cartuja* of Miraflores when there

is the not unknown English equivalent *Charterhouse*. Perhaps it is to give local colour like *retablo* and *trassagrario*—one hesitates suggesting ignorance of the equivalent English terms. But, more than all, would one like to know the authority on which Mr. H. I. Kay relies for the absurd statement that in the early sixteenth century the citizens of Seville “forced the Pope to issue a decree forbidding preachers to question the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.” His credulity must be immense!

This notice is all too short, but enough has perhaps been said to show that “Spanish Art” provides matter not only for the student of Spanish art, but also for those who are interested in Spanish ecclesiology.

E. B.

International Economic and Political Problems of the Day and Some Aspects of Fascism Discussed, 1919-26. By H.E. President Tommaso Tittoni. Edited and translated by Baron Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Co., Ltd., London. 1926.

FAMILIARITY with the Italian language evidences here the difficulties of its translation, and excuses the colloquialism, “Don’t shoot the pianist, he has done his best,” applied to Baron Quaranta di San Severino’s very able presentation of Senator Tittoni’s words in the cold storage, so to say, of the English language. Our loss is unavoidable, political speeches lie under yet another disability for the reader—namely, that in more than one instance within these few years, the logic of events, a euphuism for human nature, has asserted itself somewhat otherwise than the orator anticipated. In his speech at Milan, October 12, 1920, dealing with the future of the League of Nations, Sr. Tittoni observed that “it will be comparatively easy to obtain that the small and weak states obey the decisions of the society; but will the same be done by the great nations?” The speaker answered his doubt, saying, “The future of the Society of Nations will depend in great measure upon the wisdom and goodwill of the Great Powers.” Human nature, however, true to type, answered both postulates—in 1923 in the Balkan Peninsula, and again in 1925-26, when the

admission of Germany to the Council was a burning question—in terms difficult to conciliate *prima facie* with wisdom or goodwill. The speeches dealing with Italy's financial problems (1925-26) possess, so rapidly do events move, rather a retrospective interest. They merit study, nevertheless, for their informative character concerning the policy of national monetary revaluation, which at this moment constitutes a problem of the first magnitude for Italy, inasmuch as Sr. Mussolini has refrained from taking either of the courses adopted by other states placed in a similar position. The effect of his measures yet lies in the lap of the gods, in the action which makes appeal to the faith that can move mountains and finds in Sr. Tittoni a true believer and patriot.

M. M.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Thomas Arnold.* R. J. Campbell, D.D. (Great English Churchmen Series.) Macmillan. 6s. net.
- Navies and Nations.* A review of naval developments since the Great War. Hector C. Bywater. Constable. 12s. net.
- Some People.* Harold Nicolson. Constable. 7s. 6d. net.
- The Shadow of Mussolini.* Mrs. Wilfrid Ward. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d. net.
- Ireland.* Stephen Gwynn. (Kitbag Travel Books.) Harrap. 7s. 6d. net.
- David Hume and the Miraculous.* A. E. Taylor. Cambridge University Press. 2s. 6d. net.
- The Marvellous History of St. Bernard.* Henri Ghéon. Translated into English by Barry V. Jackson. Sheed and Ward. 2s. 6d., paper; 3s. 6d., cloth.
- Twilight Songs.* Katherine Tynan. Blackwell. 5s.
- Jésus-Christ et le Mariage.* Louis Ronzic. Lethielleux.
- Poems of Father Abram Ryan.* With a Preface and Life of the poet by Rev. F. Boyle. Talbot Press. 3s. 6d. net.
- The Faith of York.* A souvenir of the thirteenth centenary of the founding of York Minster. W. P. Thurstan, B.A. Harding and More.
- The Unity of the Church and the Supremacy of Rome.* Very Rev. M. J. Legoc, O.M.I. Indian C.T.S. 6 annas.
- David Arnot.* Michael Barrington. Crosby Lockwood. 7s. 6d. net.
- The Son of Learning.* Austin Clarke. Allen and Unwin. 5s. net.
- The Priest's New Ritual.* Rev. Paul Griffith. John Murphy Co.
- Soviet Union Year Book, 1927.* A. A. Santalov and Louis Segal. Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.
- Porcelain: The Soul of Ireland.* John Mackay. Benn. 10s. 6d. net.
- The Story of the Great St. Bernard.* St. Anthony's Annals. 1s. 6d. net.
- The Aryan Origin of the Alphabet.* L. A. Waddell. Luzac and Co. 7s. 6d. net.
- Sumer-Aryan Dictionary.* Part I: A—F. L. A. Waddell. Luzac and Co. 12s. net.

- Recollections of the Irish War.* Darell Figgis. Benn. 16s. net.
- Are Mediums Really Witches? or The Vexed Question of Spiritualism.* John P. Tuoe. Wickersham Press, Lancaster, Pa. \$1.75 net.
- The Country of Sweet Bells.* Wilfred R. Childe. Swan Press. 3s. 6d. net.
- The Apple Tree.* William Kerr. Swan Press. 3s. 6d. net.
- The Immortal Rose.* Lorna Keeling Collard. Swan Press. 3s. net.
- Realities: An Anthology of Verse.* Ed. G. S. Tancred. Swan Press. 2s. net.
- The Ordinary Ways of the Spiritual Life.* Mgr. A. Farges. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s. 6d.
- Where Freedom Falters.* By the author of *The Pomp of Power*. Scribner. 16s. net.
- Richard II in Ireland (1394-5) and Submissions of the Irish Chiefs.* Edmund Curtis, M.A. Clarendon Press. 15s. net.
- Bombay Mission History: with a Special Study of the Padronado Question.* E. R. Hull, S.J. Examiner Press, Bombay.
- Chartulary of Winchester Cathedral.* Edited in English by A. W. Goodman, B.D., F.S.A. Warren and Son. 25s. net.
- The Life, Character, and Influence of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam.* J. J. Mangan, A.M., M.D. Two vols. Burns Oates and Washbourne.
- The Vision Beatific.* Rev. J. D. Walshe, S.J. Macmillan. 4s. 6d. net.
- The Book of the Microcosm.* Dorothy Una Ratcliffe. North Country Press. 5s.
- Sociality: The Art of Living Together.* Atkinson Lee. Holborn Publishing House. 5s. net.
- De Quincey: Selections.* Ed. M. R. Ridley. Clarendon Press. 3s. 6d. net.
- Cantabile: Songs and Poems.* John Caldwell-Johnston. East and West, Ltd. 5s.
- Contemplative Prayer.* The teaching of Ven. Augustine Baker thereon. Dom B. Weld Blundell. Catholic Records Press. 3s.
- General Councils and Anglican Claims.* S. Herbert Scott, D.Ph. Sheed and Ward. 1s.
- The Truth about Ireland.* N. C. West. Eason and Son. 1s.
- The Dream and Other Poems.* Richard Church. Benn. 1s.
- Midsummer Night and Other Poems.* Ianthe Jerrold. Benn. 1s.

- The League of Nations and the World's Workers.* Kathleen E. Innes, B.A. Hogarth Press. 1s. 6d.
- Coal: A Challenge to the National Conscience.* By V. A. Demant, Alan Porter and others. Hogarth Press. 2s. 6d. net.
- The Letters of Saint Teresa.* Appendix to Vol. IV. Benedictines of Stanbrook. Thomas Baker. 1s. 6d.
- Umanizziamo l'insegnamento della musica.* Ermenegildo Paccagnella. "Nuova Didattica e Pedagogia Musicale," Milano.
- How to Study a Picture.* G. F. H. Berkeley. Talbot Press. 1s.
- Much Ado about Women.* E. S. P. Haynes. Cayme Press. 3s.
- The Credibility of Herodotus' Account of Egypt.* Wilhelm Spiegelberg. Blackwell. 2s. 6d. net.
- Vie de Saint Louis de Gonzague Racontée aux Jeunes.* P. B. Fournier, S.J. Lethielleux.
- The First Contract.* A timely treatise on the Sacrament of Matrimony. Fr. Peter Canley. Author, Erie, Pa.
- Court of Conscience.* A treatise on the Sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction. Fr. Peter Canley. Author, Erie, Pa.
- The Good Shepherd.* A practical treatise on the Sacrament of Holy Orders. Fr. Peter Canley. Author, Erie, Pa.

DECISIONS OF ROMAN CONGREGATIONS

By Apostolic Letters published in the *Acta Apostolicæ Sedis* for July Apostolic Internunciatures are erected for the Republics of Latvia and Lithuania. The former Prefecture Apostolic of Labuan and North Borneo is divided into two prefectures, which take their names from Sarawak and from North Borneo respectively. Both are entrusted to the care of the Missionary Fathers of Mill Hill. The Church of Our Lady of Victories in Paris is given the title and privileges of a Minor Basilica.

In August appears a document providing for certain alterations in the boundaries of the Vicariates of Mackenzie and Athabaska, in Canada; the name of the latter is changed to Grouard. New Prefectures Apostolic are erected at Hpyeng-an in Korea and Kagoshima in Japan. The Congregation of the Holy Office publishes a decision by virtue of which Catholics are forbidden to take part in or to support congresses or associations having as their object the reunion of Christendom. The feast of St. Teresa or Lisieux is extended to the Universal Church, and is ordered to be observed annually as a lesser double on October 3, with the Mass and Office of the Common of Virgins, save for the Collect and the Lessons of the Second Nocturn, which are proper.

The September issue of the *Acta* announces the raising of the status of the Prefecture of Lang-Long in China to that of a Vicariate Apostolic; a new prefecture of Keng-Tung is erected in Burma, and the name of the Vicariate of Eastern Burma is changed to Tungu. In Java a portion of the territory of the Batavia Vicariate is separated to become the new Prefecture of Malang.

Autumn Books

STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MYSTICS

By JOSEPH MARECHAL, S.J., Professor of Psychology at the Jesuit Philosophical and Theological College at Louvain. Translated with an introductory Foreword by ALGAR THOROLD. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.

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